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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A substantial literature has emerged to describe teachers’ systematic labor patterns. A 
fundamental assumption of this literature has been that teacher turnover occurs between school 
years. I examine the tenability of this assumption using rich administrative data from North 
Carolina that enable me to measure teacher turnover not only as an annual event but as occurring 
at any month throughout the school year. Documenting the teacher turnover that occurs within 
school year allows for a more complete and accurate picture of how this instability occurs not 
just between school years, but during the school year as well. If within-year turnover is a low-
frequency event and evenly spread among all types of schools, then, it may not be necessary to 
do more than document when, where, by whom, and the extent to which it occurs. Yet, if within-
year turnover is a frequent occurrence or occurs disproportionately at underserved schools, 
within-year turnover may adversely affect students as well as their administrators who are forced 
to find a replacement teacher in the middle of the school year. 
Each of the studies in this dissertation, demarcated as chapters, address a different 
element of within-year teacher turnover. In the first study, I begin by describing the frequency 
with which within-year teacher turnover occurs, including measuring the extent to which other 
measures of teacher turnover misidentify the true frequency with which teachers turn over by 
overlooking within-year turnover. I then consider the teacher and school characteristics 
associated with higher levels of within-year turnover. I also identify the ways in which within-
year turnover patterns resemble or differ from end-of-year turnover. 
Unlike this first study that focuses on all public school teachers in North Carolina, the 
second study attends to novice teacher turnover. In this paper, I argue that an increasingly less 
	 2 
experienced teacher labor force who have entered teaching from more varied entry pathways 
appear to be feeding a new dynamic whereby novice teachers begin their career in schools with 
higher concentrations of economically disadvantaged and racial/ethnic minority students. As 
these schools tend to have more challenging working conditions, teachers new to the profession 
risk becoming demoralized, leading to higher turnover, even during the school year. The unique 
contribution of this study is the use of survival analysis to model turnover monthly throughout 
the year, rather than as a single annual event occurring at one point in time. This approach allows 
me to understand how differences in the timing of novice teacher turnover across teacher entry 
pathway and school characteristics. 
The final study shifts the focus from the teacher and school characteristics that predict 
within-year turnover to the impact that such turnover has on students. This study conceptualizes 
teacher turnover as harming student achievement through three distinct mechanisms: (1) staff 
instability; (2) classroom disruption; (3) differences in quality of replacement and replaced 
teacher. The destabilizing effect of teacher turnover is likely greater when turnover occurs during 
the school year than at the end of the year. Yet, within-year teacher turnover is likely to be most 
detrimental for the students assigned to the teacher who leaves midyear. In addition to the 
disruptive effect of losing their teacher, the replacement teacher may be a long-term substitute or 
be hired from a pool of less qualified teachers. This paper relies on a variety of fixed effects 
models to identify differences in the effect of turnover depending on the timing in the school 
year and organizational unit in which it occurs. 
Taken together, the three studies in this dissertation add breadth to the policy discourse 
surrounding teacher turnover. In the literature, teacher turnover is treated as occurring between 
the end of one school year and the beginning of the next. Yet, if the underlying factors which 
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predict within- versus end-of-year turnover differ, policy levers to address this problem may also 
differ, depending on the timing of turnover. For instance, compared to teacher incentive 
programs that reward teachers in the subsequent school year, loss aversion may be exploited by 
asking teachers to give back money if they do not remain in their school. Examining teachers’ 
employment status every month increases our understanding of turnover as an ongoing 
management problem that schools, their leaders, and staff must contend with, rather than an 
annual recruitment and hiring activity.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FREQUENCY OF TEACHER TURNOVER: 
CONSIDERING WITHIN-YEAR TURNOVER 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite the overwhelming impact of teachers on student learning (Chetty, Friedman, & 
Rockoff, 2013; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004), more qualified and effective 
teachers are less likely to teach the students most in need (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2015; 
Steele, Pepper, Springer, & Lockwood, 2015). To understand the factors that contribute to this 
entrenched pattern in the teacher labor market, a substantial research base describes the factors 
most strongly related to teacher turnover. Research has shown that teachers are more likely to 
move from high-poverty schools with high concentrations of low-income students and 
traditionally underserved racial/ethnic groups, which also tend to have more challenging working 
conditions at the classroom and school level (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Guarino, Santibañez, & 
Daley, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001). This positive sorting, whereby the most effective teachers are 
matched with higher performing students, leaves the students most in need strong instructional 
support with less exposure to high quality teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Goldhaber 
et al., 2015; Kalogrides, Loeb, & Beteille, 2013). 
A limitation of this research base is that it assumes teacher turnover only occurs between 
school years. Researchers have operationalized the measurement of teacher turnover with little 
direct attention to the turnover that occurs during the school year. Some researchers count 
teachers in the spring of one year who are not present the following fall (e.g. Clotfelter, Glennie, 
Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008). Others identify whether and where a teacher is employed based on their 
active employment in October or November, compared to their employment status in the same 
month in the previous year (Allensworth, Ponisciak, & Mazzeo, 2009; Ronfeldt, Loeb, & 
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Wyckoff, 2013). While examination of year-to-year turnover has produced several important 
findings, turnover within the school year, for example when beginning teachers find teaching too 
stressful or when teachers transfer to other schools, may have even greater effects on student 
outcomes. Anecdotal information about within-year teacher turnover based on principal reports 
and teachers’ comments has become more common, but the magnitude and nature of this 
phenomena have yet to be quantified. We begin to address this gap in the study presented in this 
manuscript. 
Within-year teacher turnover has five potential consequences that make it important to 
quantify it generally and then to examine the extent to which it disproportionally affects high 
poverty, low achieving schools. First, turnover during the school year may be particularly 
disruptive to students, as this turnover undermines instructional continuity and student-teacher 
relationships within the classroom. Second, when teachers leave mid-year, their students may be 
assigned long-term substitutes while the school hires a replacement. Also, the supply of mid-year 
hires may leave less qualified teachers to replace the teacher who left. Third, in addition to the 
direct impact on the students who face this disruption, turnover undermines amassed social 
capital, which forms the basis of collegiality between school staff (Johnson, Kraft, & Papay, 
2012; Simon & Johnson, 2015). Fourth, current measures of teacher turnover may substantially 
underestimate teacher turnover by not addressing within-year turnover and any bias seems likely 
to be greater in the schools that experience the highest within-year turnover.  Fifth, if within-year 
teacher turnover occurs disproportionately at schools with high concentrations of low-income 
students and underrepresented minorities, administrators at these schools may be forced to 
dedicate their time and effort to staff teacher vacancies in classrooms that may have been better 
spent on instructional improvements. The literature describes a segment of high turnover schools 
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plagued by instability, the erosion of professional norms, and the absence of mentors for new 
teachers, which may be distracted from improvement efforts by the need to recruit and fill mid-
year teacher vacancies (Ingersoll, 2001; Loeb, Darling-Hammond, & Luczak, 2005) and depress 
student outcomes. Documenting the teacher turnover that occurs within school year allows for a 
more complete and accurate picture of how this instability occurs not just between school years, 
but during the school year as well.  
However, if within-year turnover is a low-frequency event and evenly spread among all 
types of schools, then, it may not be necessary to do more than document when, where, by 
whom, and the extent to which it occurs. During the school year, teacher transfer may relate 
primarily to districts’ needs to ensure that all schools are adequately staffed based on shifting 
student enrollments. In contrast, research on end-of-year teacher sorting has shown how teachers 
are more likely to move from schools with high concentrations of students of color and weak 
leadership (Ingersoll, 2001; Ladd, 2011; Schweig, 2014). 
 In this paper, we describe the frequency with which within-year teacher turnover occurs 
and the types of teacher and school characteristics associated with higher levels of this type of 
turnover that has not been addressed in prior research. Building off of the substantial research on 
the dynamics of teacher labor markets, we also seek to identify the ways in which within-year 
turnover patterns resemble or differ from end-of -year turnover. We address three main research 
questions: 
1) To what extent do teachers turn over during the school year? How does this within-year 
turnover rate compare to end-of -year turnover? 
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2) What are the teacher background characteristics, school demographic characteristics, and 
working conditions of teachers who leave during the school year? How do these 
characteristics compare to end-of-year turnover? 
3) To what extent do the background characteristics of the teachers or the characteristics of 
their schools predict within-year turnover? How do the predictors of within- and end-of-
year turnover compare? 
The following section summarizes previous research on teacher turnover and discusses the ways 
in which this body of research may apply to within-year turnover. In doing so, we focus on 
teacher background characteristics and school demographic characteristics and working 
conditions. We then describe the sample of teachers used for this study, the data, and the 
methods.  
Literature Review 
Characterizing Within-Year Turnover 
One of the first challenges in understanding within-year turnover is describing the ways 
in which it is similar to and different from the turnover that occurs between school years. Similar 
to end-of-year turnover, within-year turnover consists of teachers moving between schools 
(“movers”) and leaving teaching (“leavers”). However, it is different from between year turnover 
in that teachers may leave and return to the same school during the year (“returners”). 
Also, teacher turnover may be voluntary or involuntary. In contrast to moving schools at 
the end of the school year, moving schools within the year may be more likely to be involuntary, 
particularly when it occurs in the same district. Involuntary within-year transfers may be 
primarily in response to shifting student enrollment patterns that require a teacher hired at one 
school to transfer to another school in the district. These staffing decisions tend to be seniority-
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based, although there is variation across district policy within states (Koski & Horng, 2007), with 
some districts able to make more strategic transfers (Grissom, Loeb, & Nakashima, 2013). 
Among the three largest districts in North Carolina, the site of the current study, data from the 
National Council on Teacher Quality (2013) show that Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Guilford 
County Schools place more of an emphasis on seniority whereas Wake County Schools assigns 
teachers in the “best interests” of the district, although Charlotte-Mecklenburg adopted a 
discretionary layoff policy during layoffs following the Great Recession (Kraft, 2015). With 
most within-year, within-district moving attributable to involuntary transfer, most voluntary 
moves occur when teachers move to different districts within the state. 
In contrast to switching schools mid-year, leaving the teaching profession during the 
school year would appear to be primarily voluntary as the most common involuntary reason for 
leaving teaching—contract nonrenewal—tends to occur at the end of the school year. An 
additional exception to this pattern may be staff reductions following the Great Recession, which 
may have occurred during the school year or non-renewals at the end of the school year. When 
teachers voluntarily leave during the school year, it is likely rooted in intense dissatisfaction with 
teaching. Research suggests teacher dissatisfaction and exit of the teacher workforce is linked to 
working conditions, to the extent that school conditions inhibit teachers’ ability to develop 
professionally (Horng, 2009; Johnson, Kraft, & Papay, 2012; Kraft & Papay, 2014). Early career 
teachers may be particularly sensitive to the influence of classroom and school working 
conditions when making their decision to leave their school and the profession (Smith & 
Ingersoll, 2004).  
The final type of teacher turnover analyzed in this paper includes teachers who 
temporarily leave their school for a part of the year and return to the same school either in the 
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current year or next. The turnover patterns of these returners has generally been overlooked in 
studies of the teacher labor market. One exception is Grissom and Reininger’s (2012) study of 
the personnel, work, and family factors associated with teachers’ return to teaching. Drawing on 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort, they find approximately half of 
teachers who left teaching to re-enter the profession within ten years of their exit. Of teachers 
who leave and return, 48 percent of these teachers return after one-year outside the profession, 
with another 19 percent returning after the second year. In survival analysis, they find female, 
younger, better paid, and more experienced teachers are more likely to reenter when controlling 
for a range of teacher characteristics. Whereas these authors examined teachers who exit the 
profession for at least one year, we focus on teachers who returned after a minimum of a month-
long spell out of the classroom. With no information on school characteristics, they were not able 
to document the types of schools in which these returners work. Studies on teacher absences, 
which may be related to leaving and returning within a year, find higher absentee rates in schools 
with higher concentrations of low-income students (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2009; Miller, 
Murnane, & Willett, 2007). We now turn to the broader teacher turnover literature to link within-
year turnover with the body of literature on the factors predictive of end-of-year turnover. 
Teacher Turnover Literature 
The teacher turnover literature has coalesced on a set of central findings related to the 
teacher and school characteristics most predictive of turnover (Borman & Dowling, 2008; 
Guarino et al., 2006). The literature distinguishes between teacher background characteristics, 
school demographic characteristics, and school working conditions as all having an important 
influence on teachers’ decision to remain in their current school, move schools, or leave 
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how teacher, classroom, and school characteristics may predict within-year teacher turnover. 
Recognizing that this literature is built around understanding end-of-year turnover, we note areas 
in which teacher and school characteristics may predict within-year teacher turnover differently 
than end-of-year turnover.  
Among teacher demographic characteristics, research on end-of-year turnover has found 
that men are more likely to leave teaching (Borman & Dowling, 2008), although women may be 
more likely to temporarily leave and re-enter following child rearing (Grissom and Reininger, 
2012). White teachers have generally been found to turnover at higher rates (Ingersoll, 2001, 
Kirby, Berend, & Naftel, 1999; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004), although more recent research 
suggests a reversal of the pattern with higher turnover rates among teachers of color, particularly 
Black teachers (Ingersoll, 2015). Regarding teacher age, researchers have come to identify a U-
shaped distribution of attrition and age and experience, with both the youngest and oldest 
teachers most likely to turnover (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Guarino, et al., 2006). Of this set of 
teacher characteristics, there is no indication that systematic differences would exist when 
comparing end-of-year and within-year turnover. 
Outside of teacher retirements, end-of-year teacher turnover is most likely to occur at the 
beginning of teachers’ careers (Ingersoll, Merrill, & Stuckey, 2014). There are reasons to believe 
that within-year teacher turnover occurs at similarly higher rates among new teachers. Through 
inverse-seniority policies—so called “Last in, First Out”—new teachers are most likely to be laid 
off as part of staffing cuts (Goldhaber & Theobald, 2013), which may occur over the summer or, 
perhaps with less frequency, during the school year. Seniority policies may also shape the 
transfer for teachers within a district, with novice teachers more likely to be transferred mid-year 
to meet staffing needs within the district. New teachers may also be more likely to leave teaching 
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during the school year in comparison to their more experienced colleagues. With less time 
invested in their careers, when faced with the demands of acculturation into the teaching 
profession, demoralization or burnout may lead to premature exit. New alternate entry and out-
of-state prepared teachers may be at a particular risk to this within-year turnover as the 
opportunity costs associated with entry into teaching are much lower than teachers from 
traditional pathways, especially within the same state (Bastian & Henry, 2014; Redding & Smith, 
2016). 
 Among school characteristics, researchers have described systematic patterns in the 
teacher labor market where teachers more frequently transfer out of under-resourced urban 
schools with high concentrations of low-income students and traditionally underserved 
racial/ethnic groups (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). For instance, Hanushek and 
colleagues’ (2004) observe a strong relationship between schools with higher rates of free or 
reduced price lunch (FRPL), lower achievement levels, and higher minority student enrollments 
and higher turnover rates in public schools in Texas.1 However, this study and others drawing on 
administrative data tend not to include measures of school working conditions. Without 
controlling for school working conditions, these estimates would likely be upwardly biased to the 
extent to which working conditions are negatively correlated with greater poverty, lower 
performance and minority student enrollment. Several papers offer a corrective, controlling for a 
range of teacher-reported working conditions.  
Leadership—either at the administrative level or distributed among teachers—tends to be 
particularly important in teachers’ retention decisions. Using data from the Schools and Staffing 
																																																						
1 The notable exception to this pattern is that for Black teachers, as the percentage of black students increases, black 
teachers are increasingly more likely to stay. (Kirby, Berends, & Nattel, 1999). Congruence between teacher and 
principal race is also associated with lower turnover rates (Grissom & Keiser, 2011). 
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Survey, Grissom (2011) finds a positive association between principal effectiveness and teacher 
retention, particularly for schools in the highest quartile of Black or Hispanic students or 
economically disadvantaged students. Similarly, in New York City, Boyd and colleagues (2011) 
report that administrator support is the most influential school characteristic in retaining teachers. 
In North Carolina, Ladd (2011) also finds principal leadership to be predictive of planned and 
actual movement between schools. Yet, when Schweig (2014) re-estimates teacher survey 
responses using multilevel exploratory factor analysis to account for shared variance in the error 
term associated with multiple respondents in the same school, he finds distributed leadership to 
be a stronger predictor of intended departure than school leadership. Other studies have affirmed 
the importance of distributed leadership, finding that teacher influence over school decisions 
(Allensworth, Ponisciak, & Mazzeo, 2009; Ingersoll, 2001) and more opportunities for teacher 
collaboration (Smith & Ingersoll, 2004) are associated with lower turnover rates, particularly 
among novice teachers. In addition to these social conditions, student conflict is predictive of 
higher turnover rates (Boyd et al., 2011; Ingersoll, 2001). 
From this literature, we identify a series of hypotheses that we believe are related to 
within-year turnover. Among teacher background characteristics, we expect younger and older, 
white, male, alternate entry teachers, out-of-state, and teachers with less experience to turnover 
during the school year at higher rates. We also predict that teachers most likely to leave within 
the school year work in schools with higher concentrations of economically disadvantaged 
students and traditionally underserved racial/ethnic groups as well as schools with more difficult 
working conditions. Among within-year movers, we expect that they will be more likely to work 
in large, urban districts and will be most responsive to difficult school working conditions. 
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Finally, we predict that returners are more likely to be female and work in low-income, high 
minority schools.  
Study Sample 
 This study aims to characterize the frequency of within-year teacher turnover and 
describe the teacher and school characteristics associated with within-year turnover. We draw on 
administrative data from the state of North Carolina from the 2008-2009 to the 2014-2015 school 
years. The analytic sample includes all full-time teachers in traditional public schools from 
kindergarten through twelfth grades. From this sample, we exclude teachers assigned to multiple 
schools. After limiting the sample to full-time teachers assigned to one school who are not 
missing data on teacher, classroom, or school characteristics, the total sample includes 145,441 
unique teacher observations and 445,641 teacher-year observations. 
Study Data 
Outcome Variables 
For each of these teachers, we create variables for six types of turnover: (1) stayer, (2) 
within-year mover, (3) end-of-year mover, (4) returner, (5) within-year leaver, and (6) end-of-
year leaver. Stayers remained in their school throughout the year and return the following year. 
Within-year movers changed schools before the end of the school year. End-of-year movers 
changed schools between the end of one school year and the beginning of the next. Returners 
temporarily exited teaching for at least one month before returning to their current school. While 
we would ideally define within-year leavers as those who left the profession, due to data 
limitations, we define them as those who left teaching in the public schools of North Carolina 
during the school year. Because of the same data limitation, the inability to follow teachers who 
leave North Carolina for positions in other states, we define end-of-year leavers as those who left 
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teaching in North Carolina after the end of one school year and prior to the beginning of the next. 
To construct these different categories, we draw on monthly teacher pay files, which give 
detailed information on where a teacher is paid for working in a given month. This data allows us 
to identify when in the school year a teacher moved, returned, or left their school. To ensure that 
this measure of teacher turnover is mutually exclusive, we code a teacher’s first transition. For 
instance, if a teacher moved schools and then left teaching at the end of the school year, this 
variable would code a teacher as a within-year mover. A limitation of this approach is that it 
overlooks any teachers who turned over at multiple points within the same year. 
To understand differences in the predictors of within- and end-of-year turnover, we also 
create more general measures of within-year and end-of-year turnover. These two measures 
include moving and leaving. In these analyses, teachers who temporarily leave and return are 
excluded from the analysis. 
Independent Variables of Interest 
This analysis utilizes a range of teacher, classroom, and school variables to better 
understand the factors associated with these various types of teacher turnover. These variables 
are listed in Table A1. They include teacher background characteristics, school demographic 
characteristics, and school working conditions. These variables help us to understand the types of 
teacher and school characteristics predictive of higher probabilities of within-year teacher 
turnover.  
 We draw on a variety of teacher background characteristics, including teacher 
experience, gender, race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, and other non-White teachers), age, and 
indicators of teachers’ entry pathway into teaching (alternate entry, Teacher For America (TFA), 
out-of-state prepared, and Other, including Visiting International Faculty and teachers from 
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unclassifiable entry pathways). To account for nonlinearities in the relationship between teacher 
experience and turnover, is separated into five categories: 0-2 years of experience, 3-5 years, 6-
10 years, 11-20 year, and more than 20 years. We also create a categorical variable of teacher 
age: 25 years old and younger, 26 to 30 years old, 31-40 years old, 41-50 years old, 51-60 years 
old, and over 60 years old. 
School-level variables include indicators for the school level (elementary, middle, or high 
school) and urbancity (city, suburb, rural, and town). Additional variables are the average student 
enrollment, total per-pupil expenditures, the percent of students receiving free lunch, and the 
percent of Black and Hispanic students. We examine differences in school quality with an 
overall performance composite measure (the number of state accountability tests passed divided 
by the number of tests taken). The final measures of school climate include the reported violent 
rates per 1,000 students, the short-term suspension per 100 students, and the percentage of 
teachers with 3 years of experience or less. We also add a variable for the local education agency 
(LEA) teacher salary supplement, the main district-to-district source of variation in teachers’ 
salaries in the data given North Carolina’s statewide teacher salary schedule. 
In addition to these school demographic characteristics, we also add descriptive variables 
compiled from teacher responses to the biennial Teacher Working Conditions (TWC) survey 
measuring leadership characteristics, distribution of decision-making, teacher empowerment, and 
facilities and resources. In years the survey was conducted, we use confirmatory factor analysis 
to generate these four factors that have been used previously in the literature (e.g. Ladd, 2011; 
Schweig, 2014). Each factor had moderate to high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha 
ranging from 0.79 to 0.93, depending on the year (see Table A1). As the survey was conducted 
every other year, for off years, we impute the school-level average from the previous year. 
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Methods 
 This study seeks to answer three research questions. The first research question aims to 
understand the frequency of within-year turnover. We describe the annual frequency of within-
year turnover, contrasting it to between-year turnover. In answering this question, we provide 
evidence of the extent to which conventional measures of teacher turnover attenuate the overall 
turnover rate by overlooking the prevalence of teacher turnover during the school year. To 
investigate the issue of attenuation, we report on annual teacher turnover rates, breaking down 
the frequency of overall school turnover into teachers who turn over during the school year and 
at the end of the school year. For comparison to other studies, we also construct another annual 
turnover measure used in earlier studies based on a teacher’s active employment in October in 
year t compared to their employment status in the same month in year t+1. We then calculate the 
percentage of teachers who were identified as moving or leaving schools with the end-of-year 
and October-to-October turnover measures to document the extent to which conventional 
estimates of moving schools or leaving teaching have attenuated these types of teacher mobility 
by overlooking within-year turnover. 
The second research question looks at descriptive evidence of the differences in the 
teacher, classroom, and school characteristics between teachers who remain in their school, 
move, leave or return during the school year, and move or leave at the end of the school year. 
 The third research question asks about the extent to which teacher, classroom, and school 
characteristics predict within-year turnover. To contrast the predictors of within- and end-of-year 
turnover, we first run a series of logistic regression models predicting within-year turnover and 
end-of-year turnover compared to staying in the same school. This models take the simplified 
form: 
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 Pr #$%&'()% *+, = ).1 + ). (1) 
where 1 = 	34 +	356* +	+	378+ + 9, 
is the odds that teacher i turned over from school j in year k as a function of their background 
characteristics (6*) and a vector including school context and working conditions (8+). Models 
include year fixed effects (9,) to account time-specific correlates of turnover. In the first series 
of models, #$%&'()% is coded as a binary variable where one indicates within-year movers and 
leavers and zero indicates teachers who remained in their school during their school and at the 
end of the school year. The second series of models code #$%&'()% equal to one for end-of-year 
movers and leavers and zero for teachers who remained in their school throughout the year and 
returned the following year. Standard errors are clustered at the teacher level to account for 
repeated observations of the same teacher. 
 We extend these models by comparing within-year movers, end-of-year 
movers, returners, within-year leavers, and end-of-year leavers to the teachers who stay in their 
school in a given school year. We estimate this model using multinomial logistic regression, with 
estimates reported in reference to teachers who remained in their school. 
Results 
Frequency of Within-Year Turnover 
 We find that slightly less than four percent of teachers turn over during each school year, 
which compares with 13.4% of teachers turning over at the end-of-year, as we report in Table 1. 
As the average North Carolina school employs approximately forty teachers, this means that, on 
average, each school loses at least one teacher during the year. Within-year turnover may result 
from demoralized novice teachers leaving teaching before the end of the year, involuntarily 
transfer or dismissal, maternity or other health leave of absence, and retirements, all of which,  
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Table 1. Attenuation in Annual Measures of Teacher Mobility   
Overall teacher turnover      
Overall Within-year End-of-year 
October-to-
October      
17.09 3.84 13.41 15.89      
  
 
       
Movers      
Overall Within-year End-of-year 
October-to-
October      
8.80 1.72 7.24 7.60      
 
 
        
Leavers      
Overall Within-year End-of-year 
October-to-
October      
8.29 2.12 6.17 8.29      
Notes. Observations = 436,945 
 
we suspect, significantly disrupt students’ learning opportunities. In addition to the negative 
effect on students, within-year turnover leads to a non-trivial attenuation of the magnitude of 
teacher turnover and minimize attention to within-year teacher turnover, which may have more 
significant consequences than end-of-year turnover. First, the 3.84% of teachers to turn over 
during the school year accounts for 22.47% of total turnover, with traditional measures of 
turnover attenuated to 77.53 percent of their true value. Second, when within-year turnover is 
overlooked, as is the case when turnover is measured at the end of the school year, it 
underestimates the true frequency of turnover. We find that comparing teachers’ employment 
status from the end of one school year to the beginning of the next underestimates the true 
frequency of turnover by 17.7%.  The October-to-October measure of turnover more accurately 
represents annual teacher mobility, as it does not miss within-year turnover to the same extent 
that end-of-year turnover measures do. October-to-October measures of moving capture the 
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mobility that occurs in year t as well as the first couple of months of t+1. However, this measure 
under-estimates moving by 7.02%, attenuating turnover to 92.98% of its true value. 
 When within-year movers are omitted, the movement of teachers between schools risks 
being overlooked by conventional measures of teacher turnover. By comparing teacher’s 
employment status at the end of one school year to the beginning of the next, we find that 7.24% 
of teachers moved schools, as shown in the second panel of Table 1. This overlooks the 1.72% of 
teachers to move during the school year, attenuating the true frequency of moving by 17.73% to 
82.27% of its true value. October-to-October measures of teachers’ movement to other schools 
better capture this within-year dynamic, only attenuating turnover to 86.36% of its true value.  
 Omitting within-year teacher turnover attenuates measures of leaving teaching less than 
measures of moving. The source of mismeasurement for leaving is in terms of the timing. By 
observing leaving during the school year, we demonstrate that a quarter of leaving occurs during 
the school year. Whereas 6.17% of teachers leave teaching at the end of the year, 2.12% leave 
before the end of the academic year. As conventional end-of-year measures of leaving still 
identify that a teacher had left, the timing would be incorrectly attributed to between year leaving 
rather than including within-year leaving, which is likely more detrimental to the students, 
teachers and administrators who lost a teacher midyear. 
 To further probe the issue of timing, we present monthly turnover frequencies in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 plots the percentage of teachers to move schools or leave teacher in a given month 
during the school year. Teachers are most likely to move schools at the beginning of the school 
year. 0.56% of teachers move schools during the first month of the school year and 0.35% move 
in the second month. In other periods, only approximately 0.2% of teachers move schools, with a 
slight jump in January and February. These months in the middle of the school year are  
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Figure 1. Monthly Frequency of Within-Year Teacher Turnover 
 
the period when the most teachers leave teaching during the school year, with 0.45% and 0.42% 
leaving in January and February, respectively. Besides the higher rates of moving schools at the 
start of the school year, teachers leave teaching during the year more often than they move 
between schools. As turnover is not evenly distributed across teachers or schools, in the next 
section, we characterize the teacher and school characteristics most strongly related to within- 
and end-of-year turnover. 
Characterizing Within- and End-of-Year Turnover 
In this section we present the descriptive and associational evidence and the analysis of 
turnover patterns from our second and third research questions. First we describe the results for 
teacher race/ethnicity, gender, experience and age, and entry pathway. We then report on the 
following school characteristics: minority student enrollment, economically disadvantaged  
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Table 2. Conditional Means and Frequencies, by Turnover Status 
  Stayer 
Within-
year 
mover 
Within-
year 
leaver 
End-of-
year 
mover 
End-of-
year 
leaver 
Temporary 
Exit and 
Return 
Teaching experience (years) 12.47 11.02 13.41 9.67 13.43 10.79 
0-2 years experience 71.77 2.37 3.27 11.99 9.93 0.67 
3-5 years experience 77.09 2.17 2.85 9.39 7.45 1.05 
6-10 years experience 81.15 2.13 2.24 8.39 5.12 0.97 
11-20 years experience 86.31 1.70 1.56 6.55 3.49 0.39 
20+ years experience 78.40 1.66 3.78 5.15 10.44 0.56 
Male	 79.74	 2.06	 2.89	 8.06	 6.96	 0.28	
Female 79.79 1.80 2.74 7.93 7.03 0.72 
White 80.50 1.67 2.73 7.55 6.93 0.62 
Black 76.47 2.82 2.88 10.10 7.07 0.64 
Hispanic 74.62 2.30 3.57 9.59 9.07 0.86 
Other race 77.05 2.19 3.16 8.78 8.10 0.73 
In-state, traditional preparation 81.86 1.80 2.26 7.63 5.79 0.66 
Alternate entry 78.51 2.64 2.41 9.71 6.04 0.69 
Teacher For America 55.37 1.37 3.64 8.69 30.62 0.31 
Out-of-state prepared 78.02 1.89 3.28 7.64 8.41 0.76 
Other 80.14 1.92 3.03 6.55 7.81 0.55 
Age (years) 40.73 39.54 43.71 37.76 42.33 38.42 
< 26 years old 73.22 2.04 2.17 12.64 9.50 0.43 
26-30 years old 75.50 2.08 3.10 9.76 8.52 1.04 
31-40 years old 81.40 2.02 2.26 8.37 5.13 0.82 
41-50 years old 85.88 1.65 1.60 7.07 3.51 0.30 
51-60 years old 80.39 1.63 3.59 5.70 8.21 0.48 
60+ years of age 62.37 1.63 8.52 4.47 22.13 0.63 
School size (100s) 7.91 7.75 8.05 7.39 7.89 7.88 
City 77.91 2.14 3.08 8.34 7.78 0.75 
Rural 80.91 1.85 2.43 7.79 6.41 0.61 
Town 80.13 2.06 2.48 8.16 6.52 0.65 
Suburb 82.34 1.75 2.25 6.71 6.14 0.81 
Elementary school 80.87 1.68 2.21 7.88 6.60 0.76 
Middle School 78.84 2.12 2.82 8.57 7.06 0.59 
High School 76.83 2.98 4.41 7.81 7.16 0.81 
% economically disadvantaged 56.15 61.42 59.13 61.69 58.50 55.66 
% White students 51.99 42.42 45.40 44.46 46.97 49.11 
% Black students 26.46 34.93 31.93 32.90 30.72 28.47 
% Hispanic students 13.64 14.86 14.62 14.83 14.40 14.53 
% other race 7.91 7.79 8.05 7.81 7.91 7.88 
Violent acts rate 7.98 10.51 9.70 9.53 8.94 7.95 
Suspension rate 17.51 25.26 22.47 23.16 20.40 17.36 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less 19.82 22.80 22.51 22.34 21.91 21.08 
Overall performance composite 66.21 63.38 60.93 62.31 62.47 67.62 
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Per pupil expenditures 8.50 9.17 8.73 8.80 8.64 8.75 
Teacher salary supplement 3.35 3.44 3.49 3.34 3.46 3.58 
Facilities and Resources (std) -0.08 -0.24 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.12 
Distributed leadership (std) -0.13 -0.28 -0.24 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 
Principal leadership (std) -0.14 -0.33 -0.30 -0.32 -0.25 -0.19 
Professional development (std) -0.10 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.09 
Notes. Observations = 445,641. Conditional means presented for continuous variables. 
Conditional frequencies presented for categorical and binary variables.   
 
student enrollment, overall school performance, school working conditions, and other notable 
school characteristics. For each teacher and school characteristic, we first describe overall 
differences between within- and end-of-year turnover before reporting differences in terms of 
within-year and end-of-year turnover before decomposing turnover into the five types listed 
above. 
Teacher Race/Ethnicity 
In Table 2, we find that Black and Hispanic teachers are more likely to turnover than 
White teachers. 19.50% of White teachers turn over annually compared to 23.53% of Black 
teachers, and 25.38% of Hispanic teachers. In Table 3, before controlling for school 
characteristics, the odds of within-year and end-of-year turnover for Black teachers are 
considerably greater compared to white teachers (1.34 and 1.26, respectively). When school 
controls are added, we find no evidence of a difference in within- or end-of-year turnover 
between Black and White teachers. We see a similar story for Hispanic teachers in terms of 
within-year turnover but not end-of-year turnover. Even when controlling for school 
characteristics, the odds of end-of-year turnover for Hispanic teachers are 17% greater than 
White teachers. 
Table 2 also shows that the descriptively higher turnover rates for Black teachers are 
driven by moving schools, both during and at the end of the school year. 2.82% of Black teachers 
move midyear compared to only 1.67% of White teacher. At the end of the school year, 10.10%  
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Estimates of Within- and End-of-Year Teacher Turnover  
                                                   Within-year turnover End-of-year turnover 
0-2 years experience 2.05*** 1.79*** 1.78*** 1.62*** 
 (25.23) (19.65) (32.84) (27.13) 
3-5 years experience 1.37*** 1.34*** 1.34*** 1.30*** 
 (11.75) (10.75) (18.47) (16.43) 
11-20 years experience 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 
 (-17.59) (-18.01) (-23.41) (-22.31) 
20+ years experience 0.87*** 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.94*** 
 (-4.98) (-8.05) (-4.46) (-3.43) 
Female                                             0.97 1.11*** 1.02* 1.04** 
                                                   (-1.86) (5.27) (1.97) (3.26) 
Black                                              1.33*** 0.97 1.26*** 1.00 
                                                   (13.32) (-1.10) (17.22) (0.15) 
Hispanic                                           1.27*** 1.02 1.28*** 1.17*** 
                                                   (4.35) (0.41) (7.29) (4.58) 
Other race                                         1.16*** 1.00 1.10*** 1.02 
                                                   (3.40) (-0.04) (3.62) (0.69) 
Alternate entry                                    1.20*** 0.96 1.24*** 1.17*** 
                                                   (7.80) (-1.70) (15.50) (10.98) 
Teacher For America                                  1.55*** 0.85 2.88*** 1.95*** 
                                                   (4.40) (-1.56) (27.48) (16.84) 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.29*** 1.27*** 1.30*** 1.28*** 
                                                   (14.40) (12.98) (25.20) (22.89) 
Other                                              1.16*** 1.04 1.20*** 1.16*** 
                                                   (4.17) (1.00) (8.44) (7.00) 
< 26 years old 1.62*** 1.60*** 1.04 1.03 
 (13.86) (13.26) (1.89) (1.72) 
26-30 years old 1.80*** 1.83*** 0.97 0.97 
 (16.09) (16.06) (-1.50) (-1.36) 
31-40 years old 1.49*** 1.52*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 
 (9.90) (10.30) (-9.68) (-9.71) 
51-60 years old 2.60*** 2.51*** 1.14*** 1.11*** 
 (23.16) (21.80) (5.41) (4.30) 
60+ years of age 6.35*** 5.64*** 2.75*** 2.66*** 
 (39.37) (35.74) (35.26) (33.77) 
School size (100s)                                  0.95***  0.97*** 
                                                    (-22.22)  (-19.08) 
City                                                1.04  0.99 
                                                    (1.20)  (-0.50) 
Rural                                               1.04  1.01 
                                                    (1.28)  (0.75) 
Town                                                0.97  0.99 
                                                    (-0.84)  (-0.70) 
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Middle school  2.39***  1.12*** 
  (38.60)  (9.31) 
High school  5.34***  1.16*** 
  (77.65)  (13.46) 
% economically disadvantaged                       0.999  0.998*** 
                                                    (-1.48)  (-6.45) 
% Black students                                    1.006***  1.006*** 
                                                    (11.50)  (17.66) 
% Hispanic students                                 1.004***  1.002*** 
                                                    (4.66)  (4.85) 
% Other race students  1.006***  1.001 
  (6.17)  (1.39) 
Violent acts rate                                   0.997***  1.000 
                                                    (-3.52)  (1.20) 
Suspension rate                                     0.999***  1.001*** 
                                                    (-3.65)  (3.55) 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less              3.832***  2.207*** 
                                                    (16.29)  (16.54) 
Overall performance composite                      0.995***  0.996*** 
                                                    (-5.01)  (-6.86) 
Per pupil expenditures                              0.996**  0.998** 
                                                    (-3.28)  (-2.91) 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.04***  0.99 
                                                    (5.60)  (-1.37) 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      0.95***  1.00 
                                                    (-4.45)  (-0.02) 
Distributed leadership (std)                        0.95***  0.97*** 
                                                    (-3.50)  (-4.16) 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.95***  0.93*** 
                                                    (-4.07)  (-9.47) 
Professional development (std)                     1.07***  1.01 
                                                    (5.09)  (1.32) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 
 (-84.97) (-41.69) (-83.43) (-28.03) 
Observations                                       378882 378882 425158 425158 
Deviance 154717.08 144381.40 357761.67 354468.47 
Notes. Estimates reported as odds ratios. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics 
reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
of Black teachers move schools compared to 7.55% of White teachers. Although Hispanic 
teachers are less likely to move schools within and at the end of the school year than Black 
teachers, they are less likely to move schools than White teachers. In Table 4, controlling for 
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school characteristics, the risk of moving schools within the year for Black teachers are 19% 
greater than White teachers. The risk of moving at the end of the school year are 6% greater for 
Black teachers than White teachers. For Hispanic teachers, we find no evidence of differences in 
moving during the year compared to White teachers. Instead, Hispanic teachers have greater 
odds of moving schools at the end of the year compared to white teachers, with relative risk ratio 
of 1.13. 
Table 2 shows no practically significant differences in the rates at which Black teachers 
leave teaching compared to White teachers. Hispanic teachers are more likely to leave teaching 
than White teachers. During the school year, Hispanic teachers’ turnover rate is 3.57% compared 
to 2.73% for White teachers. At the end of the school year, their turnover rate is 9.07% compared 
to 6.93% for White teachers. Table 4 reveals that after controlling for school characteristics, 
Black teachers are much less likely to leave teaching than White teachers, particularly within the 
school year. Compared to White teachers, the risk of leaving are lower within the year compared 
to the end of the year (0.83 versus 0.93). Hispanic teachers are no more likely to leave during the 
school year compared to White teachers, but, counter to our hypothesis, are more likely leave 
teaching at the end of the school year (1.23). 
Teacher Gender 
 There is virtually no difference in the overall turnover rate of male versus female 
teachers, except in regards to female teachers’ higher rates of temporarily exiting teaching (Table 
2). 0.28% of male temporarily exit and return compared to 0.72% of female teachers. When 
controlling for school characteristics in Table 3, female teachers have slightly greater odds of 
turnover than male teachers, particularly during the school year (1.11 versus 1.04).  
When separating these results between moving schools and leaving teaching in Table 4,  
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Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates of Within- and End-of-Year Teacher 
Moving, Leaving, and Temporary Exit and Return 
 
                                                   
Within-year 
mover 
Within-year 
leaver 
End-of-year 
mover 
End-of-year 
leaver 
Temporary 
Exit and 
Return 
0-2 years experience 1.33*** 2.20*** 1.40*** 1.97*** 0.97 
 (6.10) (21.93) (14.74) (26.98) (-0.37) 
3-5 years experience 1.10* 1.56*** 1.16*** 1.51*** 1.03 
 (2.30) (12.83) (7.39) (17.81) (0.53) 
11-20 years experience 0.75*** 0.54*** 0.79*** 0.61*** 0.46*** 
 (-8.00) (-18.65) (-13.05) (-22.46) (-12.68) 
20+ years experience 0.72*** 0.80*** 0.68*** 1.18*** 0.65*** 
 (-6.76) (-6.39) (-15.02) (6.79) (-5.65) 
Female                                             1.01 1.19*** 0.997 1.11*** 2.71*** 
                                                   (0.40) (7.21) (-0.16) (6.21) (14.14) 
Black                                              1.19*** 0.83*** 1.06** 0.93*** 1.003 
                                                   (4.93) (-6.22) (3.27) (-3.68) (0.05) 
Hispanic                                           1.06 1.03 1.13** 1.23*** 1.29 
                                                   (0.73) (0.46) (2.81) (4.70) (1.90) 
Other race                                         1.05 0.97 0.95 1.12** 1.16 
                                                   (0.72) (-0.54) (-1.52) (3.04) (1.29) 
Alternate entry                                    1.02 0.90*** 1.12*** 1.20*** 0.96 
                                                   (0.67) (-3.33) (6.33) (9.18) (-0.72) 
Teacher For America                                  0.42*** 1.32* 0.65*** 4.34*** 0.68 
                                                   (-4.61) (2.35) (-5.82) (31.50) (-1.00) 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.07* 1.45*** 1.07*** 1.54*** 1.16** 
                                                   (2.19) (16.76) (4.94) (30.00) (3.21) 
Other                                              0.85** 1.22*** 0.93* 1.48*** 0.87 
                                                   (-2.89) (4.59) (-2.46) (14.12) (-1.29) 
< 26 years old 1.15** 2.07*** 0.90*** 1.25*** 2.29*** 
 (2.74) (15.97) (-4.35) (8.52) (8.42) 
26-30 years old 1.28*** 2.33*** 0.89*** 1.09** 2.25*** 
 (4.50) (17.66) (-4.31) (3.03) (7.59) 
31-40 years old 1.15* 1.81*** 0.83*** 0.76*** 0.96 
 (2.27) (11.34) (-6.78) (-8.30) (-0.38) 
51-60 years old 1.18* 4.30*** 0.78*** 1.75*** 1.54*** 
 (2.57) (27.95) (-7.87) (16.84) (3.48) 
60+ years of age 1.45*** 11.95*** 0.81*** 5.70*** 3.67*** 
 (4.29) (42.83) (-4.31) (46.83) (9.18) 
School size (100s)                                 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.99*** 0.97*** 
                                                   (-15.04) (-17.17) (-19.98) (-8.16) (-6.34) 
City                                               1.00 1.06 0.99 0.998 1.02 
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                                                   (-0.05) (1.57) (-0.58) (-0.09) (0.21) 
Rural                                              1.10* 0.99 1.05* 0.97 0.93 
                                                   (2.30) (-0.18) (2.40) (-1.42) (-1.11) 
Town                                               1.001 0.94 1.04 0.93* 1.01 
                                                   (0.03) (-1.30) (1.43) (-2.55) (0.10) 
Middle school 2.21*** 2.54*** 1.17*** 1.07*** 1.20** 
 (22.80) (33.42) (10.10) (4.10) (2.97) 
High school 4.53*** 6.13*** 1.21*** 1.13*** 2.14*** 
 (46.56) (66.19) (13.46) (8.19) (15.46) 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.001 0.998** 0.997*** 0.998*** 0.995** 
                                                   (0.85) (-2.71) (-5.60) (-4.53) (-3.13) 
% Black students                                   1.008*** 1.005*** 1.007*** 1.005*** 1.002 
                                                   (10.07) (7.23) (15.92) (10.60) (1.19) 
% Hispanic students                                1.007*** 1.002* 1.004*** 1.001 1.005* 
                                                   (5.21) (2.07) (5.82) (1.82) (2.19) 
% Other race students 1.005** 1.007*** 1.002* 1.000 0.997 
 (3.28) (5.54) (2.47) (-0.49) (-1.07) 
Violent acts rate                                  0.998 0.997*** 1.000 1.000 0.997 
                                                   (-1.54) (-3.34) (0.43) (0.89) (-1.13) 
Suspension rate                                    0.999** 0.999* 1.001** 1.000 0.998 
                                                   (-3.00) (-2.41) (2.66) (1.65) (-1.40) 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             3.88*** 4.03*** 2.25*** 2.23*** 1.99** 
                                                   (10.72) (13.62) (13.20) (12.00) (3.27) 
Overall performance composite                      0.999** 0.999* 1.001** 1.000 0.998 
                                                   (-3.00) (-2.41) (2.66) (1.65) (-1.40) 
Per pupil expenditures                             0.999 0.994** 0.997** 0.999 1.000 
                                                   (-0.50) (-3.12) (-3.28) (-1.26) (-0.04) 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.06*** 1.02* 1.00 0.99* 1.06** 
                                                   (6.45) (2.04) (0.48) (-2.57) (3.25) 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     0.93*** 0.97* 1.00 1.00 0.93* 
                                                   (-4.00) (-2.23) (0.19) (-0.52) (-2.33) 
Distributed leadership (std)                       0.93*** 0.97 0.96*** 0.97* 0.95 
                                                   (-3.42) (-1.77) (-3.63) (-2.55) (-1.65) 
Principal leadership (std)                         0.97 0.92*** 0.90*** 0.96*** 0.98 
                                                   (-1.28) (-4.68) (-9.87) (-3.77) (-0.70) 
Professional development (std)                     1.07** 1.07*** 1.01 1.01 1.10** 
                                                   (3.07) (4.17) (1.36) (0.84) (2.68) 
Constant 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.16*** 0.03*** 0.00*** 
 (-28.83) (-40.62) (-20.93) (-36.60) (-19.87) 
Observations 445641 445641 445641 445641 445641 
Notes. Estimates reported as relative risk ratios. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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we find that the higher turnover rates among female teachers are driven by leaving teaching. 
Also, we find a stronger relationship between gender and leaving within the school year than at 
the end of the year. The odds a female teacher will leave teaching during the school year are 19% 
greater than a male teacher. The odds a female teacher will leave teaching at the end of the 
school year are 11% greater than a male teacher. There is an even larger gender gap in terms of 
temporary exit and return. The odds a female teacher will temporarily exit teaching are 171% 
greater than a male teacher. 
To examine the extent to which the higher rates of leaving teaching are related to 
childbearing, in Table A7, we add to the model an interaction between female and the age 
categories. Female teachers are predicted to leave teaching at higher rates than male teachers 
beginning in their mid-20s and continuing into their 30s. The odds of within-year turnover are 
16% greater for female teachers in their late 20s compared to male teachers of the same age. 
After these prime childbearing years, the odds of within-year leaving for male and female 
teachers converge. That being said, the difference in predicted probabilities is small. The 
predicted probability of within-year turnover is 5% for a female teacher between 26 and 30 years 
old and 4.1% for a male teacher in the same age group. For teachers in their 30s, the predicted 
probability of within-year turnover is 5.5% for female teachers compared to 4.8% for male 
teachers.2 We find no corresponding gender difference for end-of-year turnover for females in 
their late 20s or 30s. We do, however, find evidence that when female teachers exit the 
classroom temporarily it tends to be concentrated around these traditional childbearing ages 
																																																						
2 In Table A8 we run the multinomial logistic regression model with the interaction between gender and the 
categories. We find even stronger evidence of a gender gap between men and women in terms of leaving within the 
school year. The relative risk ratio on the interaction between Female Teacher and 26-30 years old is 1.43. The 
relative risk ratio on the interaction between Female Teacher and 30-40 years old is 1.19. We find no significant 
evidence of a differential effect outside this period.  
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(Table A8). With temporary exit and return being a rare event—0.9% of teachers exit and return 
in a year—young female teachers are much more likely than male teachers to display this 
behavior. The predicted probability of temporary exit is 1.2% for 26 to 40 year-old female 
teachers and 0.2% for 26 to 40 year-old male teachers, a difference that also disappears in 
teachers’ 40s. 
Teacher Experience  
Descriptively, Table 2 shows the least experienced teachers are most likely to turnover. 
28.23% of teachers in their first three years in the profession turn over each year. 5.64% of 
novice teachers turn over during the school year with an additional 21.92% turning over at the 
end of the school year. In other words, a fifth of all novice teachers who turn over during their 
first three years on the job leave before the end of the school year. The rates of within- and end-
of-year turnover decrease until teachers reach 20 or more years of experience. Among teachers 
with over 20 years of experience, 5.44% turn over during the school year with an additional 
15.59 turning over at the end of the school year, which means that a fourth of the veteran 
teachers who turnover do so during the school year. 
The regression analysis in Table 3 confirms the significance of these differences. When 
controlling for school characteristics, the odds of within-year turnover among teachers with zero 
to two years of experience are 79% greater compared to teachers with six to ten years of 
experience. Compared to teachers with six to ten years of experience, novice teachers are more 
likely to turn over during the school year than at the end of the year when controlling for school 
characteristics (1.79 versus 1.62). Although teachers with three to five years of experience are 
more likely to turn over than teachers with six to ten years of experience, the magnitude of the 
turnover have diminished and differences between within- and end-of-year turnover have 
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narrowed (1.34 versus 1.30). Midcareer teachers, those with 11 to 20 years of experience and 
veteran teachers are less likely to turnover than teachers with six to ten years of experience, both 
within and at the end of the school year.  
In Table 2, we find that as teachers gain experience, they are less likely to move schools 
within and at the end of the year. 2.37% of novice teachers move within the year compared to 
only 1.66% of the most experienced teachers. 11.99% of novice teachers move at the end of the 
school year compared to 5.15% of the most experienced teachers. This pattern is consistent when 
controls are added for teacher background and school characteristics (Table 4). Compared to 
teachers with six to ten years of experience, the risk of within-year moving for novice teachers is 
33% greater and the risk of end-of-year moving are 40% greater. The risk of within- and end-of-
year moving are lowest for veteran teachers with over 20 years of experience. 
The most and least experienced teachers leave teaching at the highest rates, both within 
and at the end of the school year. On average, in Table 2 we see that 3.27% of teachers in their 
first three years in the profession leave teaching during the school year and 9.93% leave at the 
end of the school year. In other words, a quarter of all teachers to leave teaching during their first 
three years on the job leave before the end of the school year. Among teachers with more than 20 
years of experience, 3.78% leave midyear and 10.44% leave at the end of the year, likely for 
retirement, which we discuss below in greater detail. When we control for teacher and school 
characteristics, novice teachers are more than twice as likely to leave teaching within the year 
compared to teachers with six to ten years of experience. Veteran teachers are less likely to leave 
teaching during the school year but more likely to leave at the end of the year compared to 
teachers with six to ten years of experience (0.80 versus 1.18). 
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Teacher Age 
Within- and end-of-year turnover rates differ greatly across different teacher age groups. 
In Table 2, we find that, on average, 4.21% of teachers younger than 26 turn over during the 
school year. 5.18% of teachers between 26 and 30 years old turn over during each school year. 
The within-year turnover drops to 3.25% for 41-50 year-old teachers before jumping to 10.15% 
for teachers over 60 years old. An additional 26.6% of teachers over 60 years old turn over at the 
end of the school year. In other words, when teachers over 60 turn over, over a quarter do so 
during the school year. 
In the regression analysis in Table 3, we find a stronger relationship between age and 
within-year turnover than end-of-year turnover. For instance, we find no evidence that teachers 
in their 20s are more or less likely to turnover at the end of the school year compared to 41 to 50 
year-old teachers. In terms of within-year turnover, the odds ratio for teachers who are less than 
26 years old is 1.62, controlling for experience and other covariates. For teachers between 26 and 
30 years old, the odds ratio for within-year turnover is 1.80. Results from Table 3 confirm also 
the strong relationship between within-year turnover and age among the oldest teachers. The 
odds of within-year turnover for teachers over 60 is 464% greater compared to 41 to 50 year-old 
teachers. Although there is also a strong relationship between age and end-of-year turnover, it is 
much smaller in magnitude, with an odds ratio of 2.66 for teachers over 60 compared to those 
between 41 and 50, when controlling for teacher and school characteristics.  
Older teachers are much less likely to move schools, particularly at the end of the school 
year. On average, 12.64% of teachers under 26 years old move schools compared to only 4.47% 
of teachers over 60 years old (Table 2). In regression analysis in Table 4, compared to 41-50 
teachers, teachers at every other age group are more likely to move schools during the school 
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year and less likely to move schools at the end of the school year. 
Older teachers are the most likely to leave teaching, both within and at the end of the 
year. Descriptive results in Table 2 indicate that 8.52% of teachers over 60 leave teaching during 
the school year every year. An additional 22.13% leave at the end of the school year. In contrast, 
3.1% of 26 to 30 year olds leave within the year and 8.52% leave at the end of the year. Table 4 
shows that, when controlling for teacher and school characteristics, teachers over 60 years old 
are nearly 12 times as likely to leave within the school year compared to teachers between 41 
and 50 years old and almost 6 times as likely to leave at the end of the year. 
To examine the extent to which the comparatively high rates of within-year leaving for 
the oldest and most experienced teachers are driven by teachers retiring midyear, we create two 
indicator variables, one if a teacher is eligible for full benefits and another if a teacher is eligible 
for reduced but not full retirement benefits.3 Table A3 reports the turnover rates for teachers with 
over 20 years of experience, separated by whether the teacher is not yet eligible for retirement 
benefits, is eligible for full benefits, or only eligible for reduced benefits. We find suggestive 
evidence that teachers eligible for retirement are leaving midyear. Among the most experienced 
teachers not eligible for retirement, 2.41% leave teaching within the school year compared to 
5.11% of fully eligible teachers and 8.71% of teachers eligible for reduced benefits. This pattern 
is even stronger for leaving at the end of the school year. 
To further test the extent to which this relationship between teacher age and within-year 
																																																						
3 Teachers are qualified for full retirement benefits under three conditions: (1) 65 years old and over 5 years of 
experience, 60 years old and over 25 years of experience, or over 30 years of experience. Teachers are eligible for 
reduced benefits if they are over 50 years old and have 20 years of experience or over 60 years old and have 5 years 
of experience. It is worth noting that the state distinguishes creditable service and membership service, whereby 
teachers contribute to the Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement Program. As we cannot distinguish between 
these two type of service, we create this measure the general retirement eligibility standards. Although this measure 
risks overstating the number of teachers eligible for retirement, in regression analysis, it would understate the effect 
of retirement eligibility. 
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turnover is driven by teachers retiring during the school year, in supplementary models in Table 
A7, we add the indicator for a teacher’s eligibility for retirement benefits. We find strong 
evidence of a relationship between retirement eligibility and within- and end-of-year turnover. 
Compared to teachers not eligible for retirement benefits, the odds of within-year turnover are 
55% greater for teachers eligible for full benefits. There is an even stronger relationship between 
retirement eligibility and end-of-year turnover. Compared to teachers not eligible for retirement 
benefits, the odds of within-year turnover are 111% greater for those eligible for full benefits.  
Controlling for retirement eligibility changes the relationship between teacher age and within-
year turnover among older teachers. In Table 3, the odds ratio was 2.51 for teachers between 51 
and 60 years old and 5.64 for teachers over 60 years old. When controlling for retirement 
eligibility, the odds ratio shrinks to 1.56 for teachers between 51 and 60 years and 2.79 for 
teachers over 60. In other words, the retirement eligibility partially mediates the effect of age on 
retirement.   
Among teachers over 60 years old, the predicted probability of within-year turnover is 
11.2% for teachers’ ineligible for retirement benefits, 15.8% for teachers’ eligible for full 
benefits, and 12.8% for teachers’ eligible for reduced benefits. The relationship is even stronger 
for end-of-year turnover. Among teachers over 60 years old, the predicted probability of end-of-
year turnover is 22.2% for teachers’ ineligible for retirement benefits, 36.9% for teachers’ 
eligible for full benefits, and 28.8% for teachers’ eligible for reduced benefits.  
In summary, we find that retirement eligibility partially mediates the relationship between 
age and teacher turnover, both within and at the end of the school year. Further, although there is 
a stronger relationship between end-of-year than within-year turnover, we still find strong 
evidence that teachers retiring during the academic year comprise a noteworthy share of teacher 
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retirements. 
Entry Pathway 
 Descriptively,  in-state, traditionally prepared teachers are the least likely to turnover of 
all entry pathways. In Table 2, we see that, on average, 18.14% of traditionally prepared teachers 
turn over each year. In contrast, 21.49% of alternate entry, 44.63% of TFA, and 21.98% of out-
of-state prepared teachers turn over annually. These higher turnover rates are comprised of 
higher within- and end-of-year turnover. While 4.06% in-state, traditionally prepared teachers 
turn over during every school year, over 5% of alternate entry, TFA, and out-of-state prepared 
teachers turn over within the year. At the end of the school year, 13.42% of in-state, traditionally 
prepared teachers turn over annually, compared to 15.75% of alternate entry, 39.31% of TFA 
teachers, and 16.05% of out-of-state prepared teachers. In Table 3, we find that, compared to in-
state, traditionally prepared teachers, alternate entry teachers are more likely to turnover during 
the school year until school controls are added, when we find that they are neither more nor less 
likely to turnover within the year. The odds of end-of-year turnover are 17% greater for alternate 
entry teachers compared to traditionally prepared teachers, when controlling for school 
characteristics. When controlling for school characteristics, we find no evidence of differences in 
within-year turnover for Teach For America compared to traditionally prepared teachers. TFA 
teachers are twice as likely to turn over at the end of the year. The odds of turnover for out-of-
state prepared teachers are nearly 30% greater than in-state prepared teachers, both within and at 
the end of the school year. 
The frequency with which teachers from different entry pathways move schools is less 
consistent. Alternate entry teachers move schools within and at the end of the school year at the 
highest rate. Out-of-state and teachers prepared through traditional routes in North Carolina 
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move schools at similar rates within and at the end of the school year. TFA teachers have the 
lowest rates of moving schools within the school year. In the regression analysis in Table 4, we 
find no evidence of differences between teachers prepared through traditional and alternate 
routes in terms of moving within the year when controlling for teacher and school characteristics. 
The risk of end-of-year moving is 12% greater for alternate entry teachers compared to 
traditionally prepared teachers. TFA teachers have much lower risk of moving schools, both 
within and at the end of the school year (0.40 an 0.67, respectively). The risk of moving for out-
of-state prepared teachers are 7% greater than teachers prepared in North Carolina, both within 
and at the end of the year. 
  Descriptive evidence in Table 2 indicate that TFA teachers have the largest descriptive 
differences between leaving teaching within and at the end of the year. 3.64% of TFA teachers 
leave teaching during each school year with an additional 30.62% leaving at the end of the 
school year. Out-of-state prepared teachers also leave at higher rates than in-state, traditionally 
prepared teachers. 3.28% of out-of-state prepared teachers leave during the school year; 8.41% 
leave at the end of the year. In contrast, 2.26% of in-state, traditionally prepared teachers leave 
during the year and 5.79% leave at the end of the year. Alternate entry teachers also leave 
teaching at higher rates than traditionally prepared teachers, with a larger difference for leaving 
at the end of the year than within the school year. Table 4 provides additional evidence for these 
descriptive differences. Controlling for teacher and school characteristics, the risk of within-year 
leaving is 32% greater for TFA teachers compared to traditionally prepared teachers. The risk of 
end-of-year leaving is 334% greater for TFA. Out-of-state prepared teachers are much more 
likely to leave both within and at the end of the year compared to in-state prepared teachers (1.49 
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and 1.57, respectively). In addition, compared to traditionally prepared teachers, alternate entry 
teachers’ risk of leaving within the year are 10% lower but 20% greater at the end of the year.  
Across the teacher characteristics examined in this study, we find evidence both 
consistent and counter to our hypotheses about the relationship between teacher characteristics 
and teacher turnover, with important differences based on the timing and type of teacher 
turnover. Consistent with our hypothesis, Black teachers are less likely than White teachers to 
leave teaching. Yet, counter to our hypothesis, Black teachers move schools more frequently 
than White teachers and Hispanic teachers move schools and leave teaching at the end of the 
school year at higher rates than White teachers, even when controlling for school characteristics. 
The odds of leaving teaching—either permanently or temporarily—are greater for female 
teachers compared to male teachers, which is driven by higher departure rates during child-
rearing ages. We predicted the highest turnover rates among the least and most experienced 
teachers. Early career teachers move schools at the highest rates while teachers with over 20 
years of experience are least likely to move. Consistent with our hypothesis, the least and most 
experienced teachers are most likely to leave teaching, both during and at the end of year. 
Among veteran teachers, we found evidence that suggests eligibility for retirement benefits is a 
strong predictor of within-year turnover as it is also for end-of-year turnover. The findings least 
consistent with our initial hypothesis are in regards to entry pathway. When controlling for 
school characteristics, alternate entry teachers were less likely to leave during the school year 
compared to traditionally prepared teachers, although they are predicted to move schools and 
leave teaching at higher rates. Teacher For America teachers move schools at lower rates but 
leave teaching at higher rates, both during and at the end of the school year. Most consistent with 
our hypothesis, the odds of turnover are consistently greater for out-of-state prepared teachers 
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compared to in-state, traditionally prepared teachers, with no strong differences in the timing of 
turnover. 
School Characteristics 
 Previous research has linked the school demographic characteristics—including minority 
student enrollment, economically disadvantaged student enrollment, and overall school 
performance—and working conditions such as school leadership or facilities and resources to 
higher levels of turnover. In this section, we test the hypothesis that these characteristics are 
more predictive of within-year turnover than end-of-year turnover. In addition to the variables 
with which we had prior hypotheses, we also highlight key school characteristics with marked 
differences between within- and end-of-year turnover. 
Minority Student Enrollment 
 Descriptive differences reported in Table 2 suggest that teachers who turnover are more 
likely to work in schools with a greater proportion of Black students, with slightly higher Black 
student enrollment in schools where teachers move or leave during the school year compared to 
the end-of-year movers and leavers, respectively.  Stayers worked in schools with an average of 
26% Black students compared to 35% for within-year movers, 33% for end-of-year movers, 32% 
for within-year leavers, and 31% for end-of-year leavers. No similar differences are observed for 
Hispanic student enrollment. To better characterize teacher turnover across the distribution of 
minority student enrollment, we separate this variable into deciles.4 In Figure 2 and Table A4, 
schools in the bottom decile of minority student enrollment, that is, schools with 15% or fewer 
minority students, had 14.74% teachers turn over within and at the end of the school year. The  
																																																						
4 In unreported results, we tabulated the results for Black and Hispanic student enrollment, respectively. The patterns 
were generally consistent for Black student enrollment. There is less stark of a distinction for Hispanic student 
enrollment. Schools in the bottom decile of Hispanic student enrollment had an annual turnover rate of 19.87% 
compared to 23.02% in schools in the top decile.  
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Figure 2. Frequency of Turnover by Minority Student Enrollment Deciles 
 
annual turnover rate in schools in the top decile, schools with 89% minority student enrollment 
and higher, is nearly double, with an average of 28.56% of teachers turning over each year.  
When comparing schools with the lowest and highest concentrations of minority students, 
the within-year turnover rate is relatively higher than end-of-year turnover. In schools with the 
lowest minority concentrations, the within-year turnover rate is 3.25%, where it is 7.3% in the 
schools with the highest minority enrollment. In contrast, in the schools with the fewest 
minorities, the end-of-year turnover rate is 11.49%, while in the schools with the largest minority 
enrollments have an end-of-year turnover rate is 21.25%. In other words, the within-year 
turnover rate is 2.25 times greater in schools in the top decile of minority student enrollment 
compared to the bottom decile. The end-of-year turnover rate is 1.85 times greater in schools in 
the top decile of minority student enrollment compared to the bottom decile. Regression analysis 
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in Table 3 confirm the strength of this relationship between within-year turnover and the 
concentration of Black, Hispanic, and other race students. We find a similar relationship between 
Black, Hispanic student enrollment percentages and within-year and end-of-year teacher 
turnover but no relationship between other race enrollment rates and end-of-year turnover. 
 When we examine the relationship between minority student enrollment and moving 
schools, we find a similar pattern. In Figure 2, we see that 1.4% of teachers move within the 
school year from schools in the bottom decile of minority student enrollment compared to 3.45% 
of teachers in the top decile. Regression analysis in Table 4 confirms this relationship. A one 
percentage point increase in Black student enrollment is associated with a 0.8% increase in the 
risk of moving schools within the school year. To get a better sense of the practical significance 
of these differences, we present the predicted probabilities at the 10th and 90th deciles, holding all 
other variables in the model at their mean. For a teacher in a school at the 10th decile of Black 
student enrollment, that is, schools with 2.9% Black students, the predicted probability of 
moving within the school year is 1.5%. In schools at the 90th decile or with 60.5% Black 
students, the predicted probability of moving schools within the year is 2.2%. The odds of 
moving schools within the school year increase by 0.7% with a percentage increase in Hispanic 
student enrollment. This translates into a marginal effect of 0.3% when comparing schools at the 
10th and 90th deciles of Hispanic student enrollment. Although the strength of the relationship is 
similar for within- and end-of-year turnover for Black students, there is only a slight relationship 
between Hispanic student enrollment and moving at the end of the school year (1.004). 
 Consistent with moving schools, we find that teachers are disproportionately more likely 
to leave teaching within the year from schools enrolling the greatest share of minority students 
compared to those enrolling the fewest. Figure 2 shows that 3.85% of teachers in high minority 
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schools leave teaching during the school year compared to 1.85% of teachers in low minority 
schools. In regression analysis in Table 4, the magnitude of the relationship between Black 
student enrollment is consistent for within- and end-of-year turnover, with a relative risk ratio of 
1.005. A one percentage point increase in Hispanic student enrollment is associated with a 0.2% 
increase in the risk of within-year leaving. A one percentage point increase in other non-White 
student enrollment is associated with a 0.7% increase in the risk of within-year turnover. We 
don’t find any evidence of a relationship between Hispanic and other non-White student 
enrollment and end-of-year turnover. 
Economically Disadvantaged Student Enrollment 
 Compared to teachers who stay in their school, teachers who turnover do so from schools 
enrolling a greater proportion of economically disadvantaged students. In Table 2, we find that 
stayers worked in schools with an average of 56% economically disadvantaged students 
compared to 61% and 62% for within- and end-of-year movers, respectively, and 59% for 
within- and end-of-year leavers. When looking at deciles of economically disadvantaged students 
in Figure 3 and Table A5, we find a similar pattern as was observed for minority student 
enrollment, although less of a difference is observed between schools with the least and greatest 
concentration of poverty. Schools in the bottom decile of economically disadvantaged student 
enrollment, on average, had 17.33% teachers turn over within and at the end of the school year. 
The annual turnover rate in schools in the top decile is nearly half again as large, with an average 
of 25.55%. Yet, when controlling for teacher and school characteristics, including minority 
student enrollment, we find no evidence of a relationship between a greater share of  
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Figure 3. Frequency of Turnover by Economically Disadvantaged Student Enrollment Deciles 
economically disadvantaged students in a school and higher levels of within-year teacher 
turnover.5 
When looking at moving schools, we do not find as large of descriptive differences 
between the least and most economically disadvantaged schools (Figure 3 and Table A5). 1.83% 
of teachers in schools in the bottom decile move within the year compared to 2.72% in the top 
decile. 6.59% move schools at the end of the school year in schools in the bottom decile 
compared to 11.61% in the top decile. In regression analysis in Table 4, we find no evidence of a 
																																																						
5 When we drop the minority student enrollment variables from the model, we still find little evidence of a 
relationship between economically disadvantaged student enrollment and within- and end-of-year turnover. The 
odds ratio for economically disadvantaged in the model predicting on within-year turnover is 1.002 (p = 0.003). The 
odds ratio for the model predicting end-of-year turnover is 0.9996 and not significant (p = 0.211). 
	 42 
relationship between economically disadvantaged student enrollment and moving schools within 
the year and only a small, negative relationship with end-of-year turnover, with a relative risk 
ratio of 0.997. 
The results are similar for leaving. Although teachers in schools with a greatest share of 
economically disadvantaged students are more likely to leave during the year, the gap is not large 
compared to schools in the bottom decile (Figure 3). 2.46% of teachers in the bottom decile leave 
teaching annually compared to 3.21% of teachers in the top decile. The proportional differences 
are similar when comparing end-of-year turnover. 6.45% of teachers leave teaching at the end of 
the year from schools in the bottom deciles compared to 8.01% of teachers in schools in the top 
decile. In Table 4, we find a small, but negative relationship between economically 
disadvantaged student enrollment and teachers leaving within and at the end of the school year. 
A percentage point increase in economically disadvantaged student enrollment is associated with 
a 0.2% decrease in the risk of moving within and at the end of the school year. 
Overall School Performance  
The measure of school performance—the overall performance composite—is a fraction 
of the number of tests passed over the number of tests taken. As a result, we would expect lower 
performing schools, that is, schools at the bottom decile of student performance, to have the 
highest turnover rates. Descriptively, we find this pattern in Figure 4 and Table A6. Over a 
quarter of teachers turn over from schools in the bottom decile of student performance, including 
6.52% turning over within the academic year and an additional 19.58% turning over at the end of 
the year. Less than 15% of teachers turn over from the highest performing schools, with only 
3.85% turning over during the year and 11.95% at the end of the year. In the regression analysis 
(Table 3), we expect a greater share of students in a school who achieve proficiency to be  
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Figure 4. Frequency of Turnover by School Performance Deciles 
 
associated with lower odds of turnover. We find this to be the case, with evidence of a slight 
relationship between increased school performance and lower turnover. A unit increase in school  
performance is associated with a 0.5% decrease in the odds of within-year turnover and a 0.4% 
decrease in the odds of end-of-year turnover. 
Although teachers are more likely to move during the school year from the lowest 
performing schools compared to the highest performing schools, the gap is not as large as 
compared to minority or economically disadvantaged student enrollment (Figure 4). On average, 
1.71% of teachers move from the highest performing schools during each school year compared 
to 2.45% in the lowest performing schools. The gap is proportionally larger for end-of-year 
turnover. 6.11% of teachers move from the highest performing schools at the end of each year 
compared to 10.53% in the lowest performing schools. In regression analysis in Table 4, we find 
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a small, negative relationship between school performance and moving within the school year 
and a small positive relationship with moving at the end of the year. A one-unit increase in 
school performance is associated with a 0.1% decrease in the risk of within-year moving and a 
0.1% increase in the risk of end-of-year moving. 
Instead, the turnover gaps by school performance are driven by teachers leaving within 
the year at higher rates from the lowest performing schools. In Figure 4, we see that roughly two-
thirds of within-year turnover in the lowest performing schools is teachers leaving the profession. 
Teachers are also nearly twice as likely to leave during the school year in low performing 
compared to high performing schools (4.07% versus 2.14%). In terms of leaving teaching at the 
end of the school year, we still observe a gap between the lowest and highest performing schools 
is, although proportionately, it is not as large as seen for leaving within the year (9.05% versus 
5.84%). This descriptive anticipates the estimates from the regression analysis, where we find 
evidence of a slight relationship between leaving within the year but not at the end of the year. A 
one-unit increase in overall school performance is associated with a 0.1% reduction in the risk of 
leaving teaching during the school year. 
School Working Conditions 
 Descriptively, the teacher-reported levels of the quality of facilities and resources, 
distributed leadership, and principal leadership are all lower among teachers who turn over 
compared to teachers who stayed in the same school. In Table 2, when combining the within-and 
end-of-year, we see that teachers who turn over during the year do so from schools with slightly 
worse working conditions. In Table 3, better distributed leadership and principal leadership 
scores are each related to lower odds of turnover, with no large differences in the timing of 
turnover. The quality of facilities and resources are related to within-year turnover but not end-
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of-year turnover. A standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 5% decrease 
in the odds of turnover. Somewhat surprisingly, when controlling for other covariates in the 
model, teacher reports of the quality of professional development are positively related to within-
year turnover. A standard deviation increase in professional development are associated with a 
7% increase in the odds of within-year turnover. 
 When examining descriptive differences in terms of moving, we find facilities and 
resources are reported to be 0.05 standard deviations lower for teachers who move during the 
school year compared to those who move at the end of the year (Table 2). For the other 
measures, within-year movers left schools with 0.02 lower reported distributed leadership and 
0.01 lower principal leadership. In Table 4, we find no evidence of a relationship between 
principal leadership and moving within the school year, although better principal leadership is 
associated with a reduced risk of end-of-year moving (0.90). A standard deviation increase in 
distributed leadership is associated with a 7% decrease in the risk of within-year moving and a 
4% decrease in the risk of end-of-year moving. A standard deviation increase in teacher reports 
of the quality of facilities and resources are associated with a 7% decrease in the risk of moving 
schools during the year. We find no similar evidence of a relationship between facilities and 
resources and moving at the end of the school year. 
 Returning to Table 2, within-year leavers worked in schools with slightly worse 
conditions than end-of-year leavers. Facilities and resources, principal leadership, and distributed 
leadership are reported to be between 0.05 and 0.02 standard deviations lower in the within-year 
leavers’ schools compared to end-of-year leavers. In regression analysis in Table 4, a standard 
deviation increase in facilities and resources is associated with a 3% decrease in the risk of 
leaving during the school year. No similar evidence for a relationship between facilities and 
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resources and leaving at the end of the year is found. A standard deviation increase in principal 
leadership is associated with a 8% decrease in the risk of leaving within the school year and a 4% 
decrease in the risk of leaving at the end of the year. 
Other School Characteristics 
 Two descriptive differences in school characteristics emerge between teachers to turn over 
within and at the end of the school year (see Table 2). First, teachers in high schools are much 
more likely to move and leave schools within the year compared to elementary and middle 
schools. In high schools, 2.98% of teachers move schools within the year and 4.41% leave 
teaching within the year. In elementary schools, only 1.68% of teachers move and 2.21% leave 
teaching within the year. This corresponding gap is not observed for end-of-year turnover. 
Second, in comparison to stayers, within-year movers and leavers work in schools with more 
violent acts, higher suspension rates, and more novice teachers. There are few practical 
difference between turnover categories across these variables. 
 The regression analysis in Table 3 shows additional differences between the predictors of 
within-year and end-of-year turnover. The odds of within-year turnover for middle and high 
school teachers are much greater than elementary school teachers. While middle and high school 
teachers also have greater odds of turning over at the end of the school year, the magnitude is 
much smaller for these estimates. For instance, compared to elementary school teachers, the odds 
of within-year turnover are 434% greater for high school teachers and, for end-of-year turnover, 
only 16% greater for high school teachers.6 A greater share of teachers in their first three years is 
associated with high turnover, particularly within-year turnover. Counter to our hypothesis that 
within-year turnover would occur in schools with fewer disciplinary incidents, we find evidence 
																																																						
6 With evidence of differences by school level, we report on the results from the fully specified model in Table 4 
separately for elementary, middle, and high schools (see Table A9). 
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of a small relationship between the number of violent rates and the suspension rate and within-
year turnover, when controlling for teacher and school characteristics. At the same time, we find 
a small, positive relationship between the suspension rate and end-of-year turnover. An increase 
in per pupil expenditures are associated with slightly lower odds of within- and end-of-year 
turnover. We find no evidence that the district teacher salary supplement is related to end-of-year 
turnover, but an increase in the salary supplement is predictive of higher within-year turnover. A 
thousand-dollar increase in the teacher salary supplement is associated with a 4% increase in the 
odds of within-year turnover.  
 We find evidence that school size is related to within- and end-of-year turnover through 
two mechanisms. First, an increase in the number of students enrolled in a school is associated 
with lower odds of within- and end-of-year turnover. The other mechanisms by which student 
enrollments changes in the number of students enrolled in a school from one year to the next 
predict turnover, as shifting enrollment patterns may influence involuntary teacher transfer. In 
Table A7, we consider the extent to which a change in school size from the previous school year 
to the current year is related to higher levels turnover, particularly during the school year. If 
shifts in student enrollment drive this pattern, we would expect an increase in student enrollment 
to be associated with lower odds of turnover, both during and at the end of the school year, 
particularly within in regards to teachers moving schools within the same district. We find 
evidence of this hypothesis, with a 100 student change in student enrollment associated with a 
4% decrease in the odds of within-year turnover and a 3% decrease in the odds of end-of-year 
turnover. Table A8 provides further evidence of this hypothesis, with a 100 student change in 
student enrollment associated with a 18% decrease in the odds of within-district mobility.  
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To summarize, although the school characteristics in our regression analysis did not 
consistently predict greater odds of within-year compared to end-of-year turnover, we still found 
notable differences. Black student enrollment is consistently related to higher turnover rates, with 
a stronger relationship to within-year turnover compared to end-of-year turnover but a weaker 
relationship to leaving within the school year than at the end of the year. Opposite our 
hypothesis, when controlling for school characteristics, an increase in the percentage of 
economically disadvantaged students has no observable relationship with within-year turnover 
and a negative relationship with within- and end-of-year turnover. Overall school performance 
predicts slightly lower rates of moving and leaving schools within the year and slightly higher 
rates of moving teaching at the end of the school year. Among working conditions, better 
distributed leadership and principal leadership were consistently related to reductions in within- 
and end-of-year turnover. Teacher reports of the quality of facilities and resources are only 
predictive of within-year turnover, including both moving and leaving schools. Among the other 
school characteristics, compared to elementary school teachers, we found much greater odds of 
within- and end-of-year turnover for middle and high school teachers. 
Discussion 
A significant research base has described the characteristics most predictive of end-of-
year turnover. We add to this research by characterizing within-year teacher turnover, including 
its frequency and the school and teacher characteristics associated with within- and end-of-year 
turnover. Although a small segment of teachers turn over in a given month during the school 
year—less than 0.75%—throughout the course of a school year, over 4% of teachers either move 
schools or leave teaching within the school year, which comprises a non-negligible share of the 
17% of teachers to turn over annually. 
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By overlooking this within-year teacher turnover, conventional measures of teacher 
turnover have either underestimated the actual frequency with which teachers turn over or 
incorrectly attributed the timing of turnover. The two most common approaches to operationalize 
teacher turnover—comparing end-of-year turnover rates and fall-to-fall employment status—
each have their shortcomings. The former overlooks within-year turnover entirely, 
underestimating the true frequency with which teachers move schools by 17.6% and the true 
frequency for leaving schools by 25.6%. Fall-to-fall measures of turnover misattribute the timing 
of turnover, by including within-in year teacher turnover for a segment of the previous school 
year as well as teacher turnover at the beginning of the subsequent school year, the period in the 
school year when teachers are most likely to move schools. In the absence of within-year 
turnover data, our results suggest these measures are better than end-of-year turnover measures. 
Just like end-of-year turnover, within-year turnover is not evenly distributed across 
schools. Teachers working in schools with the highest concentrations of minority, low-income, 
and low-performing students have the highest within- and end-of-year turnover rates. For 
instance, in the schools with the lowest concentrations of minority students the within-year 
turnover rate is 3.25% compared to 7.3% in the schools with the highest percentages of minority 
students. The end-of-year turnover rate is 11.49% in the least racially diverse schools and 
21.25% in the most diverse schools. In regression analysis, this relationship was most consistent 
for teachers in schools with higher Black student enrollment, which was associated with 
consistently higher levels of within- and end-of-year teacher turnover. Notably, when controlling 
for teacher and school characteristics, we find no evidence of a relationship between a greater 
share of economically disadvantaged students in a school and higher levels of within-year 
teacher turnover. Among school working conditions, higher levels of teacher-reported principal 
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and distributed leadership were associated with lower within- and end-of-year turnover. Only the 
quality of resources and facilities was consistently related to within-year turnover. 
 For teacher characteristics, early career teachers move schools at the highest rates while 
teachers with over 20 years of experience are least likely to move. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the least and most experienced teachers are most likely to leave teaching, both during 
and at the end of year. Among veteran teachers, we found evidence that suggests eligibility for 
retirement benefits strongly predicted both within- and end-of year turnover. While 22.13% of 
teachers over 60 leave teaching at the end of each school year, an additional 8.52% leave during 
the year. Also in terms of teacher age, we also found evidence of an interactive effect with 
teacher gender. We found higher within- and, to a lesser degree, end-of-year turnover rates 
among female teachers to be driven by higher rates of leaving teaching and temporarily exiting 
teaching and returning during the period traditionally associated with child-rearing.  
We also identified important differences in the timing of turnover across entry pathways. 
When controlling for school and other teacher characteristics, alternate entry teachers were less 
likely to leave during the school year compared to traditionally prepared teachers, although they 
are predicted to move schools and leave teaching at higher rates at the end of the year. Teacher 
For America teachers move schools at lower rates, but leave teaching at higher rates, at the end 
of the school year. Most consistent with our hypothesis, the odds of turnover are consistently 
greater for out-of-state prepared teachers compared to in-state, traditionally prepared teachers, 
with no strong differences in the timing of turnover. 
 From these findings come a number of policy and research considerations. The literature 
describes how a segment of schools are confronted by high annual turnover so that there is a 
constant churn of new teachers. We better document this phenomenon by showing the extent to 
	 51 
which certain schools are also faced with more within-year staffing disruptions. Focusing on 
within-year turnover gives a more accurate picture of the level of turnover in these schools, 
which has implications on the presence of a supportive and stable work environment with 
sufficient instructional resources to mentor new teachers across different grades and subjects 
(Simon & Johnson, 2015). With a more accurate understanding of when teacher turnover occurs, 
more targeted organizational supports and financial incentives could be employed in high 
turnover schools to help retain teachers. Notably, we found evidence suggesting that a higher 
district teacher salary supplement reduces the likelihood that a teacher moves to a new district, 
while being associated with greater within-district mobility. 
Evidence of within-year turnover situates turnover as an ongoing management problem 
that schools and their leaders must contend with, rather than a once a year recruitment and hiring 
commitment for school leaders and staff. When within-year turnover is concentrated within a 
school, administrators may be forced to dedicate time and effort to staff teacher vacancies in 
classrooms that may have been better spent on instructional improvements. Evidence of 
differences in the timing of turnover across entry pathways has broader implications for teacher 
hiring. Previous studies have found alternate entry, Teach For America, and out-of-state prepared 
teachers to turnover at higher rates than teachers prepared through in-state education programs. 
We found evidence of higher end-of-year turnover rates for alternate entry and TFA teachers 
than traditionally prepared teachers but no evidence of differences in within-year turnover. Out-
of-state prepared teachers had consistently higher within- and end-of-year turnover rates than 
teachers prepared in traditional, in-state programs. Evidence of these differences in within-year 
turnover by entry pathway could be useful to administrators faced with hiring inexperienced 
teachers from a number of educational backgrounds. 
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 Regarding teacher experience, we found evidence that within-year turnover is 
concentrated among early career and veteran teachers suggests. For novice teachers, this 
highlights the continued need to direct high quality induction supports from the district, 
preparation program, and colleagues within the school. For veteran teachers who are eligible for 
retirement benefits and retire during the year suggests that retirement eligibility should be 
restructured around end-of-year, especially if end of year turnover has less of an impact on 
students than within-year turnover. 
 Finally, a broader contribution from this paper comes from the unique use of 
administrative data. Imbedded within the development and use of district and state administrative 
data systems has been an assumed school production function that yields annual outcomes. Using 
the example of teacher turnover, researchers have assumed that turnover occurs between school 
years leading researchers to overlook within-year turnover. We encourage researchers to 
examine other student, teacher, and school outcomes in a similar fashion. For instance, linking 
measures of student and teacher attendance to mobility could yield a measure of the length of 
time a student is assigned to a particular teacher to be more accurately identify teacher effects 
within a school year. Within a survival analytic framework, researchers could study patterns in 
the timing of student and teacher absences and student assignment, with a particular eye towards 
how students are moved between teachers during the school year in the face of accountability 
pressures. Additionally, similar to the way in which we studied teacher labor markets, 
administrators may be just as mobile, if not more mobile, than teachers during the school year. 
Finally, previous studies have assumed that within-year and end-of-year turnover equally affect 
student outcomes. Researchers should examine the possibility of differential effects of teacher 
turnover depending on its timing in the school year. Further, they could test differences in the 
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effect of turnover for individual students who lose a teacher compared to students in schools with 
higher levels of turnover.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LEAVING SCHOOL EARLY: A SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF NOVICE TEACHERS’ 
WITHIN- AND END-OF-YEAR TURNOVER 
Introduction 
Filling vacancies for classroom teachers is no longer a springtime activity for school 
administrators. Anecdotal evidence, stories that principals tell about filling vacancies after school 
starts in the fall and indeed throughout the school year, is beginning to be backed up by empirical 
research (Camburn, Spillane, & Sebastian, 2010; Horng, Klasik, & Loeb, 2010). For example in 
North Carolina from 2008-09 through 2013-14, the rate at which teachers turned over at the end 
of the school year averaged 13.4% for all teachers. When within-year turnover is included, the 
total rate is actually 17.09%, which suggests the actual annual turnover rate with which school 
personnel and students contend is 22.4% higher than previous measures of teacher turnover 
would indicate. This research suggests that teacher turnover is an even larger problem than has 
been acknowledged and investigated in prior research. While end-of-year turnover has been the 
subject of extensive examination (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley, 
2006; Ingersoll, 2001), the additional turnover that occurs during the school year, which we will 
refer to as within-year turnover, has yet to be examined and the teacher- and school-level factors 
that are driving it have yet to be explained. 
Research on end-of-year turnover suggests that both individual and school-level variables 
affect teachers’ decisions to turnover. Among teacher background characteristics, younger, 
alternate entry, out-of-state prepared teachers, and teachers with less experience turnover at 
higher rates (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Bastian & Henry, 2015). At the school level, teacher 
turnover is highest in schools with high concentrations of economically disadvantaged and 
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racial/ethnic minority students, schools that also tend to have the most difficult working 
conditions (Ingersoll, 2001; Ladd, 2011). The turnover levels in these challenging schools are 
likely exacerbated by the disproportionate number of novice, alternate entry, and out-of-state 
prepared teachers employed in them. 
Amidst these persistent patterns of teacher turnover, an increasingly less experienced 
teacher labor force who have entered teaching from more varied entry pathways appear to be 
feeding a new dynamic (Ingersoll, Merrill, & Stuckey, 2014; Henry et al., 2014). The 
opportunities to teach, especially for novice teachers, occur with greater frequency in schools 
with high concentrations of economically disadvantaged and racial/ethnic minority students. In 
North Carolina elementary schools, Clotfelter and colleagues (2007) find schools in the highest 
poverty quartile had 18.7% of teachers in their first three years of their career compared to 13.3% 
in the lowest poverty quartile. These novice teachers enter into challenging conditions that their 
preparation may not prepared them to manage effectively. As early career teachers are most 
likely to draw on school personnel and resources to support their professional development, they 
may be particularly sensitive to the influence of school working conditions when making their 
decision to remain in their school and the profession (Smith & Ingersoll, 2004). Moreover, 
alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers may be even more dependent on a supportive 
environment in their school than teachers from in-state traditional education programs. Alternate 
entry teachers likely require additional mentoring to compensate for the lack of pre-service 
training. Out-of-state prepared teachers may need additional support to learn a new curriculum 
and state instructional context. If these supports are not available for new teachers, challenging 
working conditions are likely to increase demoralization and reduce their commitment to the 
profession, making the decision to leave, even during the school year, easier. 
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To describe the systematic variation in the early career trajectories of teachers across 
various entry pathways, we engage in a comprehensive examination of teacher turnover 
longitudinally that includes both within- and end-of-year turnover. We believe that a unique 
contribution to the teacher turnover literature comes from modeling turnover monthly throughout 
the year rather than as a single annual event occurring at one point in time. Examining teachers’ 
employment status every month more accurately captures the current dynamics of teachers’ labor 
markets. Examining turnover in this way also increases our understanding of turnover as an 
ongoing management problem that schools, their leaders, and staff must contend with, rather 
than an annual recruitment and hiring activity. In addition, within-year turnover significantly 
disrupts student learning when replacements, including short- and long-term substitutes, force 
students to adjust midyear to different instructional pace and practices, and disturb professional 
relationships and collaborations (Ronfeldt, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2013; Ronfeldt, Farmer, McQueen, 
& Grissom, 2015). Finally, the paper raises an important measurement issue for the teacher labor 
market literature. This literature commonly measures teacher turnover as a single event occurring 
between school years, with researchers measuring the proportion of teachers working at the end 
of the school year but not employed in the same school at the beginning of the next. We 
demonstrate how this operationalization attentuates the overall frequency of teacher turnover by 
excluding within-year turnover, which may occur more now than in the past if the trends that we 
hypothesize to have affected this phenomenon continue to hold. 
In this paper, we seek to better understand the patterns of early career teacher turnover, 
focusing particularly on the turnover rates across teacher entry pathways and school 
characteristics. At times, we also distinguish between moving schools and leaving teaching in 
North Carolina, although the focus is on how overall turnover is consequential at the school 
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level. We conduct survival analysis of teachers’ monthly turnover patterns using detailed teacher 
employment data files from North Carolina. We ask the following questions: 
(1) To what extent does the timing of novice turnover differ by teacher entry pathway and school 
characteristics? 
(2) To what extent do teacher and school characteristics reduce or increase the risk of turnover 
among novice teachers from different pathways?  
(3) To what extent do teacher and school characteristics differentially predict end-of-year versus 
within-year novice teacher turnover? 
(4) In what ways do novice teacher qualifications and effectiveness predict a greater or lower 
risk of turnover? 
We begin with a theoretical framework describing differences in the commitment to teaching 
across different entry pathways. Then, we detail the sample of new teachers used for this 
analysis, the data used to generate monthly measures of teacher turnover, and the modeling 
approaches used for this study. 
Novice Teacher Commitment and Turnover 
Organizational commitment theory suggests that the perceived costs, affective 
attachment, and normative commitment all shape the duration of teachers’ careers (Becker, 1960; 
Firestone & Pennell, 1993; Lee, Carswell, & Allen, 2000; Meyer & Allen, 1991; Meyer, Allen, 
& Smith, 1993). Perceived costs are defined as something valued by a teacher (e.g., salary, 
pension, seniority) that are contingent on employment in a particular organization and would be 
lost upon exit (Meyer and Allen, 1991). Affective attachment relates to a teacher’s involvement 
in a school and identification with its goals and values. Also, teachers enter the profession with 
personal norms or values that shape their commitment to teaching. Normative commitments arise 
	 63 
from internalized values and normative pressure, both of which can shape teachers’ decision to 
remain in their school or the profession. We describe how these three dimensions of 
organizational commitment differ across early career teachers’ years of experience in teaching, 
entry pathway, and school context and affect the amount of time they remain in their original 
school or the teaching profession. Drawing on empirical literature and organizational 
commitment theory, in the next section and in Table 1, we develop a series of hypotheses related 
to the timing and type of turnover (moving or leaving). While any teacher turnover risks 
disrupting a school, the distinction between moving and leaving highlights the high rate with 
which novice teachers leave the profession. 
Experience  
 Previous research indicates that novice teachers are the most likely to turnover, with the 
highest turnover rates following a teachers’ first year (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Gray & Taie, 
2015). Data from the nationally representative Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study indicate 
that 26% of teachers had turned over from their initial school after the first year, with lower 
turnover rates in subsequent years (Gray & Taie, 2015). We predict that the high rates of first-
year teacher turnover not only occur at the end of the school year but during their first school 
year as well. A description of the perceived costs faced by new teachers and affective 
attachments at their first school help explain why we would expect this decline in turnover with 
gains in experience. 
Novice teachers face a unique set of costs compared to more experienced teachers, which 
predict their high turnover levels. Increasingly in recent years, new teachers have relatively low 
salaries within a single-salary schedule, which may discourage some teachers from remaining in 
teaching due to the income loss from other positions for which they could qualify (Allegretto &  
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Table 1. Hypotheses Related to Teacher and School Characteristics 
Teacher 
Characteristic 
Hypothesis Rationale 
Experience • Decline in moving and 
leaving, both within and at 
the end of the school year, 
with gains in experience 
• High perceived costs for new teachers, including relatively 
low starting salaries and pension plans that incur costs but 
accumulate little wealth in their first several years 
• Seniority-based norms leave less experienced teachers with 
more difficult teaching assignments, increasing the need 
for support from their school staff to integrate new teachers 
into the pre-existing professional and social culture of a 
school to increase their affective attachment 
Entry Pathway   
In-state, 
traditional 
certification 
• More likely than other entry 
pathways to move schools 
• Less likely than other entry 
pathways to leave teaching 
 
• High costs associated with completion of licensure 
requirements increase human capital in ways specific to 
teaching, likely reduce transfer to other professions but 
increase employment opportunities at other schools 
 
Alternate 
entry 
• Less likely than 
traditionally certified 
teachers to move schools 
• More likely to leave 
teaching within and at the 
end of the school year than 
traditionally certified 
teachers 
 
• Lack of full credential limits employment opportunities at 
other schools 
• Fewer real and opportunity costs when entering teaching 
result in less commitment to remain in teaching 
• More likely to work in underserved schools with less 
supportive social conditions, which may result in less 
affective attachment 
 
Teach For 
America 
• Unlikely to move between 
schools 
• Most likely to leave 
teaching, both within and at 
the end of the school year 
 
• Normative commitment to work in underserved schools 
suggests they would remain in their initial school 
placement 
• Fewer real and opportunity costs when entering teaching 
result in less commitment to remain in teaching 
Out-of-state 
prepared 
• No difference from in-state 
prepared teachers in terms 
of moving between schools. 
• More likely to leave 
teaching within and at the 
end of the school year than 
traditionally certified 
teachers 
 
• If an early career teacher knows they will not spend their 
career in the state, it would be most beneficial to transfer to 
their home state before investing additional time acquiring 
benefits that would not transfer to their home state. 
 
School Context • Teachers in schools with 
greater concentrations of 
minority, economically 
disadvantaged, and low-
performing students will be 
most likely to move schools 
and leave teaching, both 
during and at the end of the 
school year. 
 
• Move into schools with more positive working conditions 
and equivalent salary and benefits. 
• When early career teachers work in underserved schools 
without positive working conditions, they likely 
experience lower quality induction supports, become more 
demoralized, and lack commitment to remain in the 
profession. 
Notes. School context refers to minority, economically disadvantaged, and low-performing student enrollment 
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Mishel, 2016). Defined-benefit pension plans incur significant costs for new teachers but 
accumulate little wealth in their first several years (Costrell & Podgursky, 2009). If a novice 
teacher feels they will not remain a teacher for their entire career, within the current pension 
system, they would be best served by a quick exit from the profession. Finally, seniority-based 
norms leave more experienced teachers with non-pecuniary benefits such as assignment to more 
preferable students or a classroom with better facilities (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007). 
More difficult teaching assignments for novice teachers may also increase their likelihood of 
turnover (Henry, Smith and Bastian 2012). 
Challenging teaching assignments are especially problematic when new teachers are 
forced to negotiate the new classroom environment and do not receive the support from their 
school staff and fail to be integrated into the pre-existing professional and social culture of a 
school thereby reducing their affective attachment. Kardos and Johnson (2007) argue that 
developing affective attachment to their school is likely to be most important among novice 
teachers as they are placed in a high stress environment, often without the supports to negotiate it 
successfully (Kardos & Johnson, 2007). Research suggests that the social conditions of schools 
may be particularly important for the retention of novice teachers. For instance, among novice 
teachers, more opportunities for teacher collaboration are associated with lower turnover rates 
(Smith & Ingersoll, 2004).  
The least experienced teachers are also most likely to be moved involuntarily prior to 
earning tenure protections (Guarino et al., 2006). Involuntary within-year transfers may be 
primarily in response to shifting student enrollment patterns that require a teacher hired at one 
school to transfer to another school in the district. These staffing decisions tend to seniority-
based, although there is variation across district policy within states (Koski & Horng, 2007), with 
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some districts able to make more strategic transfers (Grissom, Loeb, & Nakashima, 2013). In 
North Carolina—the site of the current study—data from the National Council on Teacher 
Quality show that among the three largest districts, Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Guilford County 
Schools place more of an emphasis on seniority whereas Wake County Schools assigns teachers 
in the “best interests” of the district (2013).  However, Charlotte-Mecklenburg adopted a 
discretionary layoff policy during the Great Recession (Kraft, 2015). 
In-State, Traditional Certification 
In-state, traditionally certified teachers are the least likely to turnover compared to other 
entry pathways (Bastian & Henry, 2014; Borman and Dowling 2008; Darling-Hammond, 2000). 
These higher rates of persistence are attributed to the high costs associated with completion of 
licensure requirements and the values that shape teachers’ decisions to enter teaching and their 
normative commitment to remain in the profession.  
While licensure requirements drive up costs of entering teaching, which may limit those 
who decide to enter teaching, they could also ensure greater stability in the teacher labor market. 
By establishing requirements for entry into the teaching profession—pedagogical training, 
student teaching, and content knowledge—traditional education programs attempt to equip 
teachers who enter the classroom with the knowledge and skills deemed to be essential. The high 
costs associated with completion of licensure requirements through a traditional, in-state 
university-based program that increase human capital in ways specific to teaching, likely reduce 
transfer to other professions. In comparison to other early career teachers who enter the 
profession from a variety of pathways, this traditional certification may also serve as a signal of 
quality, increasing employment opportunities at other schools. As a result, we predict that 
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teachers who enter the profession through in-state, traditional university-based programs leave 
teaching at the lowest rate of all entry pathways but move schools at the highest rate. 
 The lower turnover rates for traditionally certified teachers can also be explained by the 
schools in which they teach. Previous research indicates that traditionally certified teachers tend 
to work in more affluent schools that also tend to have more positive working conditions. In the 
2011-2012 school year, compared to early career traditionally certified teachers, novice alternate 
entry teachers worked in schools with on average of 9% more students on Free or Reduced Price 
Lunch and a quarter standard deviation lower teacher reported staff collegiality (Redding & 
Smith, 2016). As traditionally certified teachers are more likely to work in schools with more 
positive social conditions, the development of affective attachments to their school may also 
result in lower turnover rates. 
 Finally, by the time traditionally certified teachers enter the profession, they have already 
spent time as a student teacher, an experience which allows them to preview the job and 
determine whether the work of teaching and the district are a good fit (Ronfeldt, Reininger, & 
Kwok, 2013). Unlike alternate entry teachers who would make such a decision while serving as 
the instructor of record, those who enter teaching establish a normative commitment to the 
profession prior to entry. 
Alternate Entry 
 Evidence suggests that alternate entry teachers turn over at higher rates than traditionally 
certified teachers, although differences exist between alternate entry programs. Drawing on four 
waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey, Redding and Smith (2016) find evidence of a growing 
turnover gap between alternate entry and traditionally certified teachers. In 2007-2008, 27 
percent of early career alternate entry teachers turned over annually, compared to only 17 percent 
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of traditionally certified teachers. Evidence from New York City and North Carolina suggests 
that teachers from more selective programs leave teaching at higher rates. In New York City, 
Kane and colleagues (2008) found much lower persistence rates among Teach For America 
(TFA) teachers with only 18 percent teaching in the district after five years. Given the unique 
program design of TFA, which recruits high performing college graduates to two years of public 
service, this steep turnover rate may be expected. Kane et al. (2008) maintain that the value-
added gains for TFA members offset the differential attrition rates for this group of teachers. 
While the evidence suggests that TFA teachers consistently turnover at higher rates, the turnover 
rates of teachers from less selective programs is inconsistent. Kane and colleagues (2008) 
observe no differences in turnover between traditionally certified teachers and participants in 
New York City Teaching Fellows. An earlier study using earlier data contradicts this finding of 
higher turnover rates among NYC Teaching Fellows. Boyd and colleagues (2006) find a 10.1 
percentage point higher attrition rates among Teaching Fellows than traditional pathways after 
four years of experience when conditioning on school fixed effects (Boyd et al., 2006). In North 
Carolina, Bastian and Henry (2015) also find higher turnover rates among alternate entry 
teachers compared to any other entry portal. Differences in the perceived costs, affective 
attachment, and normative commitment seem to explain their higher turnover rates. 
By reducing the barriers into teaching, alternate entry programs aim to recruit candidates 
with higher levels of human capital and a variety of job prospects both inside and outside 
education. As these teachers incur fewer real and opportunity costs when entering teaching and 
possibly have higher paying employment opportunities outside of education, they may be more 
likely to leave than their peers who entered teaching through a university-based teacher 
education program and have invested in human capital specific to teaching. Alternate entry 
	 69 
teachers’ lack of prior investment could result in less commitment to remain in teaching and 
higher turnover rates, even during the school year. The elevated likelihood of turnover may be 
exacerbated by the time demands placed on new alternate entry teachers who have to teach as 
well as meet frequently with mentor teachers and complete coursework required for permanent 
certification during weekends, weekday evenings, and in the summer. 
Alternate entry teachers who do not receive extensive training prior to entering the 
classroom may be less productive when they enter the classroom, which has implications for 
their normative commitment to remain in the profession. Evidence from New York City provides 
evidence for this scenario. The students of early career alternate entry teachers have smaller test 
score gains compared to teachers who completed a traditional teacher education program, 
although these differences disappear with experience (Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2008). 
However, data from North Carolina suggest a more complex pattern, with alternate entry 
teachers, other than TFA corps members, less effective in middle grade mathematics, secondary 
mathematics and secondary science but TFA more effective in nearly every grade level and 
subject (Henry et al., 2014). Given the evidence of higher turnover rates among less effective 
teachers (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2009; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & 
Wyckoff, 2005; Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2011; Henry, Bastian, & Fortner, 2011; Henry, 
Fortner, & Bastian, 2012), it is plausible that feeling performing worse with their students and 
feeling less efficacious as a teacher leads to feelings of demoralization and higher turnover rates, 
reducing teachers’ normative commitment (Johnson & Birkeland, 2003). 
Because of the dearth of pre-service training, developing an affective attachment to their 
school may be particularly important for early career alternate entry teachers as they receive the 
bulk of their training once they begin teaching. As a result of the outsized role of inductive 
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supports, alternate entry teachers may be particularly sensitive to the social conditions of the 
school, possibly resulting in lower turnover rates when working in schools with positive social 
conditions. Yet, as alternate entry teachers tend to work in underserved schools with less 
supportive social conditions, they may not receive these supports.  
At the same time, alternate entry teachers may bring a social justice or public service 
orientation to teaching that emphasizes their role in enhancing students’ life chances (Cochran-
Smith 1999; Darling-Hammond et al. 2002; Oakes, Lipton, Andersen, & Stillman 2012; 
Ronfeldt, Kwok, & Reininger, forthcoming). This motivation may enhance teachers’ 
commitment to work in under-resourced schools with difficult working conditions and with 
students from traditionally underserved racial/ethnic groups, resulting in low rates of moving 
between schools during a two- or three-year period as part of a programmatic commitment. Their 
commitment to remain in their school may also arise because of feelings of obligation that arise 
once they have entered teaching. For alternate entry teachers, schools may incur additional costs 
in providing employment for these teachers. Administrators provide them with induction 
supports and teachers dedicate time to mentor them. A teacher’s recognition of these investments 
may create feelings of obligation among alternate entry teachers, leading them to commit 
themselves to the schools until they “repay” these perceived debts (Meyer and Allen, 1991). 
Besides their normative commitment, the low rates of moving schools which we predict may 
also be explained by alternate entry teachers’ lack of full teaching credential, which could serve 
to limit employment opportunities in different schools. 
Out-of-State Prepared 
Compared to other entry pathways, there is less evidence of turnover among out-of-state 
prepared teachers, although the existing research indicates that they turnover at higher rates than 
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in-state prepared teachers (Bastian & Henry, 2015; Goldhaber & Cowan, 2014). Bastian and 
Henry (2015) find that 25 percent of the early career teachers from out-of-state programs exited 
North Carolina public schools within five years of beginning teaching, compared to only 13 
percent of in-state prepared teachers. In Washington State, Goldhaber and Cowan (2014) report 
that teachers from out-of-state prepared teachers are even more likely to exit the school system 
with 44 percent of out-of-state prepared teachers leaving by the end of their fifth year. Goldhaber 
and colleagues (2015) hypothesize that less experienced teachers will be the most likely to 
switch states because they face lower costs associated with interstate moves. These costs include 
additional seniority-benefits that bring job protection and greater returns from pension plans. If 
an early career teacher knows they will not spend their career in the state, it would be most 
beneficial to transfer to their home state before investing additional time acquiring benefits that 
would not transfer to their home state. It is also possible that these teachers emigrate from states 
that prepare more teachers than there are employment opportunities and that they may be more 
competitive for positions in the teacher surplus-producing states after they gain experience 
(Bastian & Henry, 2015). 
Given the research that shown teachers’ preference to work close to home (Boyd et al., 
2005; Reininger, 2012), we suspect out-of-state prepared teachers have less of a normative 
commitment to remain in the out-of-state schools in which they begin teaching than in-state 
prepared teachers. Further, teachers from out-of-state are likely to be unfamiliar the state’s 
educational environment, increasing the challenges faced by early career teachers and elevating 
their risk of turning over. Finally, similar to alternate entry teachers, out-of-state prepared 
teachers increasingly fill shortages in in high poverty schools with high concentrations of 
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students of color, which may strain the formation of affective attachments if these schools also 
lack strong social conditions. 
School Context 
One of the best established patterns in the teacher labor market is that teachers 
disproportionately leave under-resourced urban schools with high concentrations of 
economically disadvantaged students and traditionally underserved racial/ethnic groups 
(Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). For instance, data from the nationally representative 
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) shows an annual turnover rate of 10.5% in low poverty 
schools compared to 15.2% in high poverty schools (Ingersoll, 2001). We expect this asymmetric 
sorting to be particularly strong for the early career teachers in this study, who increasingly fill 
roles in these underserved schools. We predict that early career teachers working in schools with 
the greatest concentrations of minority, economically disadvantaged, and low-performing 
students will have the highest turnover rates, both during and at the end of the school year. Given 
the evidence of teachers sorting into schools, we expect this turnover will be driven by moving to 
new schools rather than leaving teaching. 
Underserved schools also tend to have more difficult working conditions (Borman & 
Dowling, 2008; Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001). Research on working 
conditions has focused on social conditions such as school leadership or distributed leadership, 
the availability of adequate facilities and resources and high-quality professional development 
opportunities, and student discipline problems (Buckley, Schneider, & Shang, 2005; Feng, 2010; 
Ingersoll, 2001; Johnson, Kraft, & Papay, 2012; Ladd, 2011). Given the influence of school 
demographic characteristics and working conditions on early career teacher turnover, when these 
conditions do not exist, they likely increase demoralization and lack of commitment to remain in 
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the profession, leading to higher levels of turnover, both during and at the end of the school year. 
When new teachers are placed in a high stress environment and not provided the induction 
supports to negotiate classroom challenges, these teachers may become demoralized, leaving 
teaching before the school year even ends. 
Yet, positive social conditions may be linked to teachers’ affective attachment, job 
satisfaction, and retention (Johnson, Kraft, & Papay, 2012; Simon & Johnson, 2015). For 
instance, in Chicago, Allensworth, Ponisciak, and Mazzeo (2009) explain that teacher stability is 
higher in schools where teachers reported positive relationships with their peers and the 
administrators. Teachers were less likely to turnover from schools with higher levels of teacher-
reported collective responsibility, teacher influence, teacher-teacher trust, and teacher-principal 
trust, even after controlling for teacher and student characteristics. In other studies, lower levels 
of teacher-reported school administrator quality (Boyd et al., 2011; Grissom, 2011; Ladd, 2011) 
and distributed leadership (Schweig, 2014) have been found to be strong predictors of retention.  
Research Design 
In this study, we examine the extent to which turnover among early career teachers is 
related to their entry pathway and school conditions. We conduct survival analysis to estimate 
the conditional probability that a teacher would turnover in a given month, given that they still 
remain in their school in the previous month. More specifically, we test three main hypotheses: 
(1) novice teachers’ within-year and end-of-year turnover is expected to decrease with each year 
of experience, (2) novice out-of-state prepared and alternate entry teachers turnover at higher 
rates within the year and from year to year, and (3) teachers in schools with higher 
concentrations of racial/ethnic minorities, economically disadvantaged, and low-performing 
students will have higher levels of turnover, both during and at the end of the school year. 
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Similar to other studies using administrative data, turnover is defined as moving to a new 
school or leaving teaching in the state of North Carolina for this study. This analysis of teacher 
turnover is distinctive for two reasons. First, most research on teacher turnover tends to predict 
one-year turnover rates, particularly the research from the cross-sectional SASS. By only 
examining one year of data at a time, these models fail to predict the length of teachers’ stays in 
their current school or the teaching profession. We follow three cohorts of early career teachers 
for three years, beginning with their entry into the profession. This sample and longitudinal data 
allow us to not only understand differences in turnover by certification status but also more 
adequately explain the employment trajectories of early career teachers. It also allows us to 
examine differences in timing and overall conditional probabilities of teachers from different 
entry portals leaving schools with high concentrations of poor or students from underserved 
racial/ethnic student subgroups before moving to more affluent schools. 
Second, unlike other studies on teacher turnover that treat turnover as a single annual 
event occurring between school years, we measure turnover during any month and model it 
throughout three years using survival analysis. An assumption in any survival analysis is that 
there is an underlying continuous time model (Allison, 1982; 2014). By examining turnover as 
occurring annually, researchers have made an implicit assumption that teachers have an 
equivalent risk of turning over at any point in the year. As Willett and Singer (1991) argue, this 
type of dichotomization “eliminates potentially meaningful variation by clustering together 
everyone” (p. 408) at the end of the school year. For these reasons, we argue that the frequency 
of within-year mobility leaves this assumption untenable. We are able to better model turnover 
as we come closer than previous studies to approximating the underlying continuous time model. 
Still, in comparison to daily observations, it must be noted that the data study are interval 
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censored. In some of the models described below, we treat time as discrete and estimate models 
using discrete time hazard analysis. In others, we ignore this discreteness and treat monthly data 
as continuously measured using Cox proportional and Royston-Parmar hazard models. 
Study Sample 
The main objectives for this study are to compare differences in novice teachers’ risk of 
turning over across different entry pathways into teaching and school characteristics. The sample 
is drawn from three cohorts of new teachers in the state of North Carolina who entered teaching 
in the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012 school years. We follow teachers each month of 
the school year for their first three years of teaching. To determine end-of-year turnover, we 
draw on teacher salary files in the subsequent school year to determine if the teacher has 
remained in the same school year, moved schools, or left teaching. We focus on teachers’ in their 
first three years for four reasons. First, first year teachers are the modal year of teacher 
experience in the profession and the largest share of teachers in the profession are in their first 
three years. Second, in previous work, we show that within- and end-of-year turnover is 
generally highest during teachers’ first three years on the job. Third, as the timing of this study 
overlaps with a period of flux in the entry and exit of novice teachers following the Great 
Recession, we adopt a multiple-cohort approach to adequately account for differences in the exit 
and entry of new teachers during and after the recession. An alternative approach would follow 
each cohort for all years with available data. This approach risks inappropriately weighting the 
influence of an entry pathway, particularly in the first two cohorts who were most likely to be 
influenced by their entry during a period of flux in the teacher labor market. As a sensitivity 
analysis described in greater detail below, we follow the first cohort for five years to test if the 
differences in turnover persist following teachers’ first three years. Fourth, as alternate entry is 
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one focal pathway of this study, limiting the sample to three years covers the maximum length 
alternate entry teachers in North Carolina have to transition from their lateral entry provisional 
educator’s license to the professional educator’s license.  
To build this longitudinal analysis file we draw on monthly teacher pay files, which 
include detailed information about whether or not a teacher was employed in a given month and, 
if so, the school in which they were employed. Across these cohorts, the analytic sample includes 
13,784 unique teachers and 35,536 teacher-year observations. The sample size varies across 
years, as the number of new teachers to enter the profession dipped during the Great Recession. 
Cohorts one through three consist of 3,837, 4,936, and 5,011, first-year teachers, respectively. 
Study Data 
Outcome Variables 
 For this analysis, the outcome variable is a teacher’s employment status in a given month. 
These variables document a teacher’s exit from their school, either (a) moving to a new school7 
and (b) leaving teaching in the state of North Carolina. In supplementary analysis in the 
appendix, we consider an additional outcome: temporarily leaving before returning to the same 
school in the current year or the next. These dichotomous variables are coded as 1 if the event 
was experienced in a particular month, given that it had not occurred earlier and 0 if the event 
had not been experienced in that month. It is important to note that we observe teachers for the 
length of a traditional school year, that is, for 10 months each year. So, if a teacher remained in 
the same school for the first three years of teaching, they would be observed for a maximum of 
30 months. It is also important to note that these outcomes are not mutually exclusive. Before 
estimating the risk of moving and leaving schools separately, to understand the overall churn of 
																																																						
7 In supplementary analysis in the appendix, we estimate separate models for within-district and within-state movers, 
to understand any differences in the predictors of these two types of mobility. 
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new teachers, we combine these turnover measures to predict a teachers’ exit from their first 
school. Estimating separate models for movers and leavers allows us to better estimate the rate at 
which early career teachers leave the profession, some of whom have moved schools before 
leaving. 
Main Independent Variables of Interest 
 We draw on data from North Carolina that distinguishes between teacher entry pathways 
(Henry et al., 2014). Alternatively certified teachers are separated between alternate entry and 
Teacher For America teachers. Out-of-state prepared teachers could have been undergraduate 
prepared, graduate prepared, or only earned their licensure. The out-of-state licensure only group 
earned a Bachelor’s degree at a North Carolina university but completed the requirements for a 
teacher licensure at an out-of-state institution. We also include an indicator that includes other 
institutions that were either unclassifiable or the teacher was a Visiting International Faculty 
(VIF). The reference group includes teachers who attended a traditional, university-based 
preparation program, either at the undergraduate or graduate level or earned their teaching 
license in-state. 
Other Independent Variables of Interest 
 In addition to differences by entry pathway, this study also seeks to understand 
differences in early career teachers’ turnover patterns across schools with different 
characteristics. We examine differences across the percentage of economically disadvantaged 
students, the percentage of minority students (Black, Hispanic, and other non-white students), 
and a measure of school-wide student performance. This final measure is an overall performance 
composite, which is the number of tests passed divided by the number of tests taken. While these 
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variables serve as independent variables of interest in some models, in others, they are used as 
covariates to adjust differences in the turnover patterns across different entry pathways. 
 For the third research question, we demonstrate the extent to which teacher qualifications 
and effectiveness vary predict teacher turnover. Regarding qualifications, we examine 
differences on the performance of college entrance and teacher licensure exams. We created this 
measure by first standardizing all exams observed in the data by exam then taking each teachers’ 
average across the tests s/he has taken. Additional measures of teacher performance include their 
annual evaluation from their principal (which was introduced in the state in the 2010-2011 
school year) and their EVAAS teacher value-added score for those teachers in tested subjects or 
grades. We operationalize teacher evaluation in two ways. First, we take the median evaluation 
score across the five standards on which teachers in North Carolina are evaluated. Second, with 
the overwhelming majority of teachers receiving rated proficient or above, we create a variable 
to indicate whether or not a teacher received any score below proficient. All measures are lagged 
to the previous school year to avoid endogeneity concerns. 
Covariates 
The second research question seeks to understand the teacher and school conditions that 
reduce or increase the risk of turnover among early career teachers from different pathways. As 
teacher and school characteristics are not balanced across entry pathways, we control for a range 
of variables that have been used previously in the turnover literature to adjust the risk of early 
career teachers’ moving schools or leaving the teaching profession. These variables include 
teacher background characteristics, school demographic characteristics, and school working 
conditions. A full list of variables is in Table A1. 
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At the teacher level, we control for a teacher’s gender, race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, 
Asian, American Indian, and multiracial), and age. To adjust for differences across schools, we 
control for indicators of the school level (elementary, middle, or high schools), urbancity (city, 
suburb, rural, and town), average student enrollment total, and per-pupil expenditures. The final 
measures of school climate include the reported violent rates per 1,000 students, the short-term 
suspension per 100 students, and the percentage of teachers with 3 years of experience or less. 
We also control for the local education agency (LEA) teacher salary supplement. North Carolina 
has a statewide salary schedule, with the only source of variation occurring between districts due 
to salary supplements. All continuous variables are mean-centered to allow for making 
predictions from the hazard models for a teacher in an “average” school. 
Previous research suggests that controlling only for observable school characteristics 
does not fully account for the school-level factors that shape teachers’ turnover decision (Ladd, 
2011). We draw on several scales from the Teacher Working Conditions (TWC) survey to also 
control for teacher-reported school conditions. These measures include Facilities and Resources 
(: = 	0.84 − 0.85), Distributed Leadership (: = 	0.86 − 0.88), School Leadership (: = 0.87 −0.93), and Professional Development (: = 	0.79 − 0.86). Table A2 provides additional 
information on the specific survey items that comprise these measures. 
Methods 
Studies of teacher turnover tend to analyze annual year-to-year turnover. Numerous 
problems have been described with this approach, namely, that it does not allow account for 
censored observations, prohibits longitudinal analysis, and, as a result, does not help identify 
particularly “risky” times for turnover (Willett & Singer, 1991). Given that the data includes 
monthly observations of teachers, a survival analytic framework allows us to predict when early 
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career teachers move schools and leave teaching. By accounting for these temporal patterns of 
occurrence, we are able to better model the complexities in the early career teacher labor market, 
which involves not only movement between schools and out of the profession at the end of the 
school year, but at all points during the school year as well.  
We adopt three estimation strategies to answer the first two research question of 
differences in the timing of turnover by teacher entry pathway and school characteristics. Each 
approach offers distinct advantages, which we will discuss in turn. The initial approach involves 
estimating a discrete time survival analysis model. Discrete hazard models are most appropriate 
when the observed time in the data fails to sufficiently represent the underlying continuous time 
model. They also may be more appropriate in cases of interval censoring, when the event is not 
observed at the exact time it occurs. This model can be estimated as follows: E'FG#	ℎ # = 	3I(#) +	3*L* (1) 
where L* is a vector of teacher and school characteristics. We estimate (t) as a discrete variable, 
to allow for separate hazard function in each time period a teacher is observed. In these models, 3I(#) represents the baseline hazard and values 3*, representing the difference from the baseline 
hazard. Standard errors are clustered at the teacher level. This, and all models described below 
also include a cohort fixed effect to allow for cohort differences in the risk of turnover. 
Unlike the discrete time models that predict a baseline hazard rate, the Cox proportional 
hazard model makes no assumptions of the baseline hazard rate. Without estimating a baseline 
hazard rate, the Cox model is best used for describing hazard ratios in survival data. Compared to 
the discrete time models, which allows the possibility to model for non-proportional hazard rates, 
the Cox model assumes that the hazard rate is continuous and proportional. This model can be 
estimated: 
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ℎ(#, N) = 	ℎI # exp	(βSL*) (2) 
where N equals a vector teacher, classroom, and school predictors. An often violated assumption 
of the Cox model—the proportional relative hazard—can be tested by examining if there is a 
relationship between the Schoenfeld residuals and time (Schoenfeld, 1982). 
In cases where this assumption is not met, Royston-Parmar models offer a flexible, 
parametric model with which to model time dependent effects. These models estimate a baseline 
hazard function parametrically, using a spline function of time (Royston & Lambert, 2011). They 
are more flexible than the Cox model as they allow for the effect of regression coefficients to 
vary over time. By estimating a baseline hazard function, these models enable us to predict a 
covariate-adjusted survival curve, including out-of-sample predictions. Yet, in both the Cox and 
Royston-Parmar models, concerns remain around for challenges in modeling patterns in teacher 
turnover where small numbers of teachers turn over each month, with most teachers turning over 
at the end of the school year. 
 The second research question examines the extent to which teacher and school 
characteristics reduce or increase the risk of turnover among early career teachers. We estimate a 
series of models with teacher characteristics, school demographic characteristics, and school 
working conditions. These models help document variation in the risk of turnover across teacher 
and school characteristics, as well as balance the difference in teacher and school characteristics 
across the main independent variable—teacher entry pathways. For instance, to the extent that 
alternatively certified or out-of-state prepared teachers work in schools with more racial/ethnic 
minorities or more difficult working conditions, controlling for these school demographic 
characteristics and working conditions would reduce the risk bias in estimates of the turnover 
associated with early career teachers from different pathways. At the same time, these variables 
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provide evidence of variation in early career teacher turnover across various types of schools.  It 
is important to note that to the extent to which additional variables are correlated with teachers’ 
decision to turnover and vary systematically by entry pathway or any of the other covariates 
being examined, the results should not be interpreted as the causal influence of any one of those 
variables.  
The third research question aims to understand the extent to which measures teacher 
qualifications and effectiveness predict a greater or lower risk of turnover. For this final analysis, 
we re-estimate the discrete time hazard model described above with full controls, running 
separate models for each teacher quality measure. 
Results 
Frequency of Early Career Turnover 
 We begin by documenting the overall frequency with which early career teachers turn 
over, move schools, and leave teaching in North Carolina public schools. Table 2 reports the 
annual frequency of within-year turnover, end-of-year turnover, total turnover, and the 
percentage by which end-of-year turnover measures misidentify the true frequency of turnover, 
calculated by dividing within-year turnover by the total turnover. During teachers’ first three 
years in the profession, an average of 28.73% turnover. This turnover consists of 6.76% of 
novice teachers who turn over during the school year and 20.43% who turn over at the end of the 
year. By not including within-year turnover, measures of turnover that only identify teacher 
departures at the end of the school are attenuated by 23.53%. Although novice teachers 
consistently turn over at high rates, they are most likely to turn over their first year. 8.36% of 
first year teachers turn over before the end of their first year with an additional 24.46% turning 
over at the end of the school year. 
	 83 
Table 2. Frequency and Bias in Annual Measures of Teacher Turnover, by Year in Profession 
 
While these high turnover rates are cause for concern for the schools that hire numerous first 
year teachers, the high rates with which novice teachers leave teaching is of concern for the 
overall supply of teachers. Over their first three years, 3.3% of teachers leave teaching during the 
school year and 9.3% leave teaching at the end of the school year, totaling 12.6%. In other 
words, one out of every eight novice teachers leaves teaching every year. It is also noteworthy 
that end-of-year measures of teacher turnover misidentify the timing with which teachers leave 
by 12.19%. Although first year teachers are most likely to leave, the rate at which novice 
teachers turn over does not consistently decrease with experience. 3.52% of first year teachers 
 % of Teachers to Turn Over   
 Within-Year End-of-Year All Turnover % Misidentified 
Year 1 8.36 24.46 32.82 25.47 
Year 2 6.32 21.00 27.32 23.13 
Year 3 5.61 20.43 26.04 21.54 
Overall 6.76 21.96 28.73 23.53 
   
 
  
  % of Teachers to Move   
  Within-Year End-of-Year All Movers % Misidentified 
Year 1 4.84 15.83 20.68 23.4 
Year 2 3.24 10.80 14.04 23.08 
Year 3 2.35 11.25 13.77 17.07 
Overall 3.59 12.86 16.50 21.76 
   
 
  
 % of Teachers to Leave  
 Within-Year End-of-Year All Leavers % Misidentified 
Year 1 3.52 8.63 12.15 28.97 
Year 2 3.08 10.20 13.28 23.19 
Year 3 3.26 9.18 12.44 26.21 
Overall 3.30 9.30 12.60 26.19 
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leave before the end of their first year, but that declines to 3.08% for second year teachers before 
increasing to 3.26% for third year teachers. 
In terms of moving, we find that throughout teachers first three years, on average, 16.5% 
of teachers move schools annually. This turnover consists of 3.59% of teachers who moved 
schools during the school year and 12.86% who moved at the end of the year.8 It is important to 
note that the within-year and end-of-year measures of the percentage of teachers to move schools 
in a given year are not mutually exclusive, as a teacher may have moved schools during the 
school year, only to change schools again at the end of the year. Teachers are most likely to 
move schools during their first year with 4.84% moving during the year and 15.83% at the end of 
the school year, compared with 3.24% for second year teachers and 2.35% for third year 
teachers. 
Separating teacher turnover based on whether it occurred during or at the end of the 
school year also allows us to document the extent to which conventional measures of end-of-year 
teacher turnover misidentify either the timing or full extent of teacher turnover. Better 
understanding of the timing of turnover is important for two main reasons. First, the disruptive 
effect of turnover may be more detrimental to students or the instructional culture of a school 
when it occurs during versus the end of the school year. Second, overlooking the percentage of 
teachers who move schools during the year attenuates measures of turnover by not counting 
within-year turnover.  
 
 
																																																						
8 Among within-year movers, 57% moved within the same district. This frequency is in contrast to teachers moving 
at the end of the school year, where only 25% of teachers moved within the same district.  
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Timing of Early Career Teacher Turnover 
To better understand the timing of early career teacher turnover and how it is distributed 
across teacher entry pathways and school types, Figure 1 plots of Kaplan-Meier survival curves 
for turnover (left), moving schools (center), and leaving teaching (right) for all early career 
teachers and by teacher entry pathways, minority student enrollment, economically 
disadvantaged student enrollment, and school academic performance. Figure 1a shows that by 
the end of their third year in the profession, only 38% of early career teachers remain in the same 
school. This turnover rate includes 40% of teachers who have moved schools by the end of their 
third year and 33% who have left teaching. It is important to note that as moving and leaving are 
treated as separate outcomes, they are not mutually exclusive, as a segment of teachers move 
schools and then later leave teaching.  
In addition to the cumulative turnover rates, a couple other patterns regarding the timing 
of turnover standout. First, while the largest share of teacher turnover occurs at the end of the 
school year, teachers are turning over during the school year, particularly in their first year, when 
8% turned over. Second, the rate of within- and end-of-year turnover decreases with experience, 
which is driven by a large drop in the rate at which teachers move schools after their first year. 
Third, in contrast with moving schools, the rate at which early career teachers leave the 
profession decreased only slightly during their first three years, with 12% having left by the end 
of their first year, an additional 11% in their second year, and an additional 10% in their third 
year.  
 Consist with our hypothesis, Figure 1b shows notable differences in the turnover rates 
across entry pathways. By the end of their third year, while 43% of teachers from traditional, in- 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for Turnover (right), Moving Schools (center), and 
Leaving (right), by Teacher and School Characteristics  
	
 
(a) All teachers 
 
 
(b) Teacher entry pathway 
 
 
(c) Minority student enrollment 
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(d) Economically disadvantaged student enrollment 
 
 
(e) School academic performance 
	
Notes. Each school year is coded as having 10 months. TC = In-state, traditional preparation; AE 
= Alternate entry; TFA = Teacher For America; OS = Out-of-state prepared. 
 
state preparation programs remain in their original school compared to 31% of alternate entry, 
9% of TFA teachers, and 32% of out-of-state prepared teachers. This overall turnover rate masks  
important differences in the type of turnover. Teachers from in-state, university-based teacher 
education programs are slightly more likely to move schools than alternate entry or out-of-state 
prepared teachers. TFA teachers are the least likely to move schools. The largest differences 
between entry pathway are related to the higher rate of leaving teaching for alternate entry, TFA, 
and out-of-state prepared teachers. By the end of their third year, 23% of in-state, traditionally 
prepared teachers have exited the profession compared to 45% of alternate entry and out-of-state 
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prepared teachers and 82% of TFA teachers. Higher turnover rates are not only driven by end-of-
year turnover but within-year turnover as well. During their first year, only 2% of traditionally 
prepared teachers left teaching compared to 4% of alternate entry teachers, and 5% of out-of-
state prepared teachers, a pattern of within-year turnover that continues into teachers’ second and 
third years.  
 Differences in the timing of teacher turnover also occur across school characteristics. 
Figures 1c examines the relationship between minority student enrollment and the timing of 
turnover, with separate lines for schools one standard deviation below the average racial/ethnic 
minority enrollment (below 28%, one standard deviation on either side of the mean, and one 
standard deviation above the mean, or above 81%. With few differences following the first two 
years, a turnover gap emerges at the end of the second year. 52% of teachers in schools with the 
fewest minority students remain in their school after their second year compared to only 44% in 
the schools with the highest concentration of minority students. By the end of three years, 42% 
of teachers in schools with low minority student enrollment remain in the same school compared 
to 29% of teachers in schools with the highest minority student enrollments. This turnover is 
driven by high rates of leaving the profession following the second year, with a 10 percentage 
point gap between teachers in high minority schools compared to all other schools that increases 
to 13 percentage points by the end of the third year. 
To a lesser degree, early career teachers also turnover from schools with greater 
concentrations of student poverty (Figure 1d). By the end of their third year, 35% of teachers in 
schools with more than one standard deviation above the average FRPL— that is, schools with 
more than 85% students on free or reduced lunch—have left their initial school. Teachers in 
schools with less concentrated poverty turnover at slightly lower rates, with 68% having left their 
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initial school by the end of the third year. Counter to the hypothesis that early career teachers 
would turnover from low performing schools at higher rates, we find no notable differences in 
relation to early career turnover and overall school performance (Figure 1e).9 
Survival Analysis of Early Career Teacher Turnover 
Through the survival analysis, we examine the risk of turnover by entry pathway and 
school characteristics, controlling for teacher background characteristics and school demographic 
characteristics and working conditions. In this first set of models presented in Table 3, we ignore 
the proportionality assumption of hazard modeling to estimate a "rough average of the effects" 
(Allison, 2014, p. 44) of entry pathway and school characteristics for teachers' first three years in 
the profession. In the section “Examining Differences in the Timing of Early Career Teacher 
Turnover”, we test for violation of this assumption, and re-specify the models in Table 3 to 
include an interaction between time and teacher entry pathways. When interpreting the results, 
we focus on the discrete time hazard models (columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, & 10), although the results 
are generally consistent with the Royston-Parmar models columns 3, 4, 7. 8. 11, & 12).10 
Consistent with the general pattern presented in Figure 1, we find evidence that alternate 
entry, Teach For America, and out-of-state prepared teachers are at greater risk of turning over 
than their peers who entered teaching through in-state, traditional education programs. Adding 
school-level controls in columns 2 and 4 reduces the strength of the relationship between teacher
																																																						
9 In addition to predicting moving school and leaving teaching in the appendix (Table A9), we also estimate a series 
of models that predict teachers’ temporary exit and return. There is no significant relationship between any entry 
pathway variables. The two strongest teacher-level predictors of this turnover are gender and age, with female and 
older teachers more likely to temporarily exit and return, possibly for child-rearing or medical leave. 
10 In appendix table A4, we also estimate the model using the Cox proportional hazard model. Results are consistent 
in terms of level of significance. Although the direction of the estimates never changes, there are instances where the 
Cox model has an even higher or lower magnitude. For instance, in the turnover model with full controls, the odds 
ratio on alternate entry is 1.17 while the hazard ratio from the Cox model is 1.12. The odds ratio for Teacher For 
America is 1.63 versus a 1.45 hazard ratio. In general, the estimates from the Royston-Parmar model falls between 
the discrete time and Cox models. 
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Table 3. Survival Analysis of Turnover, Moving Schools, and Leaving Teaching in North Carolina     
  Turnover Moving Leaving 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Alternate entry                                    1.32*** 1.17*** 1.25*** 1.13** 0.87* 0.80*** 0.89* 0.82*** 2.12*** 1.83*** 2.05*** 1.77*** 
Teacher For America                                  2.14*** 1.63*** 1.85*** 1.31*** 0.51*** 0.40*** 0.54*** 0.39*** 5.95*** 4.45*** 5.44*** 3.71*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.38*** 1.36*** 1.32*** 1.29*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.90** 0.89** 2.28*** 2.22*** 2.20*** 2.12*** 
Other                                              1.43*** 1.39*** 1.35*** 1.30*** 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.96 2.15*** 2.08*** 2.06*** 1.96*** 
Female                                             0.92** 0.97 0.90*** 0.95 1.00 1.03 0.97 1.00 0.85*** 0.91* 0.85*** 0.91** 
Black                                              1.02 0.90* 1.01 0.92* 1.08 0.95 1.07 0.95 0.98 0.88* 0.97 0.89* 
Hispanic                                           0.91 0.87 0.94 0.89 0.79 0.76* 0.82 0.78* 1.08 1.03 1.09 1.04 
Other race                                         0.88* 0.85* 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.95 0.87 0.82* 0.92 0.87 
Age                                                1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.00** 1.01*** 1.01* 1.00 1.00* 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
City                                                0.93  0.84***  0.84** 0.77***  1.11  0.98 
Rural                                               0.95  0.89**  0.89*  0.85**  1.01  0.93 
Town                                                0.86*  0.88*  0.84*  0.85*  0.96  0.97 
School size (100s)                                  0.97*** 0.97***  0.97*** 0.97***  0.99** 0.98*** 
Overall performance composite                      1.00  1.02***  1.00  1.02***  1.00  1.02*** 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00** 1.00***  1.00** 1.01***  1.00  1.00* 
% Black students                                    1.00*** 1.01***  1.00*** 1.01***  1.00*  1.01*** 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00*  1.00 
% Other race                                        1.00  1.00*  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             0.99  0.88  0.74  0.73*  1.38*  1.10 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00***  1.00  1.00**  1.00*  1.00* 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00*  1.00  1.00*  1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00***  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00*** 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00*** 
Middle School                                       1.35*** 1.24***  1.29*** 1.23***  1.34*** 1.25*** 
High School                                         1.88*** 1.51***  1.58*** 1.39***  2.00*** 1.65*** 
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Facilities and Resources (std)                      1.01  0.98  1.00  0.98  1.01  0.97 
Distributed leadership (std)                        0.98  0.97  0.98  0.97  1.00  0.99 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.93*** 0.91***  0.96  0.93**  0.90*** 0.88*** 
Professional development (std)                     0.99  1.01  0.98  1.00  1.01  1.03 
Observations                                       251421 251421 253267 253267 251921 251421 253683 253173 306954 305822 306954 305822 
Deviance                                           50892.0 50286.4 30119.73 29186.10 34253.3 33899.1 23070.05 22499.80 34345.5 33756.4 20754.19 20127.65 
Notes. Discrete time models (columns 1-2; 5-6; 9-10) estimated using logistic regression. Coefficients reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered at the teacher level. Royston-
Parmar models (columns 3-4; 7-8; 11-12) estimated with 2 knots. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
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entry pathway and early career turnover, which can be attributed, in part, to these teachers' 
sorting into schools with more underserved students of color and more difficult working 
conditions.11 The odds are 1.17 greater that an alternate entry teacher will turnover than a 
traditionally certified teacher, controlling for school characteristics. The odds of turnover are 
1.63 greater for TFA teachers and 1.36 greater for out-of-state prepared teachers. Although these 
differences in the risk of turnover should not be interpreted causally, even when conditioning on 
a rich set of teacher- and school-level controls, we find a turnover gap that results in substantive 
differences in the predicted survival rates. 
To calculate the predicted survival rate for different pathways, all mean-centered 
covariates are held constant. 56% of in-state traditionally prepared teachers have left their first 
school by the end of their third year, 66% of alternate entry teachers, 76% of TFA teachers, and 
66% of out-of-state prepared teachers. Compared to the survival rates observed in Figure 1, 
teacher and school controls reduce the turnover gap between in-state traditionally prepared 
teachers and all other teacher entry pathways, although a sizable gap still remains. 
The overall turnover measure overlooks important differences in terms of moving schools 
and leaving teaching. When controlling for school characteristics, alternate entry and out-of-state 
prepared teachers are at less of a risk of moving schools than in-state traditionally prepared 
teachers. TFA teachers have much lower odds of moving schools (0.51, p < .001). In terms of the 
predicted survival at the end of three years, 41% of in-state traditionally prepared teachers are 
predicted to have moved schools, 37% of alternate entry teachers, 23% of TFA teachers, and 
																																																						
11 Conditional means across entry pathways reported in Table A3 indicate that alternate entry, Teacher For America, 
and out-of-state prepared teachers work in schools enrolling more Black students but not necessarily more Hispanic 
or other non-White students. Besides TFA teachers, there are no practical differences in the enrollment of 
economically disadvantaged students. Alternate entry and TFA teachers work in schools with a lower overall 
performance composite. 
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36% of out-of-state prepared teachers. Table A5 examines differences in terms of moving within 
the same district and to another district in the same state. We observe no relationship between 
teacher entry pathways and moving to a school in the same district. The overall lower odds of 
moving schools is driven by moving across district borders. Controlling for teacher and school 
characteristics, the odds of moving to a school in a new district are 26% lower for alternate 
teachers than in-state traditionally prepared teachers, 75% lower for TFA teachers, and 18% 
lower for out-of-state prepared teachers.  
With in-state traditionally prepared teachers most likely to move schools, particularly 
across district lines, the turnover gap is driven by a greater risk of leaving teaching among 
teachers who entered teaching outside traditional education programs. When controlling for 
school characteristics, the odds of leaving teaching are 1.83 greater for alternate entry teachers, 
4.45 for TFA teachers, and 2.22 for out-of-state prepared teachers compared to teachers from in-
state, traditional preparation programs.  Over their first three years, the model predicts that 78% 
of in-state traditionally prepared teachers remain in teaching compared to 57% of alternate entry 
teachers, 33% of TFA teachers, and 56% of out-of-state prepared teachers. In other words, 
alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers were twice as likely than in-state, traditionally 
prepared teachers to leave teaching.12 
In terms of school characteristics, results indicate that an increase in Black students in a 
school and, to a lesser degree, economically disadvantaged students are associated with a greater 
risk of turnover. For Black student percentages, the odds of turnover from a school a standard 
deviation below the mean is 0.93. The odds of turnover from a school a standard deviation above 
																																																						
12 In results not presented, we estimated a series of models that tested for the additive effect of working in schools 
with more economically disadvantaged, minority, or under-performing students for early career teachers from the 
various pathways. The only evidence of this hypothesis was a significant, positive interaction between alternate 
entry and Black student enrollment. 
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the mean is 1.08. For economically disadvantaged students, the odds of turnover from a school a 
standard deviation below the mean is 0.94. The odds of turnover from a school a standard 
deviation above the mean is 1.06. Counter to the hypothesis that teachers would be less likely to 
turnover from higher performing schools, we find that a one-unit increase in a school's overall 
performance composite increase the odds of turnover by 1.02 after conditioning on other school 
characteristics. These results were generally consistent across moving schools and leaving 
teaching. 
Among other teacher and school characteristics, male and older teachers are at greater 
risk of leaving teaching. Urbanicity is related to moving schools but not leaving teaching. An 
increase in school size is associated with decreased odds of turnover. Teachers in middle and 
high schools are at greater risk of turning over.13 A higher rate of suspensions and violent acts 
are related to a greater risk of moving schools, while increase in the fraction of teachers with 
three years of experience or less is associated with reduced risk of moving schools. Of the school 
working conditions, teacher reports of principal leadership is the only significant working 
condition, with an increase in principal leadership associated with decreased odds of turnover. 
Finally, in results not presented, the odds ratios for the month indicator that fall at the end of 
each school year (months 10, 20, and 30), are of much greater magnitude than any of the within-
year estimates, confirming that the end of school years are the time when teachers are most at 
risk of turning over. 
																																																						
13 With strong evidence of differences in turnover between elementary, middle, and high schools, we estimated a 
series of models to examine differences in turnover by school type (see Table A6-A8). When controlling for school 
characteristics, we find that alternate entry teachers are no more likely to turnover or move schools from elementary 
schools than traditionally prepared teachers. Among school characteristics, the percentage of Black students 
predicted higher levels of turnover and moving schools in elementary and middle schools but not high schools 
whereas the percentage of economically disadvantaged students only predicted higher levels of turnover in high 
schools. There was no relationship with overall school performance. There is consistent evidence that 
nontraditionally prepared teachers leave teaching from all school types. TFA teachers are most likely to turnover 
from elementary schools. The odds of leaving are comparatively lower in high schools than other types of schools. 
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 To this point in the paper, we have described differences in the timing of teacher turnover 
by teacher entry pathway and school characteristics. A limitation of the survival analysis is that it 
fails to definitively separate the predictors of within- and end-of-year turnover. To address this 
concern in greater detail, we temporarily suspend the survival analysis to offer a more definitive 
test of differences in the predictors of within-year and end-of-year turnover. Table 4 presents 
four logistic regression models: (1) predicting overall turnover at any point during a teacher’s 
first three years, (2) within-year turnover, (3) end-of-year turnover, and, (4) to test for significant 
differences in the predictors or within- and end-of-year turnover, a model where zero is coded to 
end-of-year turnover and one is coded to within-year turnover. When the estimate for this final 
model is significant and greater than one, it provides evidence that the within-year turnover rate 
is greater than end-of-year turnover. When the estimate is significant and less than one, it 
indicates that the end-of-year turnover rate is greater than within-year turnover. We present the 
results separately for turnover, moving, and leaving. 
 For comparison with Table 3, column 1 of Table 4 begins with a model predicting overall 
turnover. Overall, the level of significance is consistent across the survival analysis and logistic 
regression. The magnitude of the odds ratios is generally consistent across these specifications, 
although they tend to be somewhat smaller in the survival analysis. When the results are 
separated by within-year and end-of-year turnover in columns 2 and 3, we find some differences 
by entry pathway. Among alternate entry and TFA teachers, we find that the higher turnover 
rates compared to traditionally prepared teachers is driven by end-of-year turnover. However, 
results from column 4 indicate that only in the case of TFA teachers do we find evidence that the 
difference between within-year and end-of-year turnover is significantly different. In contrast, 
for out-of-state prepared teachers, the odds of turnover are consistent, regardless of the timing.
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates Comparing Within-Year and End-of-Year Turnover, Moving, and Leaving 
  Turnover Moving Leaving 
  
Overall Within-year 
End-of-
year 
End-of-
year vs. 
Within-
year 
Overall Within-year 
End-of-
year 
End-of-
year vs. 
Within-
year 
Overall Within-year 
End-of-
year 
End-of-
year vs. 
Within-
year 
Alternate entry                                    1.24*** 1.11 1.28*** 0.95 0.84** 0.96 0.81*** 1.09 1.94*** 1.29* 2.27*** 0.72** 
Teacher For America                                  2.03*** 0.81 2.23*** 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.66 5.78*** 1.45 6.83*** 0.29*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.40*** 1.36*** 1.36*** 1.05 0.88** 0.94 0.87** 1.03 2.26*** 1.89*** 2.30*** 0.97 
Other                                              1.33*** 1.65*** 1.13 1.37* 0.89 1.09 0.80* 1.32 2.01*** 2.16*** 1.77*** 1.26 
Female                                             0.96 1.06 0.92** 1.16* 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.89** 1.02 0.83*** 1.22* 
Black                                              0.90** 0.89 0.92* 0.98 0.97 1.03 0.97 1.08 0.87* 0.76** 0.93 0.83 
Hispanic                                           0.91 1.08 0.86 1.26 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.97 1.04 1.26 0.94 1.41 
Other race                                         0.89* 0.66** 1.00 0.69* 0.95 0.88 0.97 0.87 0.84* 0.60** 0.96 0.67* 
Age                                                1.01*** 1.03*** 0.99*** 1.03*** 1.00 1.01*** 0.99*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.04*** 1.00 1.03*** 
City                                               0.86** 1.13 0.79*** 1.36** 0.80*** 0.95 0.77*** 1.24 1.11 1.43** 0.98 1.40* 
Rural                                              0.93 1.28** 0.85** 1.47*** 0.90* 1.10 0.85** 1.38** 1.00 1.29* 0.91 1.32 
Town                                               0.89 1.11 0.85** 1.21 0.84* 0.82 0.86* 0.94 0.96 1.29 0.86 1.36 
School size (100s)                                 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.99* 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.99* 0.97*** 1.01 0.96*** 
Overall performance composite                      1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00** 1.00 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.01** 1.00*** 1.00* 1.00** 1.00 1.00 1.01** 1.00** 1.01** 
% Black students                                   1.01*** 1.00 1.01*** 1.00* 1.01*** 1.00* 1.01*** 1.00 1.00* 1.00 1.00*** 0.99* 
% Hispanic students                                1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00* 0.99* 1.00 1.00 
% Other race                                       1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             1.28* 0.63 1.59*** 0.57* 0.96 0.65 1.07 0.72 1.55** 0.87 1.89*** 0.66 
Suspension rate                                    1.00* 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00* 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Violent acts rate                                  1.00 1.00 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99* 
Per pupil expenditures                             1.00* 1.00 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle School                                      1.22*** 1.79*** 1.03 1.61*** 1.18*** 1.27** 1.14** 1.07 1.25*** 2.50*** 0.93 2.75*** 
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High School                                        1.58*** 4.63*** 1.00 4.02*** 1.31*** 2.86*** 1.00 2.77*** 1.76*** 7.15*** 0.98 6.69*** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     0.98 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.01 0.99 1.02 0.95 
Distributed leadership (std)                       0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.94 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.04 
Principal leadership (std)                         0.89*** 0.87*** 0.92*** 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.90*** 0.84** 0.94* 0.89 
Professional development (std)                     1.02 1.07 1.00 1.08 0.97 1.02 0.96 1.05 1.00 1.08 0.96 1.14* 
Observations                                       34520 34520 34520 8393 34520 34520 34520 5702 34520 34520 34520 4336 
Deviance                                           37163.3 13772.5 32513.5 8293.3 30480.2 10361.1 26511.0 5700.2 24514.8 8878.8 20150.8 4301.3 
Notes. The End-of-year vs. Within-year variable is coded as 0 when a teacher turned over, moved schools, or left teaching at the end of the school year and 1 when a teacher 
turned over, moved schools, or left teaching within the school year. Coefficients reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered at the teacher level. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** 
p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
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 In terms of moving schools, teachers to enter teaching through an in-state, university 
based program move schools at the end of the school year at the highest rates. TFA teachers have 
much lower odds of moving schools within the school year compared to traditionally prepared 
teachers, although this difference is not significantly different from their low rates of end-of-year 
turnover.  
 Consistent with Table 3, we find much greater odds of leaving teaching for alternate 
entry, TFA, and out-of-state prepared teachers in comparison to in-state, traditionally prepared 
teachers. Although the magnitude of the odds ratios is greater for leaving at the end-of-year 
versus leaving within the year for out-of-state prepared teachers, we find no evidence that this 
difference is significant. In other words, the high rates of leaving for these teachers is driven by 
both within-year and end-of-year turnover. Alternate entry and TFA teachers, in contrast, are no 
more likely than traditionally certified teachers to leave during the year, but have high odds of 
turnover at the end of the school year. 
Among school characteristics, we find no difference in the relationship between within-
year and end-of-year turnover and a school’s overall academic performance. We find differences 
in the relationship between the economically disadvantaged and Black student enrollment. A one 
percentage point increase in economically disadvantaged student enrollment is associated with a 
one percent increase in the odds of within-year turnover. We find no similar relationship with 
end-of-year turnover. Results from column 4 suggest that this difference between within- and 
end-of-year turnover is significant, suggesting that the slightly higher turnover rates among 
novice teachers from high poverty schools are driven by teachers leaving during the school year. 
In contrast, we find that the relationship between Black student enrollment and teacher turnover 
is concentrated among teachers leaving at the end of the school year.  
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With no evidence of differences in the relationship between these school characteristics 
and moving schools, we find the end-of-year versus within-year turnover gap is driven by 
differences in when teachers leave schools. Among novice teachers, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between the percentage of economically disadvantaged students in the 
school and within-year turnover. A one percentage point increase in economically disadvantaged 
student enrollment is associated with a 1% increase in the odds of leaving school within the year. 
In contrast, a one percentage point increase in economically disadvantaged student enrollment is 
associated with a 0.5% decrease in the odds of leaving school within the year. We find no 
evidence of a relationship between Black student enrollment and leaving within the year but a 
small and significant relationship with leaving at the end of the year.  
Teacher Quality and Early Career Turnover 
 We extend the above analysis to examine the extent to which various measures of teacher 
quality predict early career teacher turnover. We run four separate models predicting overall 
turnover, moving schools, and leaving teaching, respectively. Each model includes a lagged 
measure of teacher quality: average teacher test score, TVAAS score, median evaluation score, 
and an indicator of whether or not they scored below proficient on any of the five standards that 
comprise a teacher evaluation score. A limitation of this approach is that we are only able to 
predict the relationship between teacher quality and turnover in teachers’ second and third years.  
 Of the measures of teacher quality, in Table 5, we see a relationship between teacher 
turnover and the two measures related to a teachers’ evaluation from their principal. First, a 
teacher who received at least one below proficient rating on any of the five standards is at greater 
risk of turning over. The next column provides further evidence that teachers who received 
proficient or accomplished ratings were at less risk of turning over compared to teachers rated  
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Table 5. Survival Analysis of Turnover, By Measures of Teacher Quality 
                                                    Principal Evaluation 
  Panel A. Turnover                                                 
Average 
teacher 
test TVAAS 
Any 
score 
below 
proficient 
Median 
Score 
Lagged quality measure 0.99 1.00 1.26***  
   Proficient Rating    0.78* 
   Accomplished Rating     0.75** 
   Distinguished Rating    1.28 
Observations                                       104401 20286 106041 106041 
 
     
Panel B. Moving Schools 
Lagged quality measure 0.96 0.97 1.20*  
   Proficient Rating    0.84 
   Accomplished Rating     0.71** 
   Distinguished Rating    1.25 
Observations                                       142680 25036 141158 141158 
 
     
Panel C. Leaving Teaching in North Carolina 
Lagged quality measure 1.03 1.02 1.27**  
   Proficient Rating    0.79* 
   Accomplished Rating     0.78* 
   Distinguished Rating    1.18 
Observations                                       142680 27337 141158 141158 
Notes. Odds ratios from separate discrete time hazard models. Models include teacher and student 
controls. Standard errors clustered at the teacher level. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. All 
models include cohort fixed effects. 
below proficient. Although the estimate on distinguished, the highest rating in the state, is 
imprecisely measured and statistically insignificant, the direction on the odds ratio suggests that 
the highest rated teachers may be at risk of turning over at higher rates than the lowest rated 
teachers. We find no evidence of a relationship between the average teacher test or a teachers’ 
value-added score. Without this evidence, these models are unable to separate whether it is the 
relationship between the evaluation score and teacher turnover is driven by the signal from an 
administrator of receiving a low evaluation or lower performance on behalf of the teacher. 
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Examining Differences in the Timing of Early Career Teacher Turnover 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate differences in the average risk of turning over 
during teachers first three years across entry pathway and school characteristics. They give no 
indication of how this relationship varies over time. To test if there is evidence of the violation of 
the proportionality assumption, we test that the Schoenfeld residuals for each covariate are 
uncorrelated with time (Schoenfeld, 1982). Of the independent variables of interest, we find 
strong evidence of a time dependent effect of alternate entry (!" = 28.75, * < .001), TFA (!" =19.96, * < .001), and out-of-state prepared teachers (!" = 2.55, * = 0.1101).14 In regards to 
moving, we find little evidence of violation of the proportionality assumption. The !" for 
alternate entry teachers is 0.21 (p = 0.64), 2.55 for TFA (p = 0.1105), and 1.20 for out-of-state 
prepared teachers (0.27). The magnitude of the !" for leaving are even larger, suggesting a 
strong relationship between entry pathway and the timing of leaving teaching. Overall, we find 
no evidence that the percentage of economically disadvantaged, minority students, or overall 
school performance have a time dependent effect on turnover. Although the Royston-Parmar 
model is our preferred specification to model time dependent effects, for comparison, we also 
present the results from the district time hazard model that includes an interaction between each 
entry pathway and a continuous measure of time. 
While the results are presented in Table 6, because of the difficulty interpreting time 
dependent Royston-Parmar models, we follow Royston and Lambert (2011) and plot the hazard 
ratio for alternate entry (left panel of Figure 2), TFA (middle), and out-of-state prepared teachers 
(right) compared to in-state traditionally prepared teachers. Across each graph, when the estimate 
or its confidence interval overlaps 1, there is no evidence of differences in the risk of turnover
																																																						
14 In regards to moving, we find less evidence of violation of the proportionality assumption. The !" for alternate 
entry teachers is 0.21 (p = 0.64), 2.55 for TFA (p = 0.1105), and 1.20 for out-of-state prepared teachers (0.27). 
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Table 6. Time-Dependent Survival Analysis of Turnover, Moving Schools, and Leaving Teaching in North Carolina 
  Turnover Moving Leaving 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Alternate entry                                    0.10 -0.05 0.24*** 0.14* -0.05 -0.17 0.12 0.04 0.57*** 0.37** 0.49*** 0.35*** 
Teacher For America                                  
-
1.18*** 
-
1.56*** 0.12 -0.23 
-
1.84*** 
-
2.18*** 
-
0.72*** 
-
1.05*** 0.04 -0.41** 0.91*** 0.56*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              0.30*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 -0.12 0.92*** 
0.86**
* 0.76*** 0.72*** 
Other                                              0.86*** 0.79*** 0.55*** 0.50*** 0.34* 0.29 -0.02 -0.05 1.62*** 
1.52**
* 1.08*** 0.99*** 
Time (in months)                                        0.02*** 0.03***  0.01*** 0.03***  0.04*** 0.05***  
Time*Alternate entry 0.01** 0.01**   -0.00 -0.00   0.01 0.01*   
Time*Teacher For America 0.12*** 0.12***  0.08*** 0.08***  0.10*** 0.10***  
Time*Out-of-state prepared 0.00 0.00   -0.01 -0.00   -0.01 -0.00   
Time*Other 
-
0.04*** -0.03***  -0.02* -0.02*   
-
0.05*** -0.05***  
Female                                             
-
0.10*** -0.04 
-
0.11*** -0.06* -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.00 
-
0.17*** -0.10** 
-
0.17*** -0.10** 
Black                                              0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.09* 0.08 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.11* -0.04 -0.13* 
Hispanic                                           -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.11 -0.21 -0.27* -0.20 -0.24* 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Other race                                         -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.08 -0.13 
Age                                                0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 0.02*** 
0.02**
* 0.01*** 0.01*** 
City                                                -0.17*** 
-
0.16***  -0.28*** 
-
0.26***  0.01  0.01 
Rural                                               -0.13**  -0.12**  -0.18*** -0.17**  -0.08  -0.08 
Town                                                -0.17**  -0.13*  -0.20**  -0.16*  -0.06  -0.03 
School size (100s)                                  -0.03*** 
-
0.03***  -0.04*** 
-
0.04***  -0.02*** 
-
0.02*** 
Overall performance composite                       0.02*** 0.02***  0.02*** 0.02***  0.01*** 0.02*** 
% economically disadvantaged                        0.00*** 0.00***  0.01*** 0.01***  0.00*  0.00 
% Black students                                    0.01*** 0.01***  0.01*** 0.01***  0.01*** 0.01*** 
% Hispanic students                                 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
% Other race                                        0.00*  0.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00*  0.00* 
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Teachers with 3 yrs experience or 
less              -0.25*  -0.16  -0.44**  -0.32*  0.05  0.07 
Suspension rate                                     0.00*  0.00***  0.00*  0.00**  0.00  0.00* 
Violent acts rate                                   0.00**  0.00*  0.00**  0.00*  0.00  0.00 
Per pupil expenditures                             0.00*  0.00***  0.00  0.00  0.00**  0.00*** 
Teacher salary supplement                          -0.00  -0.00*  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00*** 
-
0.01*** 
Middle School                                       0.23*** 0.21***  0.22*** 0.20***  0.25*** 0.22*** 
High School                                         0.49*** 0.41***  0.39*** 0.33***  0.58*** 0.49*** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
Distributed leadership (std)                        -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
Principal leadership (std)                         -0.09*** 
-
0.08***  -0.07**  -0.07**  -0.12*** 
-
0.11*** 
Professional development (std)                      0.01  0.01  0.00  -0.00  0.03  0.03 
Constant 
-
3.62*** -4.22***  
-
3.94*** -4.43***  
-
5.16*** -5.86***  
Observations                                       251421 251421 253267 253267 251921 251421 253683 253173 306954 305822 306954 305822 
Deviance                                           72542.2 71592.7 29761.1 28836.8 47365.2 46734.0 22997.0 22429.5 43929.1 43140 20509.5 19885.4 
Notes. Discrete time models (columns 1-2; 5-6; 9-10) estimated using logistic regression. Coefficients reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered at the teacher level. 
Royston-Parmar models (columns 3-4; 7-8; 11-12) estimated with 2 knots. Models include a time-varying component for the entry pathway variables. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** 
p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
	 104 
between traditionally prepared and the comparison teacher pathway at that point in their early 
career trajectory. Compared to traditionally prepared teachers, alternate entry teachers are at 
greater risk of moving schools for the first few months of their career and then have nearly twice 
the risk of leaving teaching. Teacher For America teachers have a much lower risk of moving 
schools until their third year, but have an increasing risk of leaving teaching after their first year. 
Out-of-state prepared teachers are no more at risk of moving schools, but consistently have twice 
the risk of leaving compared to in-state prepared teachers. 
With evidence that the timing of turnover varies across pathways, Figure 3 plots the 
survival curves for turnover (right), moving schools (middle), and leaving teaching (right) from 
the Royston-Parmar model that models the time dependent effect of teacher entry pathway. 
Compared to the Kaplan-Meier survival curves in Figure 1, adding controls for teacher and 
school characteristics and modeling the time dependency of entry pathway reduces the turnover 
gap between in-state, traditionally prepared teachers and alternate entry and out-of-state prepared 
teachers. Whereas there was a 12 percentage point difference in the three-year survival rate 
between traditional and alternatively prepared teachers, the predicted difference is 6 percentage 
points. For out-of-state teachers, the descriptive difference is 11 percentage points, with a 10 
percentage point predicted difference. 
Compared to the results in Table 3 that only allow for the interpretation of the cumulative 
survival rates, allowing for the time dependent effect of entry pathways allows for the 
interpretation of the survival rates at any month in a novice teachers’ career. Figure 3a shows 
that a significant difference in the percentage of teachers to remain in their original school 
emerges at the end of the first year for out-of-state prepared teachers and the end of the second 
year for alternate entry teachers. TFA teachers are shown to turnover at lower rates for the first  
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Figure 2. Hazard Ratios Comparing In-State, Traditionally Prepared Teachers to Alternate Entry 
(left), Teacher For America (center), and Out-of-State Prepared Teachers (right) from Time 
Dependent Royston-Parmar Model 
 
(a) Turnover 
 
 
(b) Moving Schools 
 
 
(c) Leaving teaching in North Carolina 
 
Notes. Each school year is coded as having 10 months. Hazard ratios compared to in-state, 
traditionally prepared teachers. For presentation, graphs limited hazard ratios less than 5. 
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Figure 3. Predicted Survival Curves from Time Dependent Royston-Parmar model for Turnover 
(right), Moving Schools (center), and Leaving (right), by Teacher Entry Pathway  
 
 
(a) Teacher entry pathway 
 
 
(b) Teacher entry pathway in high minority schools 
 
Notes. Each school year is coded as having 10 months. TC = In-state, traditional preparation; AE 
= Alternate entry; TFA = Teacher For America; OS = Out-of-state prepared. Results from Figure 
3b based on a model limited to schools with one more than one standard deviation above 
minority student enrollment (81% minority enrollment). 
 
 
two years of their career before dropping steeply around the second year. The only notable 
difference in the survival curves for moving is the lower rate at which TFA teachers are 
predicted to move schools compared to all other teachers. Controlling for teacher and school 
characteristics, in-state traditionally prepared teachers are predicted to remain in teaching at 
higher rates than teachers from other entry pathways. For instance, at the end of three years of 
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teaching, the Kaplan-Meier curve for traditionally prepared teachers in Figure 1 showed that 
77% of novice teachers remained in teaching. The predicted survival rate, which conditions on 
the average for each covariate, is 84% at the end of three years. Although the rate at which 
alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers are predicted to leave teaching is reduced when 
controlling for teacher and school controls, a significant gap persists in regards to the rate at 
which teachers leave teaching compared to traditionally prepared. Compared to in-state 
traditionally prepared teachers, the gap is 12% for alternate entry teachers and 16% for out-of-
state prepared teachers. TFA teachers are still predicted to leave teaching at the highest rates. 
With evidence above of higher turnover rates in schools enrolling more students of color, 
we re-estimate this Royston-Parmar model for schools a standard deviation above the average 
minority student enrollment and plot the predicted survival curve across entry pathways in 
Figure 3b. While the general pattern between entry pathways and teacher turnover persists, all 
teacher are more likely to turnover in these high minority schools compared to schools with 
average minority student enrollment, as is depicted in Figure 3a. Of the in-state traditionally 
prepared teachers to begin their career in high minority schools, only 39% remain in the same 
school after three years, approximately 30% of alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers, 
and 10% of Teacher For America teachers. Most stark, is that 40% of alternate entry and out-of-
state prepared teachers in high minority schools have left teaching by the end of their third year. 
As schools with a greater share of underserved students are where alternate entry and out-of-state 
teachers are most likely to find their first teaching job, these high predicted rates of exit from the 
profession raise concerns that these teachers are not being adequately inducted into the teaching 
profession in the schools where they begin their careers. 
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Figure 4. Out-of-sample predictions of teacher turnover, 2009-2010 cohort 
  
  
  
 
Notes. Predictions from Royston-Parmar model based on column 4 of Table 4. Kaplan-Meier 
survival curve from the 2009-2010 cohort. Each school year is coded as having 10 months. TC = 
In-state, traditional preparation; AE = Alternate entry; TFA = Teacher For America; OS = Out-
of-state prepared. 
 
 
As a final step, we extend this model by examining how well it predicts teacher turnover 
outside of the three-year sample used in the analysis up until this point. we use the data on 
teachers’ turnover patterns available from the 2009-2010 cohort to examine the out-of-sample 
predicted survival rate. Using the same model from above, we predict the survival rate across 
entry pathways for teachers’ fourth and fifth school years. We then contrast the predicted 
survival curve to this cohort of teachers’ observed turnover patterns. In Figure 4, two features 
stand out.  
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First, the Kaplan-Meier survival curves indicate that the turnover gap between traditionally 
prepared teachers is not isolated to their first three years. Among teachers who began teaching 
during the 2009-2010 cohort, approximately a quarter of traditionally prepared teachers and 15% 
of alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers remain in the same school after five years. 
With similar levels of moving schools across each entry pathway, the turnover gap continues to 
be driven by the lower rates at which traditionally prepared teachers leave teaching in North 
Carolina public schools compared to all other entry pathways. In results presented in the Figures 
A1 and A2 in the appendix, we find that after five years, 65% of traditionally certified teachers 
remain in teaching at the end of their fifth year, 45% of alternate entry teachers, 34% of out-of-
state prepared teachers, and 10% of TFA teachers. 
Second, the predicted survival curves from the Royston-Parmar survival are quite accurate 
in predicting the cumulative survival rate after five years. The only prediction that is somewhat 
off is for Teacher For America teachers, all of whom were predicted to have exited teaching. 
Contrasting the descriptive data and predictions raise the question of how well this model 
estimates the timing of within-year turnover. The survival curves overestimate the proportion of 
teachers who remain in the profession during the school year to account for the high level of 
turnover at the end of the school year. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we argue that the convergence of three factors—increased reliance on 
inexperienced teachers, the diversifications of teacher entry pathways, and the disproportional 
employment of novice teachers in underserved schools—are fueling a new dynamic in the 
teacher labor market. Open teaching positions are concentrated in underserved schools with 
challenging conditions that may lack the supports needed for the induction of new teachers, 
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particularly for those teachers from out-of-state or alternate entry programs that may require 
additional supports. Organizational commitment theory suggests that novice teachers bring 
normative commitments to teaching and face a unique set of perceived costs and affective 
attachments once they enter the classroom, all of which shape the time they remain in their first 
school. Difficult social conditions in teachers’ first school likely increase demoralization and 
lack of commitment to remain in their school and the profession, leading to higher levels of 
turnover, both during and at the end of the school year. 
 The use of survival analysis to understand the timing of turnover each month gives a 
nuanced view of the turnover patterns of early career teachers. Consistent with previous research 
and organizational commitment theory, we find higher turnover rates for early career alternate 
entry, Teacher For America, and out-of-state prepared teachers compared to in-state traditionally 
prepared teachers. With teachers trained in traditional university-based programs being more 
likely to move schools, the turnover gap by entry pathway is driven by much higher rates of 
leaving teaching among teachers from non-traditional entry pathways. Across the three cohorts 
in this study, 23% of in-state, traditionally prepared teachers had exited the profession by the end 
of their third year compared to 45% of alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers and 
82% of TFA teachers. Controlling for teacher and school characteristics explain a portion of this 
observed difference in the timing and frequency of turnover across entry pathways. Notably, 
higher turnover rates are not only driven by end-of-year turnover but within-year turnover as 
well. 
 Early career teachers are most likely to turnover from schools with more racial/ethnic 
minorities, particularly those schools that enroll large numbers of Black students, the schools 
where alternate entry and out-of-state prepared teachers are most likely to teach. The teacher 
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turnover from high minority schools is driven by higher rates of leaving teaching, with 42% of 
teachers in schools with the greatest concentrations of minorities leaving teaching compared to 
29% in all other schools. Although we see little evidence that alternate entry or out-of-state 
prepared teachers are more likely to turnover in under-performing or high minority schools, the 
higher placement of these underprepared teachers in high needs schools likely aggravates the rate 
at which they turnover. This finding is particularly concerning as both the within- and end-of-
year turnover disrupt the learning environments for students in these underserved schools. 
 We found evidence that the teachers at greatest risk of leaving are those who received 
lower evaluation scores from their principal. Although we do find evidence of a relationship 
between teacher value-added or the average teacher test, our results suggest that previous 
research on the relationship between teacher quality and turnover may be biased by the extent 
that it overlooks within-year turnover, particularly in teachers first year. If it is the lowest-
performing teachers to turnover midyear, current estimates may significantly underestimate the 
relationship between teacher quality and turnover, as quality measures would be unobserved for 
a segment of teachers. 
A couple of limitations of the study should be noted. Further, as with most studies of 
teacher turnover, we are unable to identify whether or not the turnover was voluntary or 
involuntary. With evidence that early career teachers move within districts during the school 
year, evidence of whether this assignment was driven by the district would give a more accurate 
understanding of the factors that shape early career teacher turnover. Second, to address the 
inherent selection bias in studying differences in teacher entry pathway, this study relies on a rich 
set of teacher and school characteristics to balance differences across entry pathways and types 
of schools. That being said, unobserved heterogeneity may bias the relationship between entry 
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pathway, school type, and teacher turnover. As a result, the results should not be interpreted as 
the effect of an entry pathway or a teacher working in a school with particular characteristics. 
Despite these limitations, this study raises several policy implications related to new teacher 
preparation, hiring, and induction.  
In recent decades, states have reduced the barriers into the teaching profession, either 
establishing procedures for teachers to receive reciprocal licenses in other states or adopting 
alternative entry pathways into teaching outside traditional, university-based programs (Henry et 
al., 2014). While such programs have helped states meet staffing shortages in hard-to-staff 
subjects and schools, questions remain about the extent to which teachers from these new 
pathways have the same commitment to remain in the profession in-state traditionally prepared 
teachers. Evidence presented in this paper indicates that alternate entry and out-of-state teachers 
do fill teaching positions in low-performing schools but also leave teaching at much higher rates 
than traditionally prepared teachers. This finding suggests that these teachers may benefit from 
induction supports or financial incentives to improve their overall retention. Evidence of high 
levels of within-year turnover, particularly in teachers’ first year, suggests that such programs 
could be better targeted to account for this within-year mobility. An alternative approach 
suggests altering elements of the teacher labor market, by either inducing more experienced and 
effective teachers to teach in high minority, low-performing schools (Zimmer, Henry, & Kho, 
forthcoming) or promoting student teaching in underperforming schools (Ronfeldt, 2012). 
Findings from this paper also indicate within-year turnover includes sorting to a new 
school within the same district. Combined with evidence that teachers hired late in the school 
year have a negative effect on student achievement (Papay & Ronfeldt, 2016), our results suggest 
that districts would be advised to reassign teachers as early in the year as possible to avoid the 
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disruption to their students and the school environment when teachers are reassigned once the 
year has begun.  
The evidence of differences in the level and timing of turnover across entry pathways is 
useful information for administrators faced with hiring inexperienced teachers. Given choice 
among candidates, principals may be hesitant to hire alternate entry or out-of-state prepared 
teachers. Further, understanding the timing of turnover also shifts the focus of teacher hiring as a 
spring and summer activity to one that could occur any point throughout the school year. Recent 
research on principal time use suggests principals are increasingly pulled out of the classroom 
and into administrative tasks and organizational management, including hiring (Camburn, et al., 
2010; Grissom, Loeb, & Master, 2013; Horng, et al., 2010). 
 Evidence of within-year turnover suggests that previous studies to focus on annual 
measures of teacher turnover underestimate the frequency with which turnover occurs and its 
overall effect on students and their school. Further, within-year turnover is likely more disruptive 
to the learning opportunities of students, particularly those in underserved schools that face 
higher annual within-year and end-of-year turnover. 
 A final contribution of the study relates to its timing. The Great Recession marked a 
period of flux within the teacher labor market. The supply of new teachers waned and the risk of 
layoffs for early career teachers peaked in the subsequent years (Goldhaber, Strunk, Brown, & 
Knight, 2016). This paper highlights how the churn within the teacher labor market during this 
period did not only occur between school years, but during the year as well, which has ongoing 
implications for the recruitment and equitable distribution of teachers (Sutcher, Darling-
Hammond, & Carver-Thomas, 2016).  
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF TEACHER TURNOVER ON STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Introduction 
 Employee turnover in public sector organizations is consequential both for its 
relationship with employee productivity and the ways in which it affects the delivery of services 
to the organization’s clients (Grissom, Viano, & Selin, 2015). Research in K-12 public education 
has examined both issues, although the primary focus has been teacher productivity (e.g. Boyd, 
Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2008; Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2011). The impact 
of teacher turnover on students has received considerably less attention in the literature, although 
recent research in this vein suggests turnover adversely affects student achievement (Hanushek, 
Rivkin, & Schiman, 2016; Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013). Teacher turnover may harm 
student achievement through three distinct mechanism: (1) staff instability; (2) classroom 
disruption; (3) differences in quality of replacement and replaced teacher.  
Staff instability impedes the development and maintenance of a cohesive organizational 
culture and a rigorous instructional program (Bryk et al., 2010; Holme & Rangel, 2012). Teacher 
turnover, especially when rates are higher, undermines the capacity of schools to maintain a 
coherent instructional program built around high expectations and teacher leadership. In addition 
to eliminating lines of professional communication among teachers, students lose connections 
with adults with whom they have built relationships within their schools. If instructional 
communication and continuity is most important at the grade level, turnover in a particular grade 
can affect the instructional program within that grade and communication of teachers about 
particular students and the objectives for their learning that they have in common. Mid-year 
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classroom disruptions of the relationships between students and teachers separates the student 
from a teacher with whom they have built a relationship and who may understand how to tailor 
instruction to meet the needs of their individual students. It is easy to imagine that the disruption 
could setback students’ performance. Finally, teacher turnover also changes the composition of 
teachers within a school. Student academic performance will suffer when a less effective teacher 
replaces the departing teacher. Of course, if the teacher departs due to poor performance and is 
replaced by a more effective one, the replacement effect could be positive. 
Studies from New York City and Texas provide credible estimates of the effect of teacher 
turnover on student achievement. Ronfeldt and colleagues (2013) find that students in a fourth or 
fifth grade with fewer teachers returning from the previous year score between 8.2 and 10.2 
percent of a standard deviation lower in math and 4.9 to 6.0 percent of a standard deviation lower 
in English language arts compared to a grade in which all teachers return for the next year. 
Effects are larger in schools with higher proportions of low-performing and Black students. 
Hanushek et al. (2016) find similar results, albeit less consistent across model specification, 
ranging from 4 to 11 percent of a standard deviation in math, with no results reported for English 
language arts. Even with evidence that turnover effects student achievement to a nontrivial 
extent, both sets of authors may underestimate the true effect of turnover for two reasons. First, 
their identification strategy leverages idiosyncratic variation in turnover between grades in the 
same year and same school and, as an alternative, between years within the same grade and same 
school. These estimates combine the effects of two between-year mechanisms: staff instability 
and replacement. Second, they estimate the impact of teacher turnover that occurred the summer 
prior to when the test scores used for outcomes are measured. With a measure of turnover that is 
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somewhat distal to the measurement of student performance in the current academic year, their 
estimates may be further attenuated. 
Using unique administrative data that measures individual teacher turnover at the 
monthly level, we examine effects of the three mechanisms through which teacher turnover 
harms student achievement. Compared to Ronfeldt et al. (2013) and Hanushek et al. (2016) that 
measure teacher turnover annually, our monthly turnover measure allows us to distinguish the 
effect of teacher turnover that occurs before the school year begins, as they both do, as well as 
turnover during the school year. Moreover, matched student-teacher data allow us to estimate the 
disruptive effect on the students who lose their teacher during the school year.  Using detailed 
micro-teacher and student administrative data from North Carolina, we estimate a series of 
models to isolate the effects of each of these mechanisms on student achievement. While most 
research on teacher turnover has focused on year-to-year turnover, to estimate the disruption 
effects within a school year, our data support examination of the effects of within-year turnover, 
which has been shown to constitute a 25 percent increase in year-to-year turnover rates (Redding 
& Henry, for submission). This data allows us to create three separate measures: classroom-level 
within-year classroom teacher turnover, grade-level within-year turnover, and grade-level end-
of-year turnover.  With different measures of the timing and level of turnover, we identify the 
effects of the three mechanisms that we hypothesize explain the effect of teacher turnover on 
student performance, including within-year replacement and disruption mechanisms. This study 
describes how these three mechanisms linked to teacher turnover—staff instability, classroom 
disruption, and teacher replacement —may affect student achievement. 
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Teacher Turnover and Student Achievement 
 Researchers have long identified systematic patterns in the teacher labor market whereby 
teachers transfer out of under-resourced urban schools with high concentrations of low-income 
students and traditionally underserved racial/ethnic groups (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004a; 
Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). The result of this pattern is that more qualified and effective 
teachers are less likely to teach the students most in need (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2015; 
Bastian, Henry & Thompson, 2013). Summarizing the relationship between teacher effectiveness 
and turnover, Boyd and colleagues (2008) write: “the more effective transfers tend to move to 
higher achieving schools, while less effective transfers stay in lower-performing schools, likely 
exacerbating the differences across students in the opportunities they have to learn” (p. 2). In 
addition to exacerbating the inequitable distribution of teachers across schools, teacher turnover 
is also assumed to negatively impact student learning. 
Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff (2013) provide the first plausibly causal estimates of 
turnover on student achievement by linking turnover in the previous school year and summer to 
student achievement in the current year. Using school-by-year and school-by-grade fixed effects, 
the authors leverage differences in grade-level turnover within the same school in the same 
academic year and in the same grade and school between years to estimate the effect of teacher 
turnover on student achievement. They attribute the negative effect of teacher turnover to the 
disruption to teachers and students caused by a teacher leaving a particular grade in a school. 
This mechanism, what we term staff instability, is distinct from classroom disruption, a separate 
mechanism that can only be measured by within-year measures of turnover. As the authors 
estimated the impact of turnover within a grade by comparing with other grades within the same 
school, their discussion focuses on the consequences of staff instability at this organizational 
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level while removing school-level confounders. As we measure end-of-year and within-year 
turnover separately, we describe how the effect of turnover differs depending on its timing and 
we can investigate the extent to which classroom disruption triggered by teachers leaving during 
a school year affects student achievement. 
 As noted above, we hypothesize that there are three mechanisms whereby teacher 
turnover may impact student achievement: (1) staff instability; (2) classroom disruption; (3) 
differences in quality of replacement and replaced teacher. While the effect the different 
mechanisms may be additive, as we describe below, the underlying mechanisms that influence 
student achievement are distinct. The first mechanism by which teacher turnover may impact 
student achievement is staff instability. The instability caused by teacher turnover can inhibit the 
formation of a cohesive organizational culture that is capable of implementing coherent 
instructional programs. When teachers leave a school, they take with them institutional 
knowledge about their students, the curriculum, and school programs and policies. Less shared 
knowledge among the remaining teachers weakens their ability to form a cohesive instructional 
culture. Further, stability of the teaching staff is vital for the development of staff collegiality and 
a culture of trust in the school (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Little, 1982). The social capital that 
results from the network of inter-relationships forms the basis of professional relationships aimed 
at improving instruction (Louis & Marks, 1998). Recent research on the school conditions 
needed for teacher instructional improvement affirm that working in a school with a strong 
culture of collaboration and high quality peers can affect student achievement (Jackson & 
Bruegmann, 2009; Kraft & Papay, 2014; Papay, Taylor, Tyler & Laski, 2016; Ronfeldt, Farmer, 
McQueen, Grissom, 2015). The formation of collaborative relationships that foster instructional 
improvements would be undermined by both within-year and end-of-year teacher turnover.  
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 The negative effects of staff instability may be particularly detrimental when 
concentrated in a particular grade. Teachers often meet in grade-level teams to coordinate lesson 
planning, align their pacing, discuss strategies to engage students, and receive collegial 
encouragement (Louis, Mark, & Kruse, 1996). Just as schools with high levels of teacher 
turnover struggle to form a cohesive organizational culture, the challenges of maintaining 
instructional continuity may be more difficult when turnover occurs at the grade level. The 
negative effect of grade-level teacher turnover is likely most detrimental when it occurs during 
the school year. Immediately following a teachers’ departure, class sizes may bulge before the 
teacher is replaced and long- or short-term substitutes may staff the recently vacated classroom 
(Papay & Kraft, 2016). When a replacement is hired, teachers may be assigned to help orient and 
mentor the new teacher, reducing the time they can dedicate to their own students (Guin, 2004). 
In schools where teachers leave midyear, administrators must dedicate time to re-staff 
classrooms throughout a year that could be used for improving teacher instruction or working 
conditions (Barnes, Crowe, & Schaefer, 2007). 
 While the negative impact of teacher instability on student achievement is of overall 
concern, that turnover occurs at disproportionately high rates in schools with high concentrations 
of underrepresented minorities and low-income students raises additional equity concerns. The 
negative effects of turnover on student achievement that Ronfeldt and colleagues (2013) 
observed are larger in schools with higher proportions of low-performing and Black students. 
Simon and Johnson (2015) describe several reasons for this phenomenon. Schools with higher 
turnover rates employ higher concentrations of novice teachers who tend to be less effective 
(Clotfelter et al., 2007; Henry, Bastian, & Fortner, 2011; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). 
Schools with more inexperienced teachers might lack sufficient mentors for new teachers across 
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different grades and subjects (Loeb, Darling-Hammond, Luczak, 2005). High turnover schools 
are forced to reallocate teaching assignments each year, which may undermine the accumulation 
of grade- or subject-specific human capital, further decreasing student achievement (Atteberry, 
Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2016; Ost, 2014) or inducing additional teacher turnover (Ost & Schiman, 
2015). Finally, as we described above, teacher turnover erodes professional norms required to 
establish trusting relationships and maintain instructional continuity within a school. In high 
turnover schools faced with a perpetual sense of upheaval, schools may lack amassed social 
capital with which to ground efforts to improve instruction. 
 Beyond the ways in which staff instability may impair a school’s organizational culture 
and instruction, teacher turnover may directly harm student achievement through classroom 
disruptions it causes for individual students. The disruptive effect on student learning is likely to 
be particularly strong when a teacher leaves during the school year. Losing a teacher midyear can 
be a destabilizing experience for a child, inflicting psychological and social upheaval. In a 
review of the literature on the impact of instability on child development, Sandstrom & Huerta 
(2013) write, “Children thrive in stable and nurturing environments where they have a routine 
and know what to expect. Although some change in children’s lives is normal and anticipated, 
sudden and dramatic disruptions can be extremely stressful and affect children’s feeling of 
security” (p. 5). The loss of this stability with the departure of a teacher disrupts the continuity of 
a child’s learning experience. When a teacher leaves mid-year, they also sever the social capital 
they have accumulated between the child and their parents/guardians, weakening the child’s 
academic support system, which may impact students with fewer supports more. The literature 
on student mobility highlights how the loss of social capital associated with nonstructural 
mobility results in an adjustment period where students under-perform in school and have a 
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greater risk of dropping out (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004b; Pribesh & Downey, 1999; 
Rumberger & Larson 1998; Swanson & Schneider, 1999). On the other hand, it may be that a 
teacher who leaves midyear is so ineffective that their departure may be beneficial for their 
students. 
 This potentially stressful adjustment period for students following a teacher’s departure 
may also result in instructional discontinuities. Instructional routines and procedures must be re-
established. The replacement teacher must learn about students’ skill level to support their 
ongoing academic development. The new teacher may also have to negotiate a larger workload if 
they also have to prepare new lesson plans and teaching materials. Although previous studies 
have not estimated the direct impact of classroom disruptions due to teacher turnover on student 
achievement, research on teacher absences suggests that students perform worse in school when 
assigned to a teacher who is absent more frequently (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2009; 
Gerhsenson, 2016; Miller, Murnane, & Willett, 2008). As chronic teacher absenteeism 
contributes to a similar disruption as within-year turnover, we expect within-year turnover to 
have similarly negative impacts on student learning. 
The final mechanism by which turnover may impact student achievement relates to 
differences in the quality of the original and replacement teacher. The literature on the 
relationship between teacher turnover and quality has described how turnover influences the 
overall composition of the teacher workforce, rather than specific issue of replacement teacher 
quality. Research from North Carolina, New York City, and Texas has shown an inverse 
relationship between teacher effectiveness and turnover: less effective teachers are more likely to 
leave the teaching profession (Boyd et al., 2008; Goldhaber et al., 2011; Hanushek et al., 2004a). 
In North Carolina, Goldhaber and colleagues (2011) find that the odds of exiting the teaching 
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professions are 1.72 higher for teachers in the lowest quintile of the effectiveness distribution 
compared to teachers in the middle quintile. Teachers in the highest quintile are the most likely 
to remain in teaching. The single exception to this pattern comes from studies in Florida, which 
find the least and most effective teachers exit teaching at the highest rates (Feng & Sass, 2011; 
West & Chingos, 2009). From a compositional standpoint, teacher exits would only have an 
adverse influence on student achievement if the teachers who leave were more effective than 
their replacement. If schools were able to hire a more effective replacement, compositionally, 
this turnover could benefit students, even though the increased quality might not be sufficient to 
overcome the effects of the other mechanisms. 
In a study of Washington D.C.’s IMPACT teacher evaluation and performance incentive 
system, Adnot, Dee, Katz, and Wyckoff (2016) report notable gains in teacher performance that 
result from the district’s selective retention policy, which was designed to remove ineffective 
teachers. They compare the differences in performance between students in a particular grade in 
a particular school who experienced turnover with those students who did not experience 
turnover in that grade and school. They find that replacement teachers improved student 
achievement by an average 8 percent of a standard deviation in math and 5 percent of a standard 
deviation in reading.  
Changes in teacher layoff policies during the Great Recession provide additional 
evidence of the ways in which policies meant to change the composition of the teacher labor 
force are linked with student performance gains (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2011; 
Goldhaber & Theobald, 2013; Kraft, 2015). Studying a discretionary layoff policy in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools, Kraft (2015) finds no overall relationship between teacher layoffs and 
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student performance in math or reading. When more effective teachers were those laid off, their 
students performed worse in the following year.  
Compared to these policies that selectively replace the lowest performing teachers, when 
teacher turnover occurs during the school year, replacement teachers would likely be less 
effective. Replacement teachers are selected from a diminished applicant pool and likely results 
in temporary assignment to a less effective teacher. Students may not even be assigned a regular 
classroom teacher as a replacement. Long-term substitute teachers may fill the vacancy 
indefinitely. While No Child Left Behind mandated that all classrooms are expected to be staffed 
by a highly qualified teacher, substitutes were exempt from this legislation, likely resulting in 
diminished instructional rigor (Miller et al., 2008). That being said, it is possible that some 
teachers who leave have led chaotic classrooms and the chaos rather than the replacement results 
in lower achievement. In summary, although evidence suggests benefits from replacing the 
lowest performing teachers, when turnover occurs during the school year, it is unlikely 
replacements will be of the same or better quality, which may be detrimental. 
Although we have treated each of these mechanisms as conceptually distinct, their effects 
are likely additive in nature. For instance, while losing a teacher midyear is likely detrimental for 
a student’s academic performance, if they attend a school with high levels of grade-level teacher 
instability, the negative effect may be even greater if the instability prevents administrators from 
quickly hiring a replacement. In contrast, if a teacher leaves midyear from a school with low 
levels of grade-level teacher instability, the staff may be able to better compensate for this loss. 
Principals could be forced to reallocate trivial amounts of their time to hire replacements and 
other teachers could help orient the new teacher, integrating them into the school’s instructional 
culture. There is the possibility that the disruptive effect of within-year classroom teacher 
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turnover would be offset by a higher quality replacement. Even with a diminished labor pool of 
replacement teachers, the teachers who leave midyear may be so demoralized and perform so 
poorly with their students that their replacement will be higher quality. 
Data and Measures 
 The goal of this study is to estimate the effect of teacher turnover on student 
achievement. We address four specific research questions: 
(1) What is the average effect of teacher turnover on student achievement? 
(2) Does grade-level turnover affect student achievement more of less than when it occurs 
within versus the end of the school year? 
(3) What is the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover on student achievement? 
(4) Do the effects of within-year classroom teacher turnover differ across traditionally 
underserved student subgroups? 
We use administrative data from the state of North Carolina that links students, teachers, and test 
scores. We draw on a six-year panel of data from the 2008-2009 to 2013-2014 school years. The 
analytic sample is limited to students in fourth and fifth grade who took End-of-Grade (EOG) 
tests in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics. To these student observations, we link 
demographic information and school characteristics, which we describe in greater detail below. 
Our sample includes 2,499,127 student-year observations in ELA and 2,053,975 observations in 
math. 
 There are five independent variables in this study that are used to measure the turnover 
that occurs at different times (i.e. within-year versus end-of-year) and organizational levels (see 
Table 1). Total grade-level turnover is a fraction of the teachers to turn over from a particular 
grade between the end of year t – 1 and the end of year t over all enrolled teachers in that grade  
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Table 1. Definition of Independent Variables for Examining the Effect of Turnover 
Independent Variable Definition  
Total grade-level turnover A fraction of the teachers to turn over from a particular grade between 
the end of year t – 1 and the end of year t over all enrolled teachers in 
that grade during this period. 
 
Within-year grade-level 
turnover 
The fraction of teachers to turn over from a particular grade during the 
current school year. 
 
End-of-year grade-level 
turnover 
The fraction of teachers who were employed in a school-by-grade level 
at the end of the school year t – 1 and no longer employed at that 
school at the start of the school year in time t. 
 
October-to-October teacher 
turnover 
The fraction of teachers to turn over from a particular grade from 
October of year t – 1 compared to October in year t.  
 
Within-year classroom 
teacher turnover 
 
An indicator of whether or not a teacher left their school during the 
school year. 
 
during this period. This measure of total grade-level turnover can be separated as occurring at the 
end of the previous school year or within the current school year. End-of-year grade-level 
turnover is the fraction of teachers who were employed at a school at the end of the school year t 
– 1 and no longer employed at that school at the start of the school year in time t. Within-year 
grade-level turnover is measured as the fraction of teachers to turnover from a school during the 
current school year. Within-year grade-level turnover can be further separated for those students 
who lost a teacher midyear. We term this final type of turnover within-year classroom teacher 
turnover, which is measured as an indicator when each specific student’s teacher left their school 
during the school year. Finally, for comparison with Ronfeldt et al. (2013), we create the 
measure of “lagged attrition”, which is measured as the fraction of teachers to turn over from a 
particular grade in October of year t – 1 compared to October in year t. 
 To create these different within-year turnover variables, we draw on monthly teacher pay 
files, which give detailed information on the school in which a teacher is employed in each 
month. This data allows us to identify the month when a teacher left their current school. From 
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this data, we create a binary indicator if the teacher left their school at any point during the 
school year. As this paper’s theory of action assumes that midyear exit for any reason, 
transferring to other schools, temporarily leaving the school, or leaving the profession, would be 
similarly disruptive to student learning in the schools the teachers leave.15 In sensitivity analyses, 
we separate each type of teacher turnover.  
Estimating the effects of these three mechanisms relies on various fixed effect 
specifications to adjust for unobserved factors correlated with teacher turnover and student 
performance. To complement the fixed effect estimation, we include a rich set of covariates for 
school characteristics and school demographic characteristics. These variables are described in 
Table A1. At the student level, we control for an individual student’s prior test scores in reading 
and mathematics when not employing a student fixed effect specification. Other controls include 
student gender, race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian, and multiracial), 
giftedness, disability status, whether the child is currently or was previously classified as limited 
English proficient, mobility (structural, within-year, and between-year), and indicators for 
whether the child was overage or underage for the grade. We also include a continuous variable 
for the days absent. 
To adjust for school-level differences, we include variables for the average student 
enrollment, total per-pupil expenditures, the district’s teacher salary supplement, the percentage 
of students within a school by race/ethnicity and the percent of students receiving free or reduced 
lunch. Measures of school climate include the reported violent rates per 1,000 students, the short-
																																																						
15 In sensitivity analysis in Table A9 in the appendix we separate the main results for within-year classroom teacher 
turnover by moving and leaving. In ELA, the estimates are quite consistent for leaving versus moving. In math, we 
find more consistent evidence of a more negative effect for within-year moving compared to within-year leaving.  
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term suspension per 100 students, and the percentage of teachers with three years of experience 
or less. 
Methods 
As discussed in the previous section, we hypothesize three mechanisms by which teacher 
turnover may impact student achievement: (1) teacher instability; (2) within-year classroom 
disruption; (3) replacement quality. We begin with a series of models that estimate the overall 
impact that total grade-level turnover has on student achievement—the teacher instability 
mechanism. From there, we describe several estimation strategies to distinguish the extent to 
which the effect of teacher instability can be explained by differences in the effect of within-year 
and end-of-year turnover and the disruptive effect to students when a teacher leaves during the 
year. 
To estimate the effect of total grade-level turnover, we estimate models with four fixed 
effects specifications: school-by-grade, school-by-year, and student-by-school fixed effects. An 
equation for the first of these models can be written as: 
 !"#$%& = 	)* + ),-./	/0123451$%& + )6!"&78 + )9:"#$%& + );<%& + =$% + >& + 0"#$%&	 (1) 
where Y@ABCD is the test score for student i in classroom j in grade g in school s at time t; -./	/0123451$%& is the total grade-level turnover measure; !"&78represents the prior test scores 
for student i; :"#$%& represents the set of student covariates; <%& represents a set of time-varying 
school covariates; =$%is a school-by-grade fixed effect; γD is a year fixed effect, and u@ABCD is an 
error term. In this model, standard errors are clustered at the school-by-grade level. This model 
capitalizes on variation in turnover in the same grade and school over time. This model could be 
biased by a temporal shock that affects both teacher turnover and student achievement.  
To address this concern, we estimate a model with school-by-year fixed effects:  
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 !"#$%& = 	)* + ),-./	/0123451$%& + )6!"&78 + )9:"#$%& + );<%& + G%& + 0"#$%&	 (2) 
where G%&is a school-by-year fixed effect. In this model, standard errors are clustered at the 
school-by-year level. This model leverages variation across grades within the same school in the 
same year to estimate the effect of turnover. This model controls for any shock that occurs in a 
year that affects both teacher turnover and student achievement. For instance, a principal’s exit 
from a school could bias OLS or school fixed effects estimates if it influences both teacher 
turnover and student achievement. Unlike the school fixed effect estimates that may be biased by 
year-to-year variation at the grade-level, this within-school estimation strategy accounts for any 
unobserved school shocks. A limitation of both of these models is that they do not account for 
the bias linked to nonrandom student or teacher sorting. In particular, these models do not 
account for unobserved, non-time-varying student characteristics, such as innate ability, that may 
bias the estimated impact of teacher turnover on student achievement. Estimates would be biased 
if students with lower ability were assigned to teachers more likely to turnover. 
To account for these unobserved student characteristics, we specify a model with student-
by-school fixed effects: 
 !"#%& = )* + ),-./	/0123451$#%& + )6:"#%& + )9<%& + H"% + >& + 0"#%& (3) 
where !"#%& is the test score for student i in classroom j in school s at time t; ), estimates the 
average difference in test performance in school years when a student is enrolled in a grade in a 
school with different levels of teacher turnover; :"#%& represents the set of time-varying student 
covariates; <%& represents a set of time-varying school covariates; H"% is a student-by-school 
fixed effect to adjust for time-invariant student and school characteristics; >& is a year fixed 
effect, and 0"#%& is an error term. In this model, standard errors are clustered at the student-by-
school level to account for nonindependence arising from repeated observations of the same 
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student. These estimates would be biased when time-varying factors caused turnover and 
students to underperform in the same school year and therefore are used as an additional 
robustness check. 
This first series of models looking at total grade-level turnover assume the effect of 
turnover is the same when teachers leave over the summer as when they leave during the school 
year. As the mechanisms that impact student achievement differ depending on the timing of 
grade-level teacher turnover, we separate the total grade-level turnover measure into end-of-year 
and within-year grade-level turnover. We then estimate Models 1 through 3, substituting end-of-
year and within-year grade-level turnover to examine the extent to which the timing of school 
turnover may have different effects on student achievement. This set of models allows us to 
better understand how the timing of grade-level turnover may harm student achievement in 
different ways. We hypothesize that within-year grade-level turnover has more negative effects 
than end-of-year grade-level turnover. 
Furthermore, for within-year turnover, the negative effects of teacher turnover are likely 
most detrimental for the students assigned to a teacher who leaves mid-year. Next, we leverage 
our measure of within-year classroom teacher turnover to estimate the effect turnover has on 
individual students whose teacher left midyear. Using our measure of within-year classroom 
teacher turnover, we estimate a series of models to understand the disruptive effect a teacher 
turning over during the school year has on their students. Within-year classroom teacher turnover 
is likely correlated with unmeasured determinants of student test performance. To isolate the 
plausibly exogenous variation in within-year classroom teacher turnover, we adopt two fixed 
effect modeling strategies. The first model uses student fixed effects to leverage within-student 
variation over time. This model can be estimated: 
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 !"#%& = )* + ),/0123451"#%& + )6<%& + I" + >& + 0"#%& (4) 
where !"#%& is the test score for student i in classroom j in school s at time t; Turnover@ACD is an 
indicator of whether or not a student was assigned to a teacher who left during the school year; ),estimates the average difference in test performance in school years when a student is assigned 
to a teacher who turns over compared to years when the student is assigned to teacher who 
remains in the school for the whole year; <%& represents a set of school covariates; I" is a student 
fixed effect to adjust for time-invariant student characteristics; >& is a year fixed effect, and 0"#%& 
is an error term. Standard errors are clustered at the student level to account for nonindependence 
arising from repeated observations of the same student. 
 This model is only identified for students who experience two particular turnover 
conditions: assignment to a teacher that remains in the school the whole year and a teacher who 
leaves during the school year. In cases where this model is identified, the student essentially 
serves as their own comparison group, and their deviations from their average test performance 
are compared in years with and without a teacher who left midyear. This estimation sample is 
much smaller than the full sample used in this analysis, as an average of 4 percent of teachers 
turn over within each school year, or roughly one teacher per school (Paper 1). This model is 
identified for 72,258 students in ELA and 62,272 students in math. Although this model controls 
for a rich set of school characteristics, this model would be biased by unobserved school 
characteristics such as principal turnover that affect mid-year turnover and student achievement. 
To address this concern, we re-specify this model with a student-by-school fixed effect.  
As this student-by-school fixed effects model is biased by uncontrolled for time-varying 
school factors, any spillover effects from grade-level turnover would bias these estimates. To 
address this concern, we re-estimate the student and student-by-school fixed effects models with 
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the measure of end-of-year and within-year grade-level turnover. To avoid double-counting 
teachers who turn over during the school year, the measure of within-year grade-level turnover 
includes all teachers in the grade at the school other than the teacher of the students who turned 
over that year. Appendix Table A6 presents the results using the original, unadjusted measure of 
within-year grade-level turnover, which are qualitatively similar. This operationalization allows 
us to understand the extent to which the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover is 
independent from the effect of the other turnover that occurs during the school year or over the 
previous summer. This model can be estimated: !"#%& = )* + ),/0123451"#%& + )6-./	PQ!/0123451$%& +	)9-./	<!	/0123451$%& +	);:"#%& + )R<%& + I" + >& + 0"#%& (5) 
where )6 and )9are estimated based on variation in the proportion of within-year turnover a 
student experiences over time. If )6 and )9 are significant, it suggests that the effect of turnover 
is not only linked to the disruption caused by a teacher’s departure, but also the staff instability at 
the grade level. If ), remains consistent with the inclusion of the two measures of grade-level 
turnover, end-of-year (PQ!/0123451$%&) and within-year (-./	<!	/0123451$%&), in the 
model, we would have stronger evidence of the direct effect of disruption versus the indirect 
effect of staff instability. It may also be that there is an additive effect of being in a grade that 
experiences high turnover and being in a classroom with a teacher who leaves midyear. To test 
for this hypothesis, we also estimate a model with the interaction between /0123451"#%& and )9-./	<!	/0123451$%&, the within-year percentage turnover measure. 
 We then extend these analyses of the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover in 
several ways. First, we test the extent to which the effect within-year classroom teacher turnover 
can be explained by the quality of the departing teacher. To Model 4, we separately add four 
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measures of teacher quality: teaching experience, average teacher test score, lagged evaluation 
score, and lagged teacher value-added score. The average teacher test score is a standardized 
measure of all available tests, including college entrance and PRAXIS exams. The lagged 
evaluation score takes the teacher’s median evaluation score across five domains from the 
previous school year. The lagged value-added score is obtained from the state’s EVAAS score 
for teachers in tested grades and subjects. In these models, if the effect of within-year classroom 
teacher turnover is being driven by any of these measures of teacher quality, the estimate would 
go to zero. If the estimate on within-year classroom teacher turnover remains consistent and 
statistically significant would provide evidence that the negative effect of losing a teacher during 
the school year is not driven by the quality of that teacher.  
 Next, as we observe within-year classroom teacher turnover at the monthly level, we 
examine the extent to which the effect of turnover differs throughout the course of the school 
year by replacing the turnover indicator with a series of monthly turnover indicator variables. We 
also consider differences in the effect of teachers who move versus leave teaching during the 
school year. We supplement our main analysis with an examination of the heterogeneity of the 
effects of within-year classroom teacher turnover for underserved student subgroups and students 
at different performance levels. With the assumption that within-year classroom teacher turnover 
would be more detrimental for students historically marginalized by the education system, we 
consider whether the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover is greater for Black, 
Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged students. To examine whether within-year classroom 
teacher turnover is more detrimental for the lowest performing students, we separate students 
into three groups based on their prior achievement: below the 25th percentile, between the 25th 
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and 75th percentile, and above the 75th percentile. We then examine the extent to which losing a 
teacher during the school year is worst for lower, moderately, or higher performing students. 
Results 
Grade-Level Turnover 
 In this section, we present the results from a series of models that estimate effects from 
the underlying mechanisms hypothesized to explain the relationship between teacher turnover 
and student achievement. Estimates from Table 2 indicate that total grade-level turnover 
generally has a negative effect on ELA, with no detectable effect in mathematics. In our  
Table 2. Estimates of the Effect of Total Grade-Level Turnover on Student Achievement 
 ELA Mathematics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total grade-level turnover -0.012 -0.040*** -0.022** -0.009 0.005 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) 
School-by-Grade FE x   x   
School-by-Year FE  x   x  
Student-by-School FE   x   x 
Observations 2149995 2149995 2149995 1764768 1764768 1764768 
R2 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.00 
Notes. Models include student controls, school controls, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
preferred specifications, the school-by-year and student-by-school fixed effect, we find that 
losing all teachers predicts either a 0.04 and 0.022 standard deviation decrease in student 
achievement in ELA. The estimates most comparable to Ronfeldt and colleagues’ (2013) results 
come from columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, the models with school-by-grade and school-by-year fixed 
effects. Our estimates are slightly smaller and less consistent than the results from New York 
City.16  
																																																						
16 Tables A2 and A3 reports results directly comparable to Ronfeldt et al. (2013). In administrative data from New 
York City, teacher turnover is measured by comparing the teachers in a school in October of year t-1 compared to 
October in year t. Table A2 and A3 reports the estimates using the various modeling strategies in the current 
analysis, including Ronfeldt and colleagues’ identification strategies, school-by-grade and school-by-year fixed 
effects (Columns 1 and 3). Even with the October-to-October measure, our estimates are slightly smaller and less 
consistent than the results from New York City. Depending on the specification, we find an effect that ranges 
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Table 3. Estimates Comparing the Effect of End-of-Year and Within-Year Grade-Level Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Within-year grade turnover -0.052*** -0.073*** -0.082*** -0.119*** -0.089** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.022) (0.031) (0.013) 
       
End-of-year grade turnover -0.006 0.024** 0.010 0.002 0.026* 0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) 
School-by-Grade FE x   x   
School-by-Year FE  x   x  
Student-by-School FE   x   x 
Observations 2231725 2231725 2231725 1852715 1852715 1852715 
R2 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.00 
Notes. Models include student controls, school controls, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In Table 3, we separate end-of-year and within-year grade turnover and include both in 
the same model.17 Across all four specifications, the effects of within-year grade turnover is 
negative and significant, varying from -0.052 to -0.082 in ELA. The negative effect of within-
year grade-level turnover is generally larger in mathematics, ranging from -0.074 to -0.119.   
However, turnover during the summer is consistently smaller in magnitude and when significant 
positive, 0.023 to 0.026, further highlighting the importance of separating the timing of turnover, 
and suggesting that turnover can be beneficial for math achievement. We interpret these positive 
findings of end-of-year turnover in the context of Grissom, Loeb, & Nakashima’s (2013) and 
Dee and Wyckoff’s (2015) recent studies, which find that strategic involuntary turnover or 
teacher dismissal can result in the recruitment of and replacement by higher performing 
replacement teachers. Overall, these suggests that grade-level teacher instability operates 
independently depending on whether the turnover occurred prior to or during the current 
academic year. 
																																																						
between -0.011 (and not significant) and -0.038 compared to -0.049 and -0.064 in ELA. In mathematics, we find an 
effect that ranges between -0.021 and -0.053 compared to -0.074 and -0.082. 
17 Tables A4 and A5 run separate models for end-of-year and within-year grade-level turnover. The results are 
qualitatively similar compared to when both measures are included in the same model. 
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Classroom Disruption 
 To this point, we observe consistently negative effects of within-year grade turnover on 
student achievement in ELA and mathematics but inconsistent estimates of end-of-year grade 
turnover. These estimates of within-year turnover combine the loss of students’ classroom 
teacher during the school year and teacher instability. In the next series of analysis, we separately 
identify the extent to which losing a teacher during the school year disrupts the continuity of 
children’s learning experience by directly estimating its effect on student performance from the 
effects of teacher instability. 
In Table 4, we examine the effect of losing a teacher midyear on student achievement for 
ELA and math, respectively. After estimating a model with an indicator of whether or not 
students were assigned to teachers who turned over within the school year (columns 1 and 7), we 
add a control of within-year grade-level turnover that excludes the teacher who turned over 
(columns 2 and 6). In columns 3 and 7, we then add the end-of-year grade-level measure to the 
model. The addition of these covariate allows us to test the extent to which the effect of losing a 
teacher midyear can be explained by the direct effect of classroom disruption compared to other 
teacher instability. We then estimate a model that tests for an additive effect of losing a teacher 
within the school year and being in a grade with high within-year teacher instability (columns 4 
and 8). We first estimate these models using student fixed effects. These results would be biased 
if unobserved school characteristics were correlated with within-year classroom teacher turnover 
and student performance. For instance, a principal’s departure may be linked with higher levels 
of within-year classroom teacher turnover as well as student performance. To address this 
concern, we then condition on student-by-school fixed effects. Consistency of the estimates
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Table 4. Estimates of the Effect of Within-Year Classroom Teacher Turnover 
 
Panel A. Student Achievement in ELA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.037*** 
(0.004) 
-0.039*** 
(0.004) 
-0.039*** 
(0.004) 
-0.040*** 
(0.004) 
-0.038*** 
(0.004) 
-0.042*** 
(0.004) 
-0.042*** 
(0.004) 
-0.043*** 
(0.004) 
         
Within-year grade turnover (adjusted)  
 
-0.053*** 
(0.010) 
-0.053*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
-0.049*** 
(0.012) 
         
End-of-year grade turnover  
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.005) 
 
 
         
Within-year teacher classroom turnover 
* Within-year grade turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.031 
(0.058) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.060) 
Student FE x x x x     
Student-by-School FE     x x x x 
Observations 2499127 2499127 2495173 2499127 2499127 2499127 2495173 2499127 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel B. Student Achievement in Mathematics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.067*** 
(0.004) 
-0.069*** 
(0.004) 
-0.070*** 
(0.004) 
-0.071*** 
(0.004) 
-0.044*** 
(0.003) 
-0.048*** 
(0.004) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
         
Within-year grade turnover (adjusted)  
 
-0.075*** 
(0.009) 
-0.075*** 
(0.009) 
-0.076*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
-0.054*** 
(0.011) 
-0.054*** 
(0.011) 
-0.055*** 
(0.011) 
         
End-of-year grade turnover  
 
 
 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
         
Within-year classroom teacher turnover 
* Within-year grade turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.057 
(0.054) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.064) 
Student FE x x x x     
Student-by-School FE     x x x x 
Observations 2053975 2053975 2051271 2053975 2053975 2053975 2051271 2053975 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes. The adjusted measure of within-year grade turnover is the proportion of teachers to turn over from a grade, not including the current teacher. Models 
include school controls and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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across these two specifications would provide strong evidence of the negative effect of within-
year classroom teacher turnover. 
 Across all models in Panel A of Table 4, we find a consistent, negative effect of within-
year classroom teacher turnover on ELA test performance. Compared to when a student is not 
assigned to a teacher who left midyear, they score 0.037 lower in ELA when assigned to a 
teacher who leaves during the school year. This result translates to the loss of roughly 27 
instructional days (CREDO, 2015). This estimate is consistent when we control for within-year 
and end-of-year grade turnover, suggesting that the disruptive effect of losing a teacher is 
independent of the effect of teacher instability at both the grade and school levels whether it 
occurs during the school year or over the prior summer.  
When we include an interaction between within-year classroom teacher turnover and 
within-year grade turnover, we find no evidence of an additive effect of losing one’s teacher and 
experiencing higher levels of within-year teacher instability in other classrooms in the same 
grade within the school. To better understand these results, Figure 1 plots the predicted 
probabilities, holding all characteristics in the model at their mean. For a student in a school that 
has no other within-year school turnover, being assigned to a teacher who leaves during the 
school year causes a -0.036 standard deviation change in student achievement in ELA. For a 
student in a grade with average within-year turnover—2.7 percent—losing a teacher within the 
school year causes a -0.038 standard deviation change. For a student in a grade with high within-
year turnover—2 standard deviations above average, or 17.4 percent—losing a teacher within the 
school year causes a -0.045 standard deviation change in ELA achievement. For students who do 
not have a teacher who leaves midyear, we only find evidence of a negative effect of within-year 
school turnover in high turnover schools, where we find a -0.01 effect. This suggests that, except  
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Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Within-Year Classroom Teacher and School 
Turnover 
 
Notes. Predicted probabilities from student fixed effect models (Table 4, column 3 and Table 5, 
column 3). Average within-year grade-level turnover is 2.7 percent. High within-year grade-level 
turnover is 17.4 percent, two standard deviations above the mean. 
 
in the case of high turnover schools, the effect of within-year grade-level turnover observed in 
Tables 2 and 3 is driven by the disruptive effect of losing a teacher midyear as opposed to 
within-year teacher instability. 
 Panel B of Table 4 reports the estimates of the effect of within-year classroom teacher 
turnover on student achievement in math. Compared to when a student is not assigned to a 
teacher who left midyear, they score 0.067 lower in math when assigned to a teacher who leaves 
during the school year. This result translates to losing roughly 48 instructional days (CREDO, 
2015). Similar to the ELA results, this estimate is consistent when we control for within-year and 
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end-of-year school turnover, suggesting that the direct effect of classroom disruption is distinct 
from the indirect effect of school-level teacher instability. Also notable is that the coefficient on 
end-of-year grade turnover remains positive and statistically significant. In contrast to the ELA 
findings, when we replace the student fixed effect with a student-by-school fixed effect, the 
effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover is slightly smaller (-0.067 versus -0.044) than 
when the student fixed effect is included.18 Also, like the ELA results, we find no evidence of an 
additive effect of losing a teacher and being in a grade with high within-year turnover. Figure 1 
also depicts these results for math. An “average” student who loses their teacher during the 
school year but attends a school without any other within-year grade-level turnover is predicted 
to score 0.051 standard deviations lower in math. For a student in a school with average within-
year grade-level turnover, losing a teacher within the school year causes a 0.053 standard 
deviation decrease. For a student in a school with high within-year turnover, losing a teacher 
within the school year causes a 0.064 standard deviation decrease in math achievement. Students 
who attend a school with high within-year turnover but who do not lose their teacher score 0.005 
standard deviations better in math. 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover and Teacher Quality 
 To test the extent to which the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover can be 
explained by the quality of the exiting teacher, we add to our model four measures of teacher 
quality: teacher experience, average teacher test score, lagged median evaluation score, and 
lagged teacher value-added score. If the estimate on within-year classroom teacher turnover goes 
																																																						
18 In columns 3, 5, and 7 of Tables A2 and A3, to make our estimates of within-year classroom teacher turnover 
comparable to Ronfeldt and colleagues’ estimates we include the indicator of within-year classroom teacher 
turnover to a model with the October-to-October measure of teacher turnover. In most cases, we find that the 
estimate on October-to-October turnover is consistent, even when accounting for within-year classroom teacher 
turnover, suggesting that their results would generally not be biased by not explicitly accounting for within-year 
classroom teacher turnover. The one exception to this pattern is the estimates from a model with school-by-grade 
fixed effects that become marginally significant when controlling for within-year classroom teacher turnover. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the Effect of Within-Year Classroom Teacher Turnover on Student Achievement Controlling for Teacher 
Quality 
         
Panel A. Student Achievement in ELA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.054*** -0.216* -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.035* 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.089) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.001) 
Teaching experience x    x    
Average teacher test  x    x   
Lagged evaluation score   x    x  
Lagged teacher value-added     x    x 
Student FE 
Student-by-School FE 
x x x 
 
x  
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Observations 2498598 2183559 1144153 386713 2498598 2183559 1144153 386713 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
 
Panel B. Student Achievement in Mathematics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.118 -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.045** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.091) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.000) 
Teaching experience x    x    
Average teacher test  x    x   
Lagged evaluation score   x    x  
Lagged teacher value-added     x    x 
Student FE 
Student-by-School FE 
x x x 
 
x  
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Observations 2053626 1793809 981132 324927 2053626 1793809 981132 324927 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 
Notes. Models include school controls and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Lagged evaluation score is the 
median evaluation score the teacher receives from their principal. 
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to zero when a measure of teacher quality is introduced, this suggests that the negative effect of 
losing a teacher during the school year can be explained by the quality of that teacher.  
 Columns 1 and 5 in Table 5 find no evidence for this hypothesis. Controlling for teacher 
experience fails to explain the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover on student 
achievement in ELA or math. Similarly, when the average teacher test score is added to the 
model, the estimate on within-year classroom teacher turnover remains consistent. When we 
control for the lagged median evaluation score, the estimate on within-year classroom teacher 
turnover is less consistent across models, and in some cases is even larger.19 The results are the 
least consistent when lagged teacher value-added score is included. When controlling for lagged 
teacher-value added in ELA and conditioning on student fixed effects, the negative effect of 
within-year classroom teacher turnover on ELA achievement is 0.216 standard deviations, with 
much less precision in the estimate due to the smaller sample size. Yet, when we account for 
unobserved school characteristics in column 8, the estimate on within-year classroom teacher 
turnover drops to 0.001 for ELA and is not significant, suggesting that quality of a teacher—as 
measured by their contribution to student test scores—may explain the negative effect of losing a 
teacher during the school year. The pattern is similar in math, although the estimate on within-
year classroom teacher turnover in column 4 is not significant. To test the extent to which these 
results are driven by sample differences, we re-estimate our main results from Table 4 limited to 
this smaller sample. Results in Appendix Table A7 indicate that the changes in coefficients are 
driven by sample differences rather than the influence of value-added. Balance tests further 
support this inference.  When we test for differences in the sample characteristics in Table A8, 
																																																						
19 The smaller sample size in this analysis can be explained by the introduction of a statewide evaluation system 
midway through this study. The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction introduced evaluations for novice 
teachers in 2010-2011, with all teachers evaluated in subsequent years. We include teacher evaluation scores where 
present. 
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we find that students in this subsample score 6 percent of a standard deviation higher in ELA and 
7 percent of a standard deviation higher in math, are absent more often, are slightly less likely to 
receive reduced lunch and be Black. Their schools have a lower suspension rate and fewer Black 
students. Finally, it is important to note that this analysis only considers the quality of the 
departing teacher.  
Timing of within-year classroom teacher turnover 
 There are reasons to believe that the effect of within-year turnover may differ depending 
on the month in which a teacher leaves. The negative effect of within-year classroom teacher 
turnover may be largest at the start of the year if the replacement teacher is selected from an 
applicant pool of less effective teachers. On the other hand, if a teacher leaves early in the school 
year, the replacement teacher may be able to establish instructional continuity and minimize the 
disruptive effect of losing a teacher early in the school year. A second hypothesis is that within-
year classroom teacher turnover may be most detrimental for students when it occurs in the 
spring. In addition to the issue of replacement teacher quality, losing a teacher later in the year 
separates the student from a teacher with whom they have built a relationship and who may 
understand how to tailor instruction to meet the needs of their individual students. This issue is 
likely particularly salient as students prepare for annual end-of-grade achievement assessments, 
which generally occurs in May for elementary school students in North Carolina. 
 When we look at the effect of the month of within-year turnover in Table 6 and Figure 
A1, we find evidence much more consistent with this second hypothesis, that the negative effect 
of within-year classroom teacher turnover is driven by losing a teacher in the spring. There is 
some inconsistent evidence that losing a teacher in the first four months of the school year has a 
negative effect on student achievement. Yet, when a teacher leaves after December, we find  
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Table 6. Estimates of the Effect of Within-Year Classroom Teacher Turnover on Student 
Achievement by Month of Turnover 
 ELA Mathematics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
September -0.107* -0.070 -0.003 -0.039 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.040) (0.054) 
     
October -0.028 -0.030 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) 
     
November -0.101*** -0.067* -0.039 -0.036 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) 
     
December -0.021 -0.034 -0.025 0.036* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
January -0.026** -0.020* -0.052*** -0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
     
February -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.071*** -0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
     
March -0.038*** -0.030*** -0.077*** -0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
April -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.093*** -0.079*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
     
May -0.054*** -0.074*** -0.105*** -0.070*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
     
End-of-year -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Student FE x  x  
Student-by-School FE  x  x 
Observations 2499127 2499127 2053975 2053975 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes. Models include school controls and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
evidence that the negative effect of generally increases from January until April or May. In ELA, 
the negative effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover increases from 0.02 in January to 
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0.074 in May. In math, the negative effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover increases 
from 0.039 in January to 0.079 in April. 
Finally, it is important to note that the estimates on the month of turnover do not only 
capture the immediate disruption to their students, but also the effort that teacher has put in to 
that point in the school year. In other words, the negative effect of losing a teacher in the last 
months of the school year are not only related to the disruption for students but the quality of 
instruction that students experienced prior to their teachers’ departure. We can imagine a teacher 
who leaves teaching in the last months of the school year may have been so demoralized that 
their instruction suffered throughout the school year. The final row of Table 6 provides 
suggestive evidence that teachers who know they are going to turn over have a negative effect on 
their students’ academic achievement, sometimes referred to as an Ashenfelter dip. Teachers 
who turn over at the end of the school year also have a small, negative on their students’ 
performance during the prior school year. The effect is 0.013 in ELA and 0.017 in math. 
Heterogeneity of the effects of within-year classroom teacher turnover 
 Elsewhere, we have shown that this pattern also occurs during the school year, with the 
highest within-year turnover rates in schools serving high concentrations of Black, Hispanic, and 
economically disadvantaged students (Paper 1). To test the extent to which the effect of within-
year turnover differs for Black, Hispanic, or economically disadvantaged students, we present 
the results using student fixed effects, estimating separate models for each group. For 
comparison, we also include estimates for White students. We also examine the extent to which 
lower performing students are more adversely affected by within-year classroom teacher 
turnover. We separate students into three groups based on their prior achievement: below the 25th 
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Table 7. Estimates of the Effect of Within-Year Teacher Turnover on Student Achievement by Student Characteristics 
 
Panel A. Student Achievement in ELA 
 White Black  Hispanic  Economically 
Disadvantaged 
Lower 
Performing 
Moderately 
Performing 
Higher 
Performing 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.046*** -0.028*** -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.018* -0.041*** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
Student FE x x x x x x x 
Observations 1116927 632844 332180 1428128 611283 1254636 633208 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 
 
Panel B. Student Achievement in Mathematics 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.053*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.049*** -0.065*** -0.022** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Student FE x x x x x x x 
Observations 887432 527995 280945 1152690 503046 1030159 520770 
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 
Notes. Models include school controls and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Lower performing students scored at the bottom quartile on the 
lagged ELA test; moderately performing include the middle quartiles; higher performing includes students who scored in the top quartile. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
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percentile (lower performing), between the 25th and 75th percentile (moderately performing), and 
above the 75th percentile (higher performing). 
 Our main results indicate that losing a teacher during the school year causes a 0.037 
decrease in ELA achievement when we include all students in the analytic sample. In Panel A of 
Table 7, counter to the hypothesis that Black and economically disadvantaged students would be 
more adversely affected by within-year classroom teacher turnover, we find a -0.028 standard 
deviation effect for Black students and -0.032 effect for economically disadvantaged students. 
The effect is -0.040 -0.049 for Hispanic students and -0.046 for White students. When the effect 
of within-year classroom teacher turnover is separated by lagged student performance, we find 
that the negative effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover is driven by moderately 
performing students. Compared to when a student does not have a teacher who turns over 
midyear, being assigned to a teacher who leaves during the school year causes a -0.018 standard 
deviation change in ELA achievement for lower performing students, a negative -0.041 change 
for moderately performing students, and no detectable effect for higher performing students. 
 In math, we find results more consistent with our hypothesis (Panel B of Table 7). 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover more adversely affects underserved racial/ethnic 
minorities, economically disadvantaged students, average performing students, and, to a lesser 
degree, lower performing students. Overall, we found that within-year classroom teacher 
turnover causes a 0.067 standard deviation decrease in math achievement. The effect is -0.053 
for White students compared to 0.072 standard deviations, 0.075 for Hispanic students, and 
0.071 for economically disadvantaged students. In terms of prior student performance, the 
pattern is similar to ELA achievement in that losing a teacher within the year is most detrimental 
for moderately performing students. 
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Conclusion 
 Previous research has identified that teacher turnover harms student achievement, 
combining the effects of both disruptions to instructional continuity in a school and changes in 
the composition of new teachers (Hanushek et al., 2016; Ronfeldt et al., 2013). The goal of this 
paper was to better explain the effect of teacher turnover by distinguishing between two of the 
three mechanisms that drive this effect: teacher instability and classroom disruption. To identify 
the effects of these mechanisms, we identified differences in effect of teacher turnover whether it 
occurred during the prior summer or during the current school year. We found consistent 
evidence of a negative effect of within-year grade-level turnover. In other words, teacher 
instability at the grade-level was most detrimental for student achievement when the turnover 
occurred during the school year. Although less consistent, we found evidence turnover at the end 
of the school year was linked with student achievement gains in math. This finding aligns with 
other recent studies that have found that strategic teacher dismissal and transfer can result in 
assignment of higher performing replacement teachers (Dee & Wyckoff, 2015; Grissom et al., 
2013). 
 We then distinguished the extent to which the detrimental effect of within-year turnover 
is driven by classroom disruption as compared to grade-level teacher instability. Within-year 
classroom teacher turnover had a negative effect of 0.037 standard deviations in ELA and 
between 0.044 and 0.067 standard deviations in math, depending on the specification. These 
estimates remained consistent when within- and end-of-year grade-level turnover were added to 
the model, suggesting that the effect of classroom disruption is independent from the effect of 
within-year classroom teacher turnover. We found no evidence of an additive effect of within-
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year teacher and grade-level turnover, likely because within-year turnover is a relatively rare 
event, with the average school losing only one teacher every year. 
 With evidence of a consistently negative effect of within-year classroom teacher 
turnover, we considered how this effect may be explained by teacher quality, differed by the 
timing of turnover, and differed by whether the teacher moved schools or left teaching. We 
found that even when controlling for teaching experience, the average teacher test score, or a 
teacher’s lagged evaluation score, the effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover was 
consistent. The evidence is less consistent when controlling for a teacher’s lagged value-added 
score. In the model with student fixed effects and lagged teacher value-added, we find an even 
larger negative effect of within-year classroom teacher turnover in ELA and math, although it is 
only significant in ELA. Yet, in the student-by-school fixed effects, these estimates go to zero 
and lose significance. We find further evidence that the relationship between within-year 
classroom teacher turnover and student achievement cannot be explained by teacher quality 
when we examine subsample differences, finding that these differences are explained by the 
small sample for which we observe lagged value-added scores for teachers. 
In terms of differences in the timing of the effect of within-year turnover, we find strong 
evidence that losing a teacher later in the school year is more detrimental. In ELA, the negative 
effect of losing a teacher in May ranged from 0.054 and 0.074 standard deviations. In math, the 
negative effect of losing a teacher in May ranged from 0.07 and 0.105 standard deviations. There 
were less notable differences in the effect of a teacher moving schools or leaving school during 
the school year. In math, we find slight evidence of a more negative effect of within-year moving 
compared to within-year leaving. Last, we consider heterogeneity in the impact of within-year 
classroom teacher turnover across student characteristics. We found that losing a teacher during 
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the school year is less detrimental for Black and economically disadvantaged students in ELA 
but more detrimental in math. Within-year classroom teacher turnover is consistently more 
detrimental for Hispanic students than White students. Across ELA and math, losing a teacher is 
the worst for moderately performing students, and, to a lesser degree, lower performing students. 
A couple limitations of this study should be noted. First, this study relies on a series of 
fixed effect estimation strategies to identify the effect of teacher turnover. The consistency of our 
estimates across these various specifications, particularly for the estimates of within-year 
classroom teacher turnover, suggest that we are estimating the unbiased effect of within-year 
turnover. Still, even with results robust to a student and student-by-school fixed effect, our 
results do not rule out unobserved factors that occur within a grade that led to a teacher’s 
departure and students in that class to underperform but we believe the consistency of the 
estimates across identification strategies and the plausibility of this within grade phenomena 
increase the credibility of our estimates. 
Second, given data limitations, we are unable to confidently distinguish the extent to 
which losing a teacher midyear is driven by the disruption it causes for students versus the 
change in teacher quality associated with this turnover. We determined that the negative effect of 
turnover was not driven by the quality of the departing teacher. Yet, by not being able to identify 
the replacement teacher, we are unable to ascertain their quality, as well as how this compares to 
the teacher who left midyear. Addressing this issue of replacement teacher quality is an area of 
future research that will help to better distinguish the mechanisms that drive effect of teacher 
turnover. 
Third, the timing of this study overlaps, in part, with the Great Recession. This timing 
limits the generalizability of this study, as differences in teacher quality or patterns of mobility 
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may not compare to periods without the same budgetary shortfall. Although fewer new teachers 
were hired during the recession, research suggests that teachers who begin their career during 
recessions are more effective (Nagler, Piopiunik, & West, 2015). In terms of teacher mobility, 
Goldhaber, Strunk, Brown, & Knight (2016) find that while only a few teachers were laid off in 
Los Angles and Washington State, the threat of job loss spurred churn in the teacher labor 
market. A benefit of higher turnover rates during this period is the increased variability with 
which to estimate the effects of turnover on student achievement. 
Better understanding the mechanisms that drive the negative effect of teacher turnover 
have important policy implications. With stronger evidence of a negative effect of school-level 
teacher instability than grade-level instability, this suggests that leadership, either at the 
administrator level or distributed through teacher leaders may be particularly important for 
creating a positive work environment where teachers are less likely to turnover (Grissom; 2011; 
Ladd, 2011; Schweig, 2014). Furthermore, with evidence of a larger negative impact from 
within-year classroom teacher turnover than turnover that occurs over the summer, districts may 
consider targeting resources—either instructional supports or monetary incentives—teachers 
most at risk of leaving midyear, particularly if the negative effect is driven by the disruption it 
has on students or the difficulty in finding a high quality replacement teacher midyear. 
With evidence of negative consequences of within-year classroom teacher turnover on 
student learning, districts and schools could do more to avoid the deleterious effects of within-
year turnover. Given our findings that within-year turnover is much more detrimental when it 
occurs later in the school year, when districts are forced to transfer teachers based on changes in 
student enrollment, they would be advised to do so as early in the school year as possible. For 
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schools, in cases of planned health leave of absence, replacement teachers could be hired ahead 
of time to reduce the disruption of losing a teacher during the school year.  
Our previous work has found leaving teaching within the academic year to occur most 
frequently at the beginning and end of teachers careers. For early career teachers who struggle 
with the transition into teaching and become demoralized with their efforts to manage their 
classroom and deliver effective classroom instruction, principals would be advised to identify 
teachers who are at risk of leaving later in the school year and counsel them out as early in the 
school year as possible. For teachers eligible for retirement benefits, incentives could be 
introduced for teachers to stay until the end of the school year rather than retire in the middle of 
the school year when they become eligible. 
More broadly, we hope this analysis brings more breadth to the policy discourse 
surrounding teacher turnover. As a policy problem, teacher turnover tends to treated as occurring 
between the end of one school year and the start of the next. Yet, we found a positive effect of 
end-of-year teacher turnover in math. Instead, the negative effect of teacher turnover is driven by 
the turnover that occurs during the school year. Furthermore, we also found some evidence that 
the negative effect of end-of-year teacher turnover is independent from the effect of within-year 
turnover. As the underlying factors which drive this effect may differ, so too may the policy 
levers to remedy this problem. For instance, compared to teacher incentive programs that reward 
teachers in the subsequent school year (e.g. Springer, Swain, & Rodriguez, 2015), incentive 
programs that exploit loss aversion by asking teachers to give back money if they do not remain 
in their school may be promote higher retention rates (Fryer, Levitt, List, & Sadoff, 2012). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Covariates used in Regression Analysis 
Teacher Characteristics School Characteristics School Working Conditions 
Teaching experience Student enrollment Distributed leadership  
(! = 	0.86 − 0.88)  
Female School level School leadership  
(! = 0.87 − 0.93	) 
Race/Ethnicity Elementary  Facilities and resources  
(! = 	0.84 − 0.85) 
White Middle  Professional development 
(! = 	0.79 − 0.86) 
Black High  
Hispanic Urbanicity  
Asian 
American Indian 
Multiracial 
 
City  
Age Suburb  
Entry Portal Rural  
Traditional Town  
Alternate entry % economically 
disadvantaged 
 
Teacher For America % Black students  
Average teacher test % Hispanic students  
 % Other race/ethnicity  
 Violent acts rate  
 Short-term suspension rate  
 % teachers with 3 years of 
experience or less 
 
 Overall performance composite  
 Total per-pupil expenditures 
($1000s) 
 
 Teacher salary supplement 
($1000s) 
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Table A2. School Working Conditions Measures 
Scale Survey Items 
Facilities and Resources Teachers have sufficient access to appropriate instructional materials. 
 Teachers have sufficient access to instructional technology, including 
computers, printers, software and internet access. 
 
 Teachers have access to reliable communication technology, including 
phones, faxes and email. 
 
 Teachers have sufficient access to office equipment and supplies such as 
copy machines, paper, pens, etc. 
 
 The reliability and speed of Internet connections in this school are 
sufficient to support instructional practices. 
 
 Teachers have adequate space to work productively. 
 The school environment is clean and well maintained. 
Distributed Leadership Selecting instructional materials and resources 
 Devising teaching techniques 
 Setting grading and student assessment practices 
 Determining the content of in-service professional development programs 
 The selection of teachers new to this school 
 Establishing student discipline procedures 
 Providing input on how the school budget will be spent 
 School improvement planning 
School Leadership There is an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect in this school.  
 School administrators consistently enforce rules for student conduct. 
 School administrators support teachers' efforts to maintain discipline in 
the classroom. 
 The school leadership consistently supports teachers. 
 The procedures for teacher evaluation are consistent. 
 The faculty and staff have a shared vision. 
	 167 
 Teachers receive feedback that can help them improve teaching. 
Professional Development Sufficient resources are available for professional development in my 
school. 
 An appropriate amount of time is provided for professional development. 
 Teachers have sufficient training to fully utilize instructional technology. 
 Professional development provides ongoing opportunities for teachers to 
work with colleagues to refine teaching practices. 
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Table A3. Percent of Teachers to Turnover by Retirement Eligibility   
  Stayer 
Within-
year mover 
Within-
year leaver 
End-of-
year mover 
End-of-
year leaver 
Not eligible for retirement 
benefits 85.85 1.38 2.41 4.90 5.45 
Eligible for full benefits 71.77 2.02 5.11 5.50 15.60 
Eligible for reduced benefits 66.02 0.73 8.71 3.58 20.95 
Notes. Restricted to teachers over 60 years of age. Observations = 115,629. 
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Table A4. Percent of Teachers to Turnover by Minority Student Enrollment  
  Stayer 
Within-
year 
mover 
Within-
year leaver 
End-of-
year 
mover 
End-of-
year leaver 
Bottom decile of minority 
student enrollment 85.26 1.40 1.85 6.16 5.33 
2nd decile 84.38 1.35 2.17 6.13 5.98 
3rd decile 83.94 1.44 2.24 6.35 6.03 
4th decile 82.99 1.65 2.32 6.68 6.37 
5th decile 82.18 1.60 2.55 7.08 6.60 
6th decile 80.89 1.80 2.62 7.65 7.03 
7th decile 80.60 2.06 2.65 7.92 6.76 
8th decile 78.61 2.35 2.85 8.96 7.23 
9th decile 76.49 2.43 3.24 9.82 8.02 
10th decile 71.44 3.45 3.85 12.08 9.17 
Notes. Observations = 559,484     
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Table A5. Percent of Teachers to Turnover by Economically Disadvantaged 
Student Enrollment 
  Stayer 
Within-year 
mover 
Within-year 
leaver 
End-of-year 
mover 
End-of-year 
leaver 
Bottom 
decile of 
FRPL 82.67 1.83 2.46 6.59 6.45 
2nd decile 83.19 1.56 2.39 6.47 6.39 
3rd decile 83.41 1.62 2.26 6.48 6.22 
4th decile 82.47 1.61 2.42 7.04 6.46 
5th decile 82.39 1.67 2.51 6.85 6.59 
6th decile 81.80 1.78 2.52 7.28 6.61 
7th decile 80.57 1.94 2.65 8.12 6.71 
8th decile 79.40 2.39 2.68 8.54 7.00 
9th decile 76.43 2.42 3.23 9.85 8.08 
10th decile 74.45 2.72 3.21 11.61 8.01 
Notes. Observations = 558, 795    
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Table A6. Percent of Teachers to Turnover by School Performance  
  Stayer 
Within-year 
mover 
Within-year 
leaver 
End-of-year 
mover 
End-of-year 
leaver 
Bottom decile of 
School Performance 73.91 2.45 4.07 10.53 9.05 
2nd decile 77.95 2.03 3.26 8.77 8.00 
3rd decile 78.86 2.00 2.96 8.59 7.60 
4th decile 79.69 1.98 2.82 8.41 7.09 
5th decile 80.29 2.14 2.50 8.13 6.95 
6th decile 81.59 2.13 2.30 7.64 6.35 
7th decile 82.94 1.79 2.30 7.06 5.91 
8th decile 83.62 1.67 2.11 6.74 5.85 
9th decile 83.87 1.70 1.91 6.69 5.83 
10th decile 84.20 1.71 2.14 6.11 5.84 
Notes. Observations = 552,805     
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Table A7. Supplementary Logistic Regression Estimates of Within- and End-of-Year Teacher 
Turnover 
                                                   Within-year turnover End-of-year turnover 
0-2 years experience 1.79*** 1.79*** 1.79*** 1.62*** 1.62*** 1.62*** 
 (19.67) (19.77) (19.55) (27.08) (27.03) (27.04) 
3-5 years experience 1.34*** 1.34*** 1.35*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 
 (10.76) (10.80) (10.81) (16.42) (16.44) (16.47) 
11-20 years experience 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 
 (-17.98) (-17.97) (-17.91) (-22.16) (-22.36) (-22.28) 
20+ years experience 0.70*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
 (-11.25) (-8.03) (-8.01) (-12.89) (-3.44) (-3.45) 
Female                                             1.11*** 1.06 1.11*** 1.04*** 1.03 1.04** 
                                                   (5.36) (1.31) (5.12) (3.47) (1.06) (3.23) 
Black                                              0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-1.37) (-1.09) (-1.06) (-0.58) (0.06) (0.19) 
Hispanic                                           1.03 1.02 1.02 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 
                                                   (0.45) (0.40) (0.38) (4.66) (4.57) (4.60) 
Other race                                         1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.02 
                                                   (-0.09) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.57) (0.71) (0.63) 
Alternate entry                                    0.97 0.96 0.96 1.18*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 
                                                   (-1.40) (-1.68) (-1.68) (11.80) (11.02) (10.82) 
Teacher For America                                  0.85 0.85 0.86 1.95*** 1.94*** 1.96*** 
                                                   (-1.54) (-1.56) (-1.52) (16.85) (16.72) (16.91) 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.27*** 1.27*** 1.27*** 1.28*** 1.28*** 1.28*** 
                                                   (13.09) (12.97) (12.99) (23.09) (22.88) (22.84) 
Other                                              1.05 1.03 1.03 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 
                                                   (1.31) (0.91) (0.94) (7.87) (7.21) (7.00) 
< 26 years old 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 1.20*** 1.40*** 1.25*** 
 (-10.94) (-5.26) (-10.19) (8.03) (8.18) (9.71) 
26-30 years old 1.02 0.93 1.06 1.24*** 1.28*** 1.29*** 
 (0.73) (-1.21) (1.74) (11.73) (6.99) (13.89) 
31-40 years old 1.17*** 1.12* 1.20*** 1.16*** 1.26*** 1.21*** 
 (6.14) (2.18) (7.34) (10.15) (7.40) (13.06) 
51-60 years old 1.56*** 1.65*** 1.65*** 1.24*** 1.23*** 1.38*** 
 (16.54) (9.19) (19.68) (12.75) (5.95) (20.89) 
60+ years of age 2.79*** 3.78*** 3.71*** 1.98*** 2.88*** 3.32*** 
 (20.12) (20.08) (38.82) (20.67) (23.00) (55.57) 
School size (100s)                                 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 
                                                   (-22.14) (-22.20) (-22.00) (-18.88) (-19.03) (-18.79) 
City                                               1.04 1.04 1.04 0.99 0.99 0.99 
                                                   (1.23) (1.20) (1.15) (-0.45) (-0.49) (-0.47) 
Rural                                              1.04 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.01 
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                                                   (1.33) (1.29) (1.35) (0.82) (0.75) (0.84) 
Town                                               0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 
                                                   (-0.89) (-0.84) (-0.81) (-0.83) (-0.68) (-0.70) 
Middle school 2.38*** 2.39*** 2.38*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 
 (38.55) (38.63) (38.46) (9.16) (9.21) (9.17) 
High school 5.32*** 5.34*** 5.33*** 1.15*** 1.16*** 1.16*** 
 (77.37) (77.64) (77.37) (12.68) (13.45) (13.33) 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
                                                   (-1.41) (-1.47) (-1.75) (-6.32) (-6.45) (-6.85) 
% Black students                                   1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
                                                   (11.44) (11.50) (11.51) (17.52) (17.62) (17.69) 
% Hispanic students                                1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
                                                   (4.57) (4.65) (4.74) (4.72) (4.84) (5.04) 
% Other race students 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (6.17) (6.16) (6.14) (1.40) (1.37) (1.48) 
Violent acts rate                                  1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-3.51) (-3.52) (-3.48) (1.18) (1.22) (1.26) 
Suspension rate                                    1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
                                                   (-3.60) (-3.66) (-3.76) (3.60) (3.62) (3.44) 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             3.84*** 3.83*** 4.08*** 2.22*** 2.22*** 2.28*** 
                                                   (16.29) (16.27) (16.84) (16.60) (16.65) (17.01) 
Overall performance composite                      1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
                                                   (-5.05) (-5.00) (-5.19) (-7.01) (-6.91) (-6.97) 
Per pupil expenditures                             1.00*** 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
                                                   (-3.32) (-3.27) (-3.31) (-3.06) (-2.94) (-2.97) 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.04*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 0.99 0.99 1.00 
                                                   (5.58) (5.61) (5.85) (-1.51) (-1.40) (-1.23) 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-4.44) (-4.44) (-4.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.23) 
Distributed leadership (std)                       0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
                                                   (-3.47) (-3.50) (-3.40) (-4.08) (-4.20) (-3.95) 
Principal leadership (std)                         0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
                                                   (-4.06) (-4.06) (-3.94) (-9.55) (-9.48) (-9.42) 
Professional development (std)                     1.07*** 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.01 1.01 1.01 
                                                   (5.02) (5.09) (4.95) (1.13) (1.31) (1.38) 
Eligible for full retirement benefits 1.55***   2.11***   
                                                   (10.89)   (29.79)   
Eligible for reduced retirement benefits 1.19*   1.43***   
                                                   (2.54)   (8.22)   
Female * < 26 years old                     0.98   0.87***  
  (-0.25)   (-3.37)  
Female * 26-30 years old                     1.16*   1.01  
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                                                    (2.36)   (0.22)  
Female * 31-40 years old                     1.09   0.95  
  (1.52)   (-1.40)  
Female * 51-60 years old                     1.00   1.15***  
  (0.01)   (3.65)  
Female * 60+ years old                     0.97   1.20***  
  (-0.38)   (3.52)  
Change in school size (100s)                                   0.96***   0.97*** 
   (-3.53)   (-3.96) 
Constant 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (-39.38) (-37.67) (-39.40) (-31.47) (-30.67) (-31.94) 
Observations 378882 378882 377162 425158 425158 423233 
Deviance 144239.93 144369.26 143821.34 353438.77 354396.22 352931.37 
Notes. Estimates reported as odds ratios. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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Table A8. Supplementary Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates of Within- and End-of-
Year Teacher Moving, Leaving, and Temporary Exit and Return 
                                                   
Within-year 
mover 
Within-year 
leaver 
End-of-year 
mover 
End-of-year 
leaver 
Temporary 
Exit and 
Return 
0-2 years experience 1.32*** 2.21*** 1.40*** 1.96*** 0.99 
 (6.06) (22.17) (14.74) (26.87) (-0.13) 
3-5 years experience 1.10* 1.56*** 1.16*** 1.51*** 1.04 
 (2.29) (12.90) (7.39) (17.85) (0.67) 
11-20 years experience 0.75*** 0.54*** 0.79*** 0.60*** 0.46*** 
 (-8.01) (-18.57) (-12.97) (-22.61) (-12.66) 
20+ years experience 0.72*** 0.80*** 0.68*** 1.18*** 0.64*** 
 (-6.76) (-6.33) (-14.97) (6.68) (-5.67) 
Female                                             1.02 1.09 1.05 0.97 1.38* 
                                                   (0.37) (1.39) (1.50) (-0.68) (2.06) 
Black                                              1.19*** 0.83*** 1.06** 0.93*** 1.01 
                                                   (4.95) (-6.21) (3.26) (-3.84) (0.09) 
Hispanic                                           1.06 1.03 1.13** 1.23*** 1.28 
                                                   (0.73) (0.45) (2.81) (4.65) (1.89) 
Other race                                         1.05 0.97 0.95 1.12** 1.15 
                                                   (0.72) (-0.57) (-1.51) (3.05) (1.26) 
Alternate entry                                    1.02 0.90*** 1.12*** 1.21*** 0.96 
                                                   (0.64) (-3.29) (6.33) (9.24) (-0.70) 
Teacher For America                                  0.42*** 1.32* 0.65*** 4.31*** 0.68 
                                                   (-4.59) (2.32) (-5.83) (31.40) (-1.00) 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.07* 1.44*** 1.07*** 1.54*** 1.16** 
                                                   (2.18) (16.73) (4.95) (29.98) (3.19) 
Other                                              0.84** 1.22*** 0.93* 1.49*** 0.84 
                                                   (-2.90) (4.44) (-2.41) (14.36) (-1.59) 
< 26 years old 0.82 0.61*** 1.32*** 1.49*** 0.61 
 (-1.82) (-4.92) (5.41) (6.74) (-1.54) 
26-30 years old 1.08 0.85* 1.11* 1.50*** 0.60* 
 (0.87) (-1.99) (2.46) (7.85) (-2.13) 
31-40 years old 1.10 1.12 1.17*** 1.35*** 0.61* 
 (1.37) (1.60) (4.16) (6.32) (-2.31) 
51-60 years old 1.04 2.37*** 0.98 1.75*** 1.77** 
 (0.41) (12.50) (-0.53) (11.46) (2.97) 
60+ years of age 1.46** 6.57*** 0.95 6.02*** 5.42*** 
 (2.90) (24.03) (-0.63) (32.26) (7.75) 
School size (100s)                                 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.99*** 0.97*** 
                                                   (-15.05) (-17.14) (-19.98) (-8.08) (-6.31) 
City                                               1.00 1.06 0.99 1.00 1.02 
                                                   (-0.06) (1.57) (-0.56) (-0.09) (0.21) 
Rural                                              1.10* 0.99 1.05* 0.97 0.93 
                                                   (2.29) (-0.18) (2.41) (-1.42) (-1.12) 
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Town                                               1.00 0.94 1.04 0.93* 1.01 
                                                   (0.02) (-1.32) (1.44) (-2.53) (0.08) 
Middle school 2.21*** 2.54*** 1.17*** 1.07*** 1.21** 
 (22.81) (33.49) (10.08) (3.99) (3.11) 
High school 4.53*** 6.13*** 1.22*** 1.13*** 2.14*** 
 (46.58) (66.18) (13.47) (8.14) (15.46) 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00** 
                                                   (0.84) (-2.69) (-5.60) (-4.55) (-3.08) 
% Black students                                   1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.00 
                                                   (10.08) (7.22) (15.90) (10.55) (1.21) 
% Hispanic students                                1.01*** 1.00* 1.00*** 1.00 1.00* 
                                                   (5.23) (2.05) (5.82) (1.80) (2.18) 
% Other race students 1.01** 1.01*** 1.00* 1.00 1.00 
 (3.28) (5.53) (2.48) (-0.53) (-1.08) 
Violent acts rate                                  1.00 1.00*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-1.54) (-3.34) (0.45) (0.91) (-1.15) 
Suspension rate                                    1.00** 1.00* 1.00** 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-3.01) (-2.43) (2.68) (1.74) (-1.47) 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             3.87*** 4.02*** 2.25*** 2.25*** 1.96** 
                                                   (10.71) (13.59) (13.23) (12.13) (3.18) 
Overall performance composite                      1.00** 0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-2.62) (-4.88) (-10.52) (0.06) (-0.53) 
Per pupil expenditures                             1.00 0.99** 1.00** 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (-0.49) (-3.10) (-3.28) (-1.32) (0.00) 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.06*** 1.02* 1.00 0.99** 1.06*** 
                                                   (6.46) (2.05) (0.48) (-2.63) (3.31) 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     0.93*** 0.97* 1.00 1.00 0.93* 
                                                   (-4.01) (-2.22) (0.20) (-0.48) (-2.34) 
Distributed leadership (std)                       0.93*** 0.97 0.96*** 0.97** 0.95 
                                                   (-3.41) (-1.76) (-3.64) (-2.58) (-1.64) 
Principal leadership (std)                         0.97 0.92*** 0.90*** 0.96*** 0.98 
                                                   (-1.28) (-4.66) (-9.87) (-3.80) (-0.68) 
Professional development (std)                     1.06** 1.07*** 1.01 1.01 1.10** 
                                                   (3.07) (4.17) (1.36) (0.82) (2.70) 
Female * < 26 years old                    1.08 0.89 0.90* 0.86* 1.82 
 (0.71) (-1.08) (-2.05) (-2.46) (1.82) 
Female * 26-30 years old                    0.92 1.43*** 0.97 1.12* 4.55*** 
                                                   (-0.94) (4.19) (-0.56) (2.09) (6.08) 
Female * 31-40 years old                    1.02 1.19* 0.91* 1.08 4.41*** 
 (0.25) (2.23) (-2.35) (1.38) (6.65) 
Female * 51-60 years old                    1.00 1.01 0.95 1.39*** 0.90 
 (-0.04) (0.07) (-0.89) (6.12) (-0.49) 
Female * 60+ years old                    0.82 1.00 1.05 1.32*** 0.63 
 (-1.27) (0.04) (0.52) (4.44) (-1.85) 
Constant 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.12*** 0.03*** 0.00*** 
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 (-28.19) (-35.58) (-23.41) (-37.23) (-17.69) 
Observations 445641 445641 445641 445641 445641 
Notes. Estimates reported as relative risk ratios. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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Table A9. Logistic Regression Estimates of Within- and End-of-Year Turnover, by School Level 
                                                   Within-year turnover End-of-year turnover 
0-2 years experience 1.77*** 1.77*** 1.90*** 1.50*** 1.65*** 1.77*** 
 (13.10) (8.86) (17.66) (16.18) (13.51) (21.13) 
3-5 years experience 1.42*** 1.34*** 1.39*** 1.25*** 1.37*** 1.31*** 
 (8.89) (4.79) (9.75) (10.23) (9.45) (10.89) 
11-20 years experience 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 
 (-11.65) (-7.77) (-15.43) (-16.01) (-10.99) (-14.59) 
20+ years experience 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 1.03 0.89** 0.90*** 
 (-3.32) (-3.81) (-7.63) (1.38) (-3.22) (-3.96) 
Female                                             0.78*** 0.93 1.10*** 0.90*** 1.06** 1.06*** 
                                                   (-5.96) (-1.85) (4.27) (-4.74) (2.63) (3.60) 
Black                                              0.95 0.92 1.01 0.98 0.94* 1.05* 
                                                   (-1.34) (-1.71) (0.46) (-0.82) (-2.35) (2.55) 
Hispanic                                           1.00 1.16 0.98 1.29*** 1.19* 1.12* 
                                                   (-0.03) (1.08) (-0.37) (5.61) (2.24) (2.36) 
Other race                                         0.94 1.06 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.06 
                                                   (-0.91) (0.58) (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.82) (1.40) 
Alternate entry                                    1.03 1.08 0.90*** 1.20*** 1.09** 1.15*** 
                                                   (0.67) (1.51) (-3.85) (7.42) (3.04) (7.26) 
Teacher For America                                  0.94 0.96 0.91 2.14*** 1.85*** 1.88*** 
                                                   (-0.32) (-0.23) (-0.79) (11.11) (8.64) (10.41) 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.22*** 1.28*** 1.23*** 1.28*** 1.21*** 1.24*** 
                                                   (7.62) (5.91) (9.23) (17.44) (8.29) (13.24) 
Other                                              0.98 1.23* 1.02 1.27*** 1.25*** 1.01 
                                                   (-0.35) (2.22) (0.38) (8.02) (4.34) (0.26) 
< 26 years old 0.73*** 0.66*** 0.58*** 1.35*** 1.17*** 1.11** 
 (-5.21) (-4.61) (-10.86) (9.50) (3.44) (2.98) 
26-30 years old 1.09 1.04 1.00 1.37*** 1.23*** 1.14*** 
 (1.92) (0.59) (-0.09) (12.72) (5.60) (4.83) 
31-40 years old 1.24*** 1.16** 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.17*** 1.19*** 
 (5.84) (2.79) (6.18) (9.50) (5.13) (8.14) 
51-60 years old 1.63*** 1.61*** 1.72*** 1.39*** 1.33*** 1.40*** 
 (12.67) (8.53) (17.83) (15.34) (8.71) (14.98) 
60+ years of age 3.51*** 3.47*** 3.89*** 3.51*** 2.89*** 3.21*** 
 (23.74) (15.85) (33.90) (41.17) (22.67) (38.99) 
School size (100s)                                 1.00 0.99 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.98** 0.97*** 
                                                   (-0.51) (-1.13) (-18.83) (-9.60) (-2.98) (-16.93) 
City                                               0.95 1.07 1.01 0.96 1.04 0.97 
                                                   (-1.25) (0.99) (0.31) (-1.80) (0.94) (-1.35) 
Rural                                              1.00 1.13* 0.98 0.98 1.02 1.00 
                                                   (0.05) (1.97) (-0.50) (-0.73) (0.45) (0.12) 
Town                                               0.98 1.06 0.92 1.00 0.99 0.96 
                                                   (-0.38) (0.72) (-1.90) (0.13) (-0.22) (-1.19) 
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% economically disadvantaged                       0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00 1.00*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 
                                                   (-5.47) (-4.69) (-0.46) (-7.62) (-4.55) (-3.62) 
% Black students                                   1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 
                                                   (9.18) (6.45) (6.34) (12.34) (8.88) (10.14) 
% Hispanic students                                1.00 1.01* 1.00* 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00** 
                                                   (1.63) (2.37) (2.21) (3.98) (3.44) (2.66) 
% Other race students 1.00** 1.00 1.01*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (2.95) (0.59) (5.56) (0.48) (0.52) (1.63) 
Violent acts rate                                  1.00*** 1.00 1.00** 1.00* 1.00 1.00 
                                                   (3.36) (-1.20) (-2.92) (2.30) (0.68) (0.67) 
Suspension rate                                    1.00** 1.00 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00 1.00** 
                                                   (3.09) (0.18) (-3.26) (3.64) (1.93) (2.63) 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             3.86*** 3.68*** 3.86*** 2.41*** 1.83*** 1.93*** 
                                                   (11.56) (6.45) (13.42) (13.85) (5.47) (8.91) 
Overall performance composite                      0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00** 0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00** 
                                                   (-4.53) (-4.58) (-3.12) (-6.89) (-5.47) (-3.21) 
Per pupil expenditures                             1.00 1.03* 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00 1.00* 
                                                   (-1.54) (2.30) (-2.88) (-3.55) (0.03) (-2.51) 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.01 1.03* 1.04*** 0.99* 0.98** 1.02** 
                                                   (0.96) (1.99) (4.81) (-2.42) (-3.01) (2.69) 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     0.94*** 0.91*** 0.97 1.02 1.00 0.99 
                                                   (-3.61) (-3.71) (-1.82) (1.59) (-0.31) (-1.07) 
Distributed leadership (std)                       0.99 0.96 0.94*** 0.96*** 1.01 0.95*** 
                                                   (-0.66) (-1.17) (-3.53) (-3.47) (0.71) (-4.39) 
Principal leadership (std)                         0.93*** 0.94* 0.95** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.94*** 
                                                   (-3.50) (-2.05) (-3.15) (-7.24) (-5.10) (-5.17) 
Professional development (std)                     1.07*** 1.06 1.05** 1.01 1.00 1.02 
                                                   (3.35) (1.89) (3.29) (1.01) (-0.00) (1.55) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (-19.69) (-9.09) (-21.13) (-16.46) (-7.42) (-22.91) 
Elementary school x     x     
Middle school  x   x  
High school   x   x 
Observations                                       199366 76642 171011 224523 86680 186942 
Deviance 66649.18 28150.91 93274.26 183955.86 75325.51 160671.29 
Notes. Estimates reported as odds ratios. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in parentheses. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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Table A10. Logistic Regression Estimates of Within-Year and End-of-Year Moving within 
District and State 
 
  Within-year mover End-of-year mover 
                                                   
Within 
district Within state 
Within 
district Within state 
0-2 years experience 1.06 1.31*** 1.06 1.34*** 
 (0.94) (3.91) (1.24) (11.56) 
3-5 years experience 0.86** 1.35*** 1.09* 1.12*** 
 (-2.87) (4.77) (2.25) (4.91) 
11-20 years experience 0.84*** 0.76*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 
 (-4.03) (-4.84) (-5.28) (-9.56) 
20+ years experience 0.82*** 0.61*** 0.79*** 0.64*** 
 (-3.44) (-6.39) (-5.53) (-15.21) 
Female                                             1.02 0.94 1.05 0.95** 
                                                   (0.53) (-1.46) (1.75) (-2.84) 
Black                                              1.33*** 0.98 1.11** 1.05* 
                                                   (6.81) (-0.35) (3.15) (2.52) 
Hispanic                                           1.04 1.01 1.03 1.13* 
                                                   (0.36) (0.07) (0.43) (2.50) 
Other race                                         1.20* 0.84 1.01 0.92* 
                                                   (2.14) (-1.51) (0.21) (-2.14) 
Alternate entry                                    1.01 1.00 1.11** 1.10*** 
                                                   (0.25) (0.03) (3.13) (4.57) 
Teacher For America                                  0.48*** 0.15*** 0.85 0.38*** 
                                                   (-3.40) (-4.64) (-1.29) (-10.52) 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.04 0.95 0.97 1.03 
                                                   (1.09) (-1.18) (-1.06) (1.89) 
Other                                              0.85* 0.78** 0.84** 0.92* 
                                                   (-2.34) (-2.62) (-3.06) (-2.36) 
< 26 years old 0.93 0.83* 0.91 1.35*** 
 (-0.94) (-2.04) (-1.73) (9.52) 
26-30 years old 0.99 0.94 0.92* 1.09*** 
 (-0.11) (-0.94) (-1.99) (3.37) 
31-40 years old 1.07 1.09 1.02 1.06** 
 (1.55) (1.48) (0.57) (2.71) 
51-60 years old 0.94 1.00 0.83*** 0.91*** 
 (-1.19) (-0.01) (-4.86) (-4.04) 
60+ years of age 0.98 0.72** 0.80*** 0.69*** 
 (-0.30) (-2.66) (-3.49) (-7.96) 
School size (100s)                                 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.98*** 
                                                   (-11.28) (-6.21) (-15.04) (-11.12) 
City                                               1.16** 0.75*** 1.13* 0.92*** 
                                                   (2.66) (-3.62) (2.37) (-3.34) 
Rural                                              1.10 1.10 1.17*** 1.04 
	 181 
                                                   (1.69) (1.36) (3.37) (1.49) 
Town                                               0.99 1.02 1.05 1.05 
                                                   (-0.11) (0.28) (0.81) (1.68) 
Middle school 1.86*** 2.43*** 1.14*** 1.11*** 
 (14.33) (16.48) (4.54) (5.91) 
High school 3.81*** 4.49*** 1.14*** 1.09*** 
 (34.01) (28.74) (4.97) (5.45) 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00 1.00 1.00* 1.00** 
                                                   (1.95) (-0.07) (-2.54) (-3.24) 
% Black students                                   1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.01*** 
                                                   (4.88) (8.12) (4.80) (13.57) 
% Hispanic students                                1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.00*** 
                                                   (3.46) (3.52) (1.79) (4.36) 
% Other race students 1.00* 1.01* 1.00 1.00 
 (2.09) (2.42) (1.48) (1.67) 
Violent acts rate                                  1.00 1.00 1.00** 1.00** 
                                                   (-1.47) (-0.35) (-2.79) (3.25) 
Suspension rate                                    1.00** 1.00* 1.00** 1.00 
                                                   (-2.59) (-2.05) (2.83) (1.41) 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             2.37*** 4.63*** 1.42** 2.07*** 
                                                   (5.39) (7.89) (2.96) (10.49) 
Overall performance composite                      1.00 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
                                                   (0.56) (-3.84) (-4.45) (-9.28) 
Per pupil expenditures                             1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00*** 
                                                   (0.22) (-0.21) (-0.61) (-3.34) 
Teacher salary supplement                         1.09*** 1.01 1.10*** 0.98*** 
                                                   (7.43) (0.78) (7.71) (-4.44) 
Facilities and Resources (std)                     0.91*** 0.98 0.95** 1.04*** 
                                                   (-4.19) (-0.81) (-3.19) (3.73) 
Distributed leadership (std)                       0.91*** 1.00 0.96* 0.96** 
                                                   (-3.75) (-0.09) (-2.01) (-3.07) 
Principal leadership (std)                         1.01 0.95 0.89*** 0.92*** 
                                                   (0.58) (-1.60) (-6.74) (-6.75) 
Professional development (std)                     1.10*** 0.98 1.10*** 0.97* 
                                                   (3.78) (-0.51) (5.31) (-2.55) 
Constant 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.12*** 
 (-26.91) (-21.45) (-28.49) (-22.01) 
Observations 445641 445641 445641 445641 
Deviance 54204.75 33965.56 77641.66 189488.87 
Notes. Estimates reported as odds ratios. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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Table A11. Linear Probability Model Estimates of Within-year Teacher Turnover  
                                                   Within-year turnover Within-year mover Within-year leaver 
0-2 years experience 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (10.01) (10.40) (4.27) (4.31) (12.01) (12.71) 
3-5 years experience 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (13.45) (12.46) (2.30) (2.08) (12.92) (11.99) 
11-20 years experience -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 (-14.01) (-13.68) (-7.88) (-7.08) (-12.30) (-12.11) 
20+ years experience -0.010*** -0.005 -0.007*** -0.004** -0.005* -0.001 
 (-3.69) (-1.78) (-4.81) (-3.23) (-2.04) (-0.39) 
Female                                             0.006*** 0.003* 0.001 -0.000 0.007*** 0.003*** 
                                                   (5.98) (2.22) (1.17) (-0.47) (7.37) (3.62) 
Black                                              -0.002 -0.004* 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
                                                   (-0.92) (-2.34) (4.74) (3.90) (-6.46) (-8.67) 
Hispanic                                           0.003 0.008* 0.002 0.005* 0.001 0.004 
                                                   (0.95) (2.24) (1.18) (2.40) (0.39) (1.32) 
Other race                                         -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
                                                   (-0.14) (0.29) (0.44) (0.45) (-0.66) (-0.17) 
Alternate entry                                    -0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.003*** -0.006*** -0.001 
                                                   (-3.85) (1.10) (0.32) (3.46) (-5.71) (-1.13) 
Teacher For America                                  -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.042*** 0.009 0.003 
                                                   (-3.41) (-4.28) (-6.09) (-5.92) (1.88) (0.67) 
Out-of-state prepared                              0.008*** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.001 0.009*** 0.009*** 
                                                   (5.69) (5.61) (-0.56) (-1.18) (8.26) (7.92) 
Other                                              -0.001 0.003 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.003** 0.006*** 
                                                   (-0.31) (1.62) (-4.29) (-3.44) (2.66) (4.83) 
< 26 years old -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.007** -0.006** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (-9.37) (-8.66) (-3.26) (-2.98) (-11.22) (-10.57) 
26-30 years old -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.22) (-0.64) (-1.92) (-1.48) (-0.71) (-0.12) 
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31-40 years old 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (5.74) (6.89) (2.84) (3.19) (5.15) (5.67) 
51-60 years old 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.000 0.001 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (11.22) (13.60) (0.33) (1.04) (13.25) (15.14) 
60+ years of age 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.005 0.006* 0.093*** 0.098*** 
 (13.36) (14.13) (1.80) (2.61) (15.10) (15.73) 
School size (100s)                                 -0.004***  -0.002***  -0.003***  
                                                   (-16.06)  (-8.52)  (-20.30)  
City                                               -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  
                                                   (-1.41)  (-0.96)  (-1.55)  
Rural                                              -0.006*  -0.003  -0.004**  
                                                   (-2.02)  (-1.00)  (-2.79)  
Town                                               -0.008  -0.003  -0.005*  
                                                   (-1.97)  (-0.98)  (-2.49)  
Middle school 0.044***  0.019***  0.030***  
 (15.72)  (11.62)  (14.58)  
High school 0.089***  0.037***  0.061***  
 (19.67)  (13.99)  (16.65)  
% economically disadvantaged                       0.000  0.000  0.000*  
                                                   (1.56)  (0.35)  (2.60)  
% Black students                                   -0.000  0.000  -0.000*  
                                                   (-0.35)  (0.93)  (-2.20)  
% Hispanic students                                -0.000  0.000  -0.000  
                                                   (-1.32)  (0.27)  (-1.85)  
% Other race students 0.000  -0.000  0.000  
 (0.55)  (-0.14)  (1.13)  
Violent acts rate                                  -0.000***  -0.000*  -0.000***  
                                                   (-4.11)  (-2.38)  (-4.26)  
Suspension rate                                    -0.000***  -0.000*  -0.000**  
                                                   (-3.50)  (-2.21)  (-3.33)  
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Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             0.056***  0.026***  0.036***  
                                                   (8.27)  (6.38)  (6.42)  
Overall performance composite                      -0.000***  -0.000*  -0.000***  
                                                   (-4.04)  (-2.37)  (-5.53)  
Per pupil expenditures                             -0.000**  -0.000  -0.000**  
                                                   (-3.31)  (-0.49)  (-3.11)  
Teacher salary supplement                         0.001**  0.002**  -0.001  
                                                   (2.94)  (2.87)  (-1.44)  
Facilities and Resources (std)                     -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
                                                   (-1.52)  (-1.75)  (-0.97)  
Distributed leadership (std)                       -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  
                                                   (-0.89)  (-0.55)  (-0.72)  
Principal leadership (std)                         -0.004***  -0.001*  -0.003***  
                                                   (-4.81)  (-2.58)  (-4.75)  
Professional development (std)                     0.003**  0.001  0.002**  
                                                   (2.93)  (1.51)  (2.62)  
Constant                                           0.043** 0.032*** 0.028** 0.026*** 0.019** 0.007*** 
                                                   (3.13) (13.43) (2.75) (12.93) (2.67) (5.65) 
District fixed effect x   x   x   
School fixed effect   x   x   x 
Observations                                       378882 378882 363814 363814 367819 367819 
Notes. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table A12. Linear Probability Model Estimates of End-of-Year Teacher Turnover  
                                                   End-of-year turnover End-of-year mover End-of-year leaver 
0-2 years experience 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 
 (22.75) (21.41) (10.25) (10.00) (17.01) (15.92) 
3-5 years experience 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (13.00) (12.22) (6.93) (6.78) (11.37) (10.82) 
11-20 years experience -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (-19.84) (-19.19) (-12.27) (-11.38) (-16.46) (-16.67) 
20+ years experience -0.004 -0.001 -0.024*** -0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (-0.83) (-0.23) (-11.27) (-9.32) (4.84) (5.03) 
Female                                             0.004* 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.007*** 0.006*** 
                                                   (2.23) (1.33) (-0.82) (-1.92) (4.35) (3.74) 
Black                                              -0.000 -0.003 0.006** 0.003 -0.007* -0.008** 
                                                   (-0.02) (-1.05) (3.09) (1.41) (-2.45) (-2.84) 
Hispanic                                           0.023*** 0.024*** 0.012* 0.013* 0.016** 0.016** 
                                                   (3.92) (3.93) (2.32) (2.59) (3.19) (3.33) 
Other race                                         0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.009 0.010* 
                                                   (0.52) (0.74) (-0.72) (-0.96) (1.70) (2.26) 
Alternate entry                                    0.019*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
                                                   (9.78) (11.13) (5.62) (6.65) (4.69) (5.30) 
Teacher For America                                  0.157*** 0.139*** -0.037*** -0.051*** 0.241*** 0.226*** 
                                                   (25.45) (16.97) (-5.26) (-6.16) (39.47) (33.19) 
Out-of-state prepared                              0.029*** 0.028*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
                                                   (9.79) (9.69) (3.23) (3.20) (7.98) (7.96) 
Other                                              0.019*** 0.019*** -0.004 -0.004 0.026*** 0.025*** 
                                                   (5.96) (6.35) (-1.89) (-1.69) (8.33) (8.63) 
< 26 years old 0.021** 0.022** 0.017** 0.017** 0.005 0.006 
 (3.22) (3.26) (3.02) (3.03) (1.56) (1.75) 
26-30 years old 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.006* 0.008** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (6.79) (7.30) (2.26) (2.83) (8.90) (9.27) 
31-40 years old 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (9.01) (9.65) (3.85) (4.11) (11.29) (11.66) 
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51-60 years old 0.034*** 0.035*** -0.006*** -0.005** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
 (8.93) (9.15) (-3.62) (-3.26) (13.61) (13.57) 
60+ years of age 0.179*** 0.181*** -0.004 -0.003 0.207*** 0.209*** 
 (30.70) (30.62) (-1.45) (-1.05) (37.84) (37.70) 
School size (100s)                                 -0.004***  -0.003***  -0.001***  
                                                   (-8.17)  (-9.35)  (-5.10)  
City                                               -0.007  -0.006  -0.003  
                                                   (-1.86)  (-1.56)  (-1.23)  
Rural                                              -0.009*  -0.006  -0.003  
                                                   (-2.40)  (-1.77)  (-1.54)  
Town                                               -0.014*  -0.009  -0.007*  
                                                   (-2.28)  (-1.71)  (-2.17)  
Middle school 0.014***  0.011***  0.005**  
 (5.19)  (4.49)  (3.19)  
High school 0.020***  0.016***  0.009***  
 (7.30)  (7.42)  (4.63)  
% economically disadvantaged                       -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
                                                   (-0.97)  (-0.99)  (-0.95)  
% Black students                                   0.001***  0.001***  0.000*  
                                                   (5.23)  (5.95)  (2.49)  
% Hispanic students                                0.000  0.000  -0.000  
                                                   (0.31)  (0.49)  (-0.12)  
% Other race students -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
 (-0.66)  (-0.45)  (-1.12)  
Violent acts rate                                  0.000  0.000  0.000  
                                                   (0.39)  (0.14)  (0.61)  
Suspension rate                                    0.000*  0.000*  0.000  
                                                   (2.19)  (2.04)  (1.86)  
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             0.103***  0.081***  0.045***  
                                                   (10.51)  (7.90)  (5.91)  
Overall performance composite                      -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.000  
                                                   (-3.69)  (-4.66)  (-1.36)  
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Per pupil expenditures                             -0.000**  -0.000  -0.000*  
                                                   (-2.94)  (-1.88)  (-2.17)  
Teacher salary supplement                         -0.003  -0.004*  0.000  
                                                   (-1.76)  (-2.13)  (1.12)  
Facilities and Resources (std)                     -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  
                                                   (-0.56)  (-0.71)  (-0.06)  
Distributed leadership (std)                       -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  
                                                   (-1.92)  (-1.59)  (-1.34)  
Principal leadership (std)                         -0.011***  -0.009***  -0.003***  
                                                   (-7.20)  (-6.68)  (-4.19)  
Professional development (std)                     0.002  0.002  0.000  
                                                   (1.26)  (1.24)  (0.33)  
Constant                                           0.141*** 0.081*** 0.144*** 0.075*** 0.012 0.007 
                                                   (6.11) (15.86) (7.03) (23.93) (1.15) (1.76) 
District fixed effect x   x   x   
School fixed effect   x   x   x 
Observations                                       425158 425158 391150 391150 386759 386759 
Notes. Estimates include wave fixed effects. t-statistics reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1. Out-of-sample predictions of moving schools, 2009-2010 cohort 
  
  
 
Notes. Predictions from Royston-Parmar model based on column 4 of Table 4. Kaplan-Meier 
survival curve from the 2009-2010 cohort. Each school year is coded as having 10 months. TC = 
In-state, traditional preparation; AE = Alternate entry; TFA = Teacher For America; OS = Out-
of-state prepared.  
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Figure A2. Out-of-sample predictions of leaving teaching in North Carolina, 2009-2010 cohort 
  
  
  
Notes. Predictions from Royston-Parmar model based on column 4 of Table 4. Kaplan-Meier 
survival curve from the 2009-2010 cohort. Each school year is coded as having 10 months. TC = 
In-state, traditional preparation; AE = Alternate entry; TFA = Teacher For America; OS = Out-
of-state prepared. 
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Table A1. Covariates used in Regression Analysis 
 
Teacher Characteristics School Characteristics School Working 
Conditions 
Entry Portal School size (100s) Distributed leadership  
(! = 	0.86 − 0.88)  
In-state, traditional 
 
School size School leadership  
(! = 0.87 − 0.93	) 
Alternate entry 
 
School level Facilities and resources  
(! = 	0.84 − 0.85) 
Teacher For America 
 
Middle school Professional development 
(! = 	0.79 − 0.86) 
Out-of-state prepared 
 
High school  
Other (Visiting International 
Faculty; Unclassifiable) 
Urbanicity  
Female Suburb  
Race/Ethnicity Rural  
White Town  
Black % Black students  
Hispanic % Hispanic students  
Other race (Asian 
American Indian 
Multiracial 
% Other race/ethnicity  
Age Violent acts rate  
 Short-term suspension rate  
 % teachers with 3 years of 
experience or less 
 
 Overall performance 
composite 
 
 Total per-pupil expenditures 
($1000s) 
 
 Teacher salary supplement 
($1000s) 
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Table A2. School Working Conditions Measures 
Scale Survey Items 
Facilities and Resources Teachers have sufficient access to appropriate instructional materials. 
 Teachers have sufficient access to instructional technology, including 
computers, printers, software and internet access. 
 
 Teachers have access to reliable communication technology, including 
phones, faxes and email. 
 
 Teachers have sufficient access to office equipment and supplies such as 
copy machines, paper, pens, etc. 
 
 The reliability and speed of Internet connections in this school are 
sufficient to support instructional practices. 
 
 Teachers have adequate space to work productively. 
 The school environment is clean and well maintained. 
Distributed Leadership Selecting instructional materials and resources 
 Devising teaching techniques 
 Setting grading and student assessment practices 
 Determining the content of in-service professional development programs 
 The selection of teachers new to this school 
 Establishing student discipline procedures 
 Providing input on how the school budget will be spent 
 School improvement planning 
School Leadership There is an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect in this school.  
 School administrators consistently enforce rules for student conduct. 
 School administrators support teachers' efforts to maintain discipline in 
the classroom. 
 The school leadership consistently supports teachers. 
 The procedures for teacher evaluation are consistent. 
 The faculty and staff have a shared vision. 
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 Teachers receive feedback that can help them improve teaching. 
Professional Development Sufficient resources are available for professional development in my 
school. 
 An appropriate amount of time is provided for professional development. 
 Teachers have sufficient training to fully utilize instructional technology. 
 Professional development provides ongoing opportunities for teachers to 
work with colleagues to refine teaching practices. 
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Table A3. Conditional Means for Teacher Entry Pathways 
  
In-state, 
traditional 
preparation 
Alternate 
entry 
Teacher For 
America 
Out-of-state 
prepared 
Other entry 
pathway 
Stayer 0.43 0.32 0.10 0.33 0.34 
Within-year mover 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.09 
Within-year leaver 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.15 
End-of-year mover 0.31 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.22 
End-of-year leaver 0.13 0.27 0.65 0.27 0.19 
Female 0.82 0.64 0.78 0.78 0.74 
White teacher 0.85 0.63 0.79 0.87 0.63 
Black 0.10 0.28 0.13 0.06 0.16 
Hispanic 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.10 
Other race 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.11 
Age 26.18 30.61 23.11 28.69 33.72 
Suburb 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.13 
City 0.31 0.33 0.57 0.42 0.39 
Rural 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.35 0.40 
Town 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.08 
School size (100s) 7.28 8.82 7.32 7.78 7.57 
Overall performance composite 74.15 70.63 62.60 73.21 73.66 
% economically disadvantaged 60.00 60.95 76.72 58.67 58.75 
% Black students 29.59 39.57 68.01 33.32 33.94 
% Hispanic students 14.18 12.47 15.62 14.65 14.72 
% Other race 7.62 8.27 6.05 8.43 7.57 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or 
less 0.23 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.24 
Suspension rate 19.61 41.33 53.60 22.73 25.54 
Violent acts rate 8.53 15.09 15.86 9.52 10.43 
Per pupil expenditures 85.98 85.27 89.45 82.88 83.62 
Teacher salary supplement 31.07 29.81 28.32 34.91 31.92 
Elementary School 0.57 0.16 0.28 0.53 0.48 
Middle School 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.22 
High School 0.45 0.67 0.48 0.45 0.56 
Facilities and Resources (std) -0.06 -0.39 -0.93 -0.18 -0.17 
Distributed leadership (std) -0.13 -0.37 -0.85 -0.24 -0.28 
Principal leadership (std) -0.17 -0.47 -0.90 -0.34 -0.32 
Professional development (std) -0.03 -0.22 -0.39 -0.12 -0.10 
Observations 8245 1440 502 2986 493 
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Table A4. Cox Survival Analysis of Turnover, Moving Schools, and Leaving Teaching in 
North Carolina 
  Turnover Moving Leaving 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Alternate entry                                    1.23*** 1.12** 0.85** 0.79*** 2.03*** 1.78*** 
Teacher For America                                  1.89*** 1.45*** 0.50*** 0.40*** 5.50*** 4.01*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.31*** 1.28*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 2.18*** 2.11*** 
Other                                              1.29*** 1.24*** 0.92 0.90 1.99*** 1.91*** 
Female                                             0.90*** 0.94* 0.98 1.00 0.85*** 0.90** 
Black                                              1.00 0.89** 1.06 0.93 0.97 0.88** 
Hispanic                                           0.93 0.89 0.82 0.78* 1.08 1.03 
Other race                                         0.93 0.89* 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.86* 
Age                                                1.01*** 1.01*** 1.00 1.00 1.02*** 1.02*** 
City                                                0.94  0.85**  1.09 
Rural                                               0.97  0.92  1.03 
Town                                                0.90*  0.88*  0.99 
School size (100s)                                  0.98***  0.97***  0.98*** 
Overall performance composite                       1.00  1.00  1.00** 
% economically disadvantaged                        1.00*  1.00  1.00 
% Black students                                    1.00***  1.00***  1.00*** 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  1.00  1.00 
% Other race                                        1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less              0.97  0.75  1.27 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00  1.00 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.00  1.00  1.00 
Middle School                                       1.28***  1.26***  1.28*** 
High School                                         1.59***  1.43***  1.76*** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      1.01  1.00  1.00 
Distributed leadership (std)                        0.98  0.97  0.99 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.94***  0.97  0.91*** 
Professional development (std)                      0.98  0.97  1.00 
Observations                                       253267 253267 253683 253173 306954 305822 
Deviance                                           134281.0 133800.8 77548.8 77163.8 70619.2 69780.4 
Notes. Exponentiated coefficients reported. Models stratified by cohort. Robust standard errors (not reported). * 
p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. 
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Table A5. Survival Analysis of Moving Schools Within the Same District or Other District 
  Move Within Same District Move to Other District 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Alternate entry                                    0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.83** 0.74*** 0.87* 0.77*** 
Teacher For America                                  1.01 0.91 1.17 0.99 0.34*** 0.25*** 0.37*** 0.25*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              0.97 0.94 0.99 0.95 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.86** 0.86** 
Other                                              0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 1.07 1.06 1.10 1.06 
Female                                             0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.99 1.03 0.96 1.01 
Black                                              1.20* 1.03 1.18* 1.03 1.04 0.93 1.03 0.93 
Hispanic                                           0.77 0.73 0.81 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.89 0.85 
Other race                                         1.09 1.07 1.14 1.10 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.87 
Age                                                1.02*** 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01* 1.00 1.00 0.99*** 0.99*** 
City                                                1.25  1.19  0.70***  0.64*** 
Rural                                               1.13  1.10  0.83**  0.80*** 
Town                                                0.73*  0.77  0.86  0.87 
School size (100s)                                  0.94***  0.94***  0.98***  0.98*** 
Overall performance composite                       1.00  1.02***  1.00  1.02*** 
% economically disadvantaged                        1.00*  1.01***  1.00**  1.01*** 
% Black students                                    1.00  1.00*  1.00***  1.01*** 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00* 
% Other race                                        1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less              0.30***  0.32***  1.09  1.06 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00***  1.00  1.00 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00* 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.01***  1.01***  1.00**  0.99*** 
Middle School                                       1.14  1.07  1.37***  1.28*** 
High School                                         1.54***  1.34***  1.59***  1.37*** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      0.97  0.94  1.02  0.99 
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Distributed leadership (std)                        0.97  0.96  0.98  0.98 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.96  0.94  0.97  0.93* 
Professional development (std)                      1.02  1.04  0.95  0.97 
Observations                                       246964 246474 290836 290100 257669 257147 268560 267684 
Deviance                                           15533.26 15303.37 11585.1 11295.6 24863.70 24516.65 17588.1 17059.1 
Notes. Coefficients from discrete time hazard model reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered at the teacher level. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; 
*** p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
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Table A6. Survival Analysis of Turnover Across School Type 
  Elementary School Middle School High School 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Alternate entry                                    1.26* 1.22 1.32*** 1.22* 1.10 1.16** 
Teacher For America                                  1.93*** 1.61*** 2.11*** 1.47*** 1.84*** 1.76*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              1.39*** 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.34*** 1.32*** 1.32*** 
Other                                              1.43** 1.45*** 1.43* 1.36 1.56*** 1.54*** 
Female                                             0.89* 0.90 0.98 0.99 1.01 0.96 
Black                                              0.98 0.88* 1.06 0.93 0.97 0.92 
Hispanic                                           0.97 0.96 1.22 1.10 0.85 0.84 
Other race                                         0.85 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.84* 0.84 
Age                                                1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 
City                                                0.89  1.01  0.91 
Rural                                               0.92  1.03  0.90 
Town                                                0.88  0.84  0.87 
School size (100s)                                  1.00  0.98  0.97*** 
Overall performance composite                       1.00  1.00  1.00 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00  1.00  1.00** 
% Black students                                    1.00*  1.01*  1.00 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  1.00  1.00 
% Other race                                        1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             0.86  1.33  0.67* 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00  1.00 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.00  1.00  1.00** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      0.96  0.98  1.07* 
Distributed leadership (std)                        1.02  0.99  0.98 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.93*  0.93  0.90*** 
Professional development (std)                     1.02  0.96  0.96 
Observations                                       130242 130242 52718 52718 107400 107400 
Deviance                                           25201.8 25130.1 10723.8 10664.7 27129 26992.3 
Notes. Coefficients from discrete time hazard model reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered 
at the teacher level. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
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Table A7. Survival Analysis of Moving Schools Across School Type 
  Elementary School Middle School High School 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Alternate entry                                    1.07 1.03 0.85 0.77* 0.79** 0.85* 
Teacher For America                                  0.45*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.27*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              0.87* 0.87* 0.84* 0.83* 0.88* 0.88* 
Other                                              1.04 1.07 1.08 1.03 1.01 1.00 
Female                                             0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.06 0.99 
Black                                              1.12 0.98 1.09 0.94 1.00 0.96 
Hispanic                                           0.89 0.88 1.23 1.10 0.76 0.76 
Other race                                         0.91 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.95 0.98 
Age                                                1.00 1.00 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.01* 
City                                                0.82*  1.06  0.74*** 
Rural                                               0.89  1.07  0.77*** 
Town                                                0.86  0.94  0.78* 
School size (100s)                                  0.98  1.00  0.96*** 
Overall performance composite                       1.00  1.00  1.00 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00  1.00  1.00 
% Black students                                    1.00**  1.01*  1.00 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  1.00  1.00 
% Other race                                        0.99  1.01*  1.00 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             0.68  0.66  0.56* 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00  1.00 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.00  1.00  1.01** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      0.97  0.95  1.06 
Distributed leadership (std)                        1.02  0.95  0.99 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.94  1.01  0.93 
Professional development (std)                     1.01  0.97  0.94 
Observations                                       130450 130242 52758 52718 107684 107400 
Deviance                                           17944.4 17825.8 6942.5 6896.9 17183.8 17033 
Notes. Coefficients from discrete time hazard model reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered 
at the teacher level. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
 
  
	
	
199 
Table A8. Survival Analysis of Leaving Teaching Across School Type 
  Elementary School Middle School High School 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Alternate entry                                    1.72*** 1.68*** 2.25*** 2.17*** 1.60*** 1.62*** 
Teacher For America                                  6.05*** 5.37*** 6.19*** 4.52*** 4.25*** 3.61*** 
Out-of-state prepared                              2.35*** 2.29*** 2.42*** 2.33*** 1.96*** 1.94*** 
Other                                              2.08*** 2.04*** 2.09*** 1.98*** 2.27*** 2.25*** 
Female                                             0.85* 0.86* 1.02 1.01 0.95 0.92 
Black                                              0.81* 0.76** 1.04 0.94 1.00 0.91 
Hispanic                                           1.10 1.09 1.12 1.03 1.01 0.98 
Other race                                         0.81 0.79 0.85 0.83 0.80* 0.76* 
Age                                                1.03*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.02** 1.04*** 1.04*** 
City                                                1.01  0.99  1.19 
Rural                                               0.91  0.95  1.09 
Town                                                0.94  0.77  1.08 
School size (100s)                                  1.01  0.97  0.98** 
Overall performance composite                       1.00  1.00  1.00 
% economically disadvantaged                       1.00  1.00  1.00 
% Black students                                    1.00  1.00  1.00 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  0.99  1.00 
% Other race                                        1.00  0.99*  1.01 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less             1.31  1.79  0.96 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00  1.00* 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00  1.00 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.00  1.00  1.00 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      0.96  1.02  1.06 
Distributed leadership (std)                        1.01  1.05  0.97 
Principal leadership (std)                          0.94  0.84**  0.88*** 
Professional development (std)                     1.04  0.98  1.00 
Observations                                       159055 158684 64586 64520 131402 130652 
Deviance                                           15461 15391 7712.1 7660.8 19479.1 19262.1 
Notes. Coefficients from discrete time hazard model reported as odds ratios. Standard errors clustered 
at the teacher level. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
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Table A9. Survival Analysis of Temporary Exit and Return   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alternate entry                                    0.88 0.90 0.90 0.92 
Teacher For America                                  0.27** 0.43 0.35* 0.48 
Out-of-state prepared                              0.94 1.03 0.93 1.00 
Other                                              1.24 1.12 1.20 1.08 
Female                                             1.46** 1.46** 1.51*** 1.48** 
Black                                              1.00 1.26 1.05 1.22 
Hispanic                                           0.78 0.80 0.95 0.99 
Other race                                         0.68 0.84 0.76 0.89 
Age                                                1.08*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.05*** 
City                                                1.09  1.03 
Rural                                               0.85  0.76 
Town                                                0.69  0.77 
School size (100s)                                  0.97*  0.97* 
Overall performance composite                       0.99  1.00 
% economically disadvantaged                        1.01**  1.01** 
% Black students                                    0.99**  0.99** 
% Hispanic students                                 1.00  1.00 
% Other race                                        0.99  0.99 
Teachers with 3 yrs experience or less              0.21**  0.27** 
Suspension rate                                     1.00  1.00 
Violent acts rate                                   1.00  1.00 
Per pupil expenditures                              1.00  1.00 
Teacher salary supplement                          1.00  1.00 
Middle School                                       1.41*  1.31* 
High School                                         4.85***  3.63*** 
Facilities and Resources (std)                      1.13  1.02 
Distributed leadership (std)                        0.89  0.90 
Principal leadership (std)                          1.25*  1.22* 
Professional development (std)                      0.90  0.92 
Observations                                       306954 305822 302505 301385 
Deviance                                           8264.21 7853.52 5294.41 5039.68 
Notes. Discrete time models (columns 1-2) estimated using logistic regression. Coefficients reported as odds 
ratios. Standard errors clustered at the teacher level. Royston-Parmar models (columns 3-4) estimated with 2 
knots. * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <.001. All models include cohort fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1. Effect of Within-Year Classroom Teacher Turnover on Student Achievement in ELA 
and Math by Month of Turnover 
 
Notes. Estimates from student-by-school fixed effect model (columns 2 and 4 of Table 6). EOY 
= End of Year.  
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Table A1. Covariates used in Regression Analysis 
Student Characteristics School Characteristics 
Prior test scores Student enrollment 
Classmates’ prior test 
scores 
Total per-pupil expenditures 
Gender Teacher salary supplement 
Race/ethnicity Racial/ethnic composition 
Poverty status Concentration of poverty 
Gifted Violent acts per 1,000 students 
Disability 
 
Short-term suspension rate 
Currently limited English 
proficient 
% teachers with 3 years 
experience or less 
Previously limited English 
proficient 
 
Structural mobility  
Within year mobility  
Between year mobility  
Days absent  
Overage for grade  
Underage for grade  
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Table A2. Estimates of the Effect of October-to-October Grade-Level Turnover on Student 
Achievement in ELA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
October-to-October 
grade-level turnover 
-0.011 -0.008 -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Within-year classroom 
teacher turnover 
 -0.054***  -0.051***  -0.034*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
School-by-Grade FE x x     
School-by-Year FE   x x   
School-by-Student FE     x x 
Observations 2275162 2275162 2275162 2275162 2275162 2275162 
R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.00 
Notes. Models include student controls, school controls, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A3. Estimates of the Effect of October-to-October Grade-Level Turnover on Student 
Achievement in Math 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
October-to-October 
grade-level turnover 
-0.021* -0.016 -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.019*** -0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Within-year classroom 
teacher turnover 
 -0.105***  -0.099***  -0.041*** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.004) 
School-by-Year FE x x     
School-by-Grade FE   x x   
School-by-Student FE     x x 
Observations 1815227 1815227 1815227 1815227 1815227 1815227 
R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.00 
Notes. Models include student controls, school controls, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4. Estimates of the Effect of End-of-Year Grade-Level Turnover on Student 
Achievement 
 ELA Math 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
End-of-year grade-level turnover 0.023** 0.010* 0.025* 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
School-by-Year FE x  x  
Student-by-School FE  x  x 
Observations 2231725 2231725 1852715 1852715 
R2 0.65 0.00 0.68 0.00 
Notes. Models include student controls, school controls, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
  
	
	
206 
Table A5. Estimates of the Effect of Within-Year Grade-Level Turnover on Student 
Achievement 
 ELA Math 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Within-year grade-level turnover -0.070*** -0.082*** -0.086** -0.073*** 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.031) (0.013) 
School-by-Year FE x  x  
Student-by-School FE  x  x 
Observations 2235679 2235679 1855419 1855419 
R2 0.65 0.00 0.68 0.00 
Notes. Models include student controls, school controls, and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Estimates of the Effect of Within-Year Classroom Teacher Turnover on Student Achievement 
 
Panel A. Student Achievement in ELA  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.037*** 
(0.004) 
-0.030*** 
(0.004) 
-0.030*** 
(0.004) 
-0.039*** 
(0.006) 
-0.038*** 
(0.004) 
-0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.049*** 
(0.006) 
         
Within-year grade turnover  
 
-0.050*** 
(0.009) 
-0.050*** 
(0.009) 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.049*** 
(0.012) 
         
End-of-year grade turnover  
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.005) 
 
 
         
Within-year classroom teacher turnover 
* Within-year grade turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045 
(0.028) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.080** 
(0.028) 
Student FE 
Student-by-School FE 
x x x 
 
x  
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Observations 2499127 2499127 2495173 2499127 2499127 2499127 2495173 2499127 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel B. Student Achievement in Mathematics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.067*** 
(0.004) 
-0.057*** 
(0.004) 
-0.057*** 
(0.004) 
-0.058*** 
(0.006) 
-0.044*** 
(0.003) 
-0.038*** 
(0.003) 
-0.039*** 
(0.003) 
-0.038*** 
(0.005) 
         
Within-year grade turnover  
 
-0.076*** 
(0.009) 
-0.076*** 
(0.009) 
-0.076*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
-0.055*** 
(0.010) 
-0.054*** 
(0.010) 
-0.055*** 
(0.011) 
         
End-of-year grade turnover  
 
 
 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
         
Within-year classroom teacher turnover 
* Within-year grade turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.025) 
Student FE 
Student-by-School FE 
x x x 
 
x  
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Observations 2053975 2053975 2051271 2053975 2053975 2053975 2051271 2053975 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes. Models include school controls and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Within-year grade turnover is the measure used in Tables 3, not 
adjusting for the teacher who left midyear. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
	
	
208 
Table A7. Sensitivity of within-year teacher turnover estimates to sample size restriction when controlling for teacher value-added 
 ELA Math 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year classroom teacher turnover -0.216* -0.218* 0.001 0.000 -0.118 -0.123 0.000 0.000 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.001) (0.000) (0.091) (0.092) (0.000) (.) 
Teacher value-added x  x  x  x  
Student FE x x   x x   
Student-by-School FE   x x   x x 
Observations 386713 386713 386713 386713 324927 324927 324927 324927 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.12 
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Table A8. Balance Test for Select Student and School Characteristics Between Full Sample and 
Value-Added Sample 
  Full Sample VAM Sample 
ELA test (std) 0.00 0.06*** 
Math test (std) 0.02 0.09*** 
Days absent 5.91 6.24*** 
Between-year mobility 0.10 0.10 
Within-year mobility 0.05 0.04*** 
Underage for grade 0.01 0.01** 
Overage for grade 0.20 0.19*** 
Gifted status 0.16 0.20*** 
Disability status 0.13 0.11*** 
Free lunch 0.46 0.46 
Reduced lunch 0.08 0.07*** 
Black student 0.25 0.24*** 
Hispanic student 0.13 0.13 
Multiracial student 0.04 0.04 
American Indian student 0.01 0.01*** 
Male student 0.50 0.50*** 
Currently LEP 0.07 0.06*** 
Formerly LEP 0.05 0.06*** 
School size (100s) 5.81 5.81 
Suspension rate 6.87 6.24*** 
Violent acts rate 2.43 2.45 
% Black students 24.81 23.21*** 
% Hispanic students 14.36 14.48 
% Asian students 2.65 2.73 
% multiracial students 4.15 4.19 
% American Indian students 1.48 0.97*** 
Teacher salary supplement 32.64 31.96** 
Per pupil expenditures 85.24 86.48*** 
City 0.30 0.30 
Rural 0.46 0.46 
Town 0.10 0.10 
Observations 2495903 386068 
Notes. t-test to test for significant differences adjusts for school-
level clustering. 
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Table A9. Estimates of the Effect of Moving Schools and Leaving Teaching Within the School Year 
 ELA Mathematics ELA Mathematics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Within-year moving -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.074*** -0.050***     
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)     
         
Within-year leaving     -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.063*** -0.042*** 
     (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Student FE 
Student-by-School FE 
x  
x 
x  
x 
x  
x 
x  
x 
Observations 2499127 2499127 2053975 2053975 2499127 2499127 2053975 2053975 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes. Models include school controls and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
